Ah, re-reading endnote 5 from your prior post, I see more clearly that you mean āmetaethical fanaticismā as just a quite strong stance that favours moral realism absolutely, which also makes this postās argument clearer. You also give a description that indicates the same thing here: āI coined the term metaethical fanaticism to refer to the stance of locking in the pursuit of irreducible normativity as a life goal.ā
Maybe including a similar endnote here, or even in the main text, wouldāve helped me. Iād read it in the last post, but then this post gave me the impression that it was arguing against even āweaker wagersā, which favour moral realism by some large rather than infinite amount. For example, the sentences preceding āI coined the term...ā are:
Instead, I wrote this dialogue to call into question that even if things increasingly started to look as though irreducible normativity were false, we should still act as though it applies. In my previous post ā#4: Why the Moral Realism Wager Fails,ā I voiced skepticism about a general wager in favor of pursuing irreducible normativity. Still, I conceded that such a wager could apply in the case of certain individuals.
That last sentence being just before the description of āmetaethical fanaticismā seems to suggest that all individuals for whom such a wager applies are metaethical fanatics. I think Iām one such individual, and that my version of āfanaticismā is more moderate.
Also, the first sentence there at least sounds to me like it could mean āeven if things came to look more like irreducible normativity were false than they currently doā, rather than āhowever much things started to look like as though irreducible normativity were falseā (i.e., even if we became arbitrarily certain of that).
(Again, this may be nit-picking driven by motivated reasoning or defensiveness or something.)
Ah, re-reading endnote 5 from your prior post, I see more clearly that you mean āmetaethical fanaticismā as just a quite strong stance that favours moral realism absolutely, which also makes this postās argument clearer. You also give a description that indicates the same thing here: āI coined the term metaethical fanaticism to refer to the stance of locking in the pursuit of irreducible normativity as a life goal.ā
Maybe including a similar endnote here, or even in the main text, wouldāve helped me. Iād read it in the last post, but then this post gave me the impression that it was arguing against even āweaker wagersā, which favour moral realism by some large rather than infinite amount. For example, the sentences preceding āI coined the term...ā are:
That last sentence being just before the description of āmetaethical fanaticismā seems to suggest that all individuals for whom such a wager applies are metaethical fanatics. I think Iām one such individual, and that my version of āfanaticismā is more moderate.
Also, the first sentence there at least sounds to me like it could mean āeven if things came to look more like irreducible normativity were false than they currently doā, rather than āhowever much things started to look like as though irreducible normativity were falseā (i.e., even if we became arbitrarily certain of that).
(Again, this may be nit-picking driven by motivated reasoning or defensiveness or something.)