The total amount of global suffering is cut in half. However, nothing else about the algorithm changes, and nobody’s behavior changes.
This probably doesn’t apply to Pearce’s qualia realist view, but it’s possible to have a functionalist notion of suffering where eliminating suffering would change people’s behavior.
For instance, I think of suffering as an experienced need to change something about one’s current experience, something that by definition carries urgency to bring about change. If you get rid of that, it has behavioral consequences. If a person experiences pain asymbolia where they don’t consider their “pain” bothersome in any way, I would no longer call it suffering.
This probably doesn’t apply to Pearce’s qualia realist view, but it’s possible to have a functionalist notion of suffering where eliminating suffering would change people’s behavior.
For instance, I think of suffering as an experienced need to change something about one’s current experience, something that by definition carries urgency to bring about change. If you get rid of that, it has behavioral consequences. If a person experiences pain asymbolia where they don’t consider their “pain” bothersome in any way, I would no longer call it suffering.