Initially I just calculated a naive expected value function and put 100% agree, but then I realized that I donât value realizing potential lives nearly as much as I value improving existing ones. While I do value realizing potential lives, the loss of them is not experienced by anyone other than present-day people like myself who think about them abstractly, which seems to me in sum to be less bad than the suffering otherwise avertible due to technological progress in the next 100 years. But I obviously havenât thought about this enough or I wouldnât have made my initial mistake.
One thing I didnât consider in my revised answer is that I didnât actually do the math. Taking an existential event as literally causing the end of earth-originating life, the question is whether the difference in probability multiplied by the immediate mass extinction itself would represent more death and suffering than the avertible death and suffering occurring over a 100-year period. I just donât know. It seems unlikely that the avertible death and suffering amounts to as much as the amount caused by the mass-extinction event itself, but after multiplying by the difference in probability and acknowledging the ambiguity of the timeline proposed in this question, things become less clear. However, letâs say that the probability-adjusted, undetermined-timing mass-extinction event does cause more suffering and death and I change my answer to 50% agree. I donât think this is what most people would interpret 50% agree to express.
I should also be clear that Iâm taking the question to mean literally ending earth-originating life in more-or-less one, fell swoop. Obviously, traditional x-risks actually have a spectrum of severity, so this is not so straightforward to apply to real-world resource allocation.
If I had to be more specific I would mean âreducing the probability of all humanity (and only humanity) dying in a few short days/âweeks from 50% to 10%â by âsignificantly reduce existential riskâ.
Also, I disagree with your methods. X risks arenât especially bad because of all the utility lost (and ânegative utilityâ created), theyâre bad because after they happen thereâs never any utility again. Unless apes re-evolve into humans and reestablish all of civilization all over again, but weâre getting too hypothetical. Whatâs 100, or even 1000 years of death and suffering compared to 10000 of utopia? If stalling/âslowing down technological progress for 1000 years made the P(Doom) go from 50% to 1%, I would definitely take it. Unless of course you think utopia is gonna be some short lived thing, but I seriously doubt that.
You are rightly grasping that we disagree, but I donât think you are understanding my view (and to be clear, reasonable people can disagree about this).
My wife and I are debating whether we will have more children or not. Having another child is desirable to us. So much so that sheâs willing to undergo the relatively risky process of child birth to have another one. However, failing to have another child is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children, IMO. Iâd even say that, failing to have 100 more children is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children. The reason why is that the child who never existed is not sentient and so does not experience any deprivation. They do not suffer. And my suffering of that abstract loss is not nearly as bad as would be the suffering I would experience losing a living child who I know.
Now you may disagree with that, and mourn all the lost utility, and that is a reasonable perspective, but its not mine, and as you can see, this is a deeper philosophical difference and not some sort of misunderstanding about expected utility or something like that.
FYI, about this sentence: âX risks arenât especially bad because of all the utility lost ⌠theyâre bad because after they happen thereâs never any utility again.â I donât really see a difference between these two statements.
I agree with Craig here. Iâve written about problems with most conceptions of utility people use and describe alternatives that I think better match what Craig is saying in this sequence.
Initially I just calculated a naive expected value function and put 100% agree, but then I realized that I donât value realizing potential lives nearly as much as I value improving existing ones. While I do value realizing potential lives, the loss of them is not experienced by anyone other than present-day people like myself who think about them abstractly, which seems to me in sum to be less bad than the suffering otherwise avertible due to technological progress in the next 100 years. But I obviously havenât thought about this enough or I wouldnât have made my initial mistake.
One thing I didnât consider in my revised answer is that I didnât actually do the math. Taking an existential event as literally causing the end of earth-originating life, the question is whether the difference in probability multiplied by the immediate mass extinction itself would represent more death and suffering than the avertible death and suffering occurring over a 100-year period. I just donât know. It seems unlikely that the avertible death and suffering amounts to as much as the amount caused by the mass-extinction event itself, but after multiplying by the difference in probability and acknowledging the ambiguity of the timeline proposed in this question, things become less clear. However, letâs say that the probability-adjusted, undetermined-timing mass-extinction event does cause more suffering and death and I change my answer to 50% agree. I donât think this is what most people would interpret 50% agree to express.
I should also be clear that Iâm taking the question to mean literally ending earth-originating life in more-or-less one, fell swoop. Obviously, traditional x-risks actually have a spectrum of severity, so this is not so straightforward to apply to real-world resource allocation.
If I had to be more specific I would mean âreducing the probability of all humanity (and only humanity) dying in a few short days/âweeks from 50% to 10%â by âsignificantly reduce existential riskâ.
Also, I disagree with your methods. X risks arenât especially bad because of all the utility lost (and ânegative utilityâ created), theyâre bad because after they happen thereâs never any utility again. Unless apes re-evolve into humans and reestablish all of civilization all over again, but weâre getting too hypothetical. Whatâs 100, or even 1000 years of death and suffering compared to 10000 of utopia? If stalling/âslowing down technological progress for 1000 years made the P(Doom) go from 50% to 1%, I would definitely take it. Unless of course you think utopia is gonna be some short lived thing, but I seriously doubt that.
You are rightly grasping that we disagree, but I donât think you are understanding my view (and to be clear, reasonable people can disagree about this).
My wife and I are debating whether we will have more children or not. Having another child is desirable to us. So much so that sheâs willing to undergo the relatively risky process of child birth to have another one. However, failing to have another child is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children, IMO. Iâd even say that, failing to have 100 more children is significantly less bad than losing one of our existing children. The reason why is that the child who never existed is not sentient and so does not experience any deprivation. They do not suffer. And my suffering of that abstract loss is not nearly as bad as would be the suffering I would experience losing a living child who I know.
Now you may disagree with that, and mourn all the lost utility, and that is a reasonable perspective, but its not mine, and as you can see, this is a deeper philosophical difference and not some sort of misunderstanding about expected utility or something like that.
FYI, about this sentence: âX risks arenât especially bad because of all the utility lost ⌠theyâre bad because after they happen thereâs never any utility again.â I donât really see a difference between these two statements.
I agree with Craig here. Iâve written about problems with most conceptions of utility people use and describe alternatives that I think better match what Craig is saying in this sequence.