One thing I didn’t consider in my revised answer is that I didn’t actually do the math. Taking an existential event as literally causing the end of earth-originating life, the question is whether the difference in probability multiplied by the immediate mass extinction itself would represent more death and suffering than the avertible death and suffering occurring over a 100-year period. I just don’t know. It seems unlikely that the avertible death and suffering amounts to as much as the amount caused by the mass-extinction event itself, but after multiplying by the difference in probability and acknowledging the ambiguity of the timeline proposed in this question, things become less clear. However, let’s say that the probability-adjusted, undetermined-timing mass-extinction event does cause more suffering and death and I change my answer to 50% agree. I don’t think this is what most people would interpret 50% agree to express.
I should also be clear that I’m taking the question to mean literally ending earth-originating life in more-or-less one, fell swoop. Obviously, traditional x-risks actually have a spectrum of severity, so this is not so straightforward to apply to real-world resource allocation.
If I had to be more specific I would mean “reducing the probability of all humanity (and only humanity) dying in a few short days/weeks from 50% to 10%” by “significantly reduce existential risk”.
Also, I disagree with your methods. X risks aren’t especially bad because of all the utility lost (and “negative utility” created), they’re bad because after they happen there’s never any utility again. Unless apes re-evolve into humans and reestablish all of civilization all over again, but we’re getting too hypothetical. What’s 100, or even 1000 years of death and suffering compared to 10000 of utopia? If stalling/slowing down technological progress for 1000 years made the P(Doom) go from 50% to 1%, I would definitely take it. Unless of course you think utopia is gonna be some short lived thing, but I seriously doubt that.
You are rightly grasping that we disagree, but I don’t think you are understanding my view (and to be clear, reasonable people can disagree about this).
My wife and I are debating whether we will have more children or not. Having another child is desirable to us. So much so that she’s willing to undergo the relatively risky process of child birth to have another one. However, failing to have another child is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children, IMO. I’d even say that, failing to have 100 more children is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children. The reason why is that the child who never existed is not sentient and so does not experience any deprivation. They do not suffer. And my suffering of that abstract loss is not nearly as bad as would be the suffering I would experience losing a living child who I know.
Now you may disagree with that, and mourn all the lost utility, and that is a reasonable perspective, but its not mine, and as you can see, this is a deeper philosophical difference and not some sort of misunderstanding about expected utility or something like that.
FYI, about this sentence: “X risks aren’t especially bad because of all the utility lost … they’re bad because after they happen there’s never any utility again.” I don’t really see a difference between these two statements.
I agree with Craig here. I’ve written about problems with most conceptions of utility people use and describe alternatives that I think better match what Craig is saying in this sequence.
One thing I didn’t consider in my revised answer is that I didn’t actually do the math. Taking an existential event as literally causing the end of earth-originating life, the question is whether the difference in probability multiplied by the immediate mass extinction itself would represent more death and suffering than the avertible death and suffering occurring over a 100-year period. I just don’t know. It seems unlikely that the avertible death and suffering amounts to as much as the amount caused by the mass-extinction event itself, but after multiplying by the difference in probability and acknowledging the ambiguity of the timeline proposed in this question, things become less clear. However, let’s say that the probability-adjusted, undetermined-timing mass-extinction event does cause more suffering and death and I change my answer to 50% agree. I don’t think this is what most people would interpret 50% agree to express.
I should also be clear that I’m taking the question to mean literally ending earth-originating life in more-or-less one, fell swoop. Obviously, traditional x-risks actually have a spectrum of severity, so this is not so straightforward to apply to real-world resource allocation.
If I had to be more specific I would mean “reducing the probability of all humanity (and only humanity) dying in a few short days/weeks from 50% to 10%” by “significantly reduce existential risk”.
Also, I disagree with your methods. X risks aren’t especially bad because of all the utility lost (and “negative utility” created), they’re bad because after they happen there’s never any utility again. Unless apes re-evolve into humans and reestablish all of civilization all over again, but we’re getting too hypothetical. What’s 100, or even 1000 years of death and suffering compared to 10000 of utopia? If stalling/slowing down technological progress for 1000 years made the P(Doom) go from 50% to 1%, I would definitely take it. Unless of course you think utopia is gonna be some short lived thing, but I seriously doubt that.
You are rightly grasping that we disagree, but I don’t think you are understanding my view (and to be clear, reasonable people can disagree about this).
My wife and I are debating whether we will have more children or not. Having another child is desirable to us. So much so that she’s willing to undergo the relatively risky process of child birth to have another one. However, failing to have another child is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children, IMO. I’d even say that, failing to have 100 more children is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children. The reason why is that the child who never existed is not sentient and so does not experience any deprivation. They do not suffer. And my suffering of that abstract loss is not nearly as bad as would be the suffering I would experience losing a living child who I know.
Now you may disagree with that, and mourn all the lost utility, and that is a reasonable perspective, but its not mine, and as you can see, this is a deeper philosophical difference and not some sort of misunderstanding about expected utility or something like that.
FYI, about this sentence: “X risks aren’t especially bad because of all the utility lost … they’re bad because after they happen there’s never any utility again.” I don’t really see a difference between these two statements.
I agree with Craig here. I’ve written about problems with most conceptions of utility people use and describe alternatives that I think better match what Craig is saying in this sequence.