Are there any axioms of rationality he thinks are probably normatively correct/required? Are they consistent all together? What implications would they have for ethics (taken together, or at least consistent subsets of these axioms)?
satisfy axioms over all possible (including choice-dependent) sequences of lotteries and choices, and not just separately for each individual choice?
satisfy any axiom over possibilities that are unrealistic, e.g. avoiding sequential dominance/Dutch books/money pumps based on the manipulation of your subjective probability of P vs NP or your subjective probability of consciousness for typical adult fruit flies?
How should we deal with the possibility that the universe is infinite and our impact could be infinite?
Are there any axioms of rationality he thinks are probably normatively correct/required? Are they consistent all together? What implications would they have for ethics (taken together, or at least consistent subsets of these axioms)?
Some more specific questions:
Are we normatively required to:
have utility functions?
have bounded utility functions?
satisfy the vNM independence axiom?
satisfy the option-set independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom?
satisfy the continuity/Archimedean axiom?
have transitive preferences?
have complete preferences?
satisfy the sure-thing principle?
satisfy a stochastic dominance axiom?
satisfy some sequential dominance axiom?
satisfy axioms over all possible (including choice-dependent) sequences of lotteries and choices, and not just separately for each individual choice?
satisfy any axiom over possibilities that are unrealistic, e.g. avoiding sequential dominance/Dutch books/money pumps based on the manipulation of your subjective probability of P vs NP or your subjective probability of consciousness for typical adult fruit flies?
How should we deal with the possibility that the universe is infinite and our impact could be infinite?
What about different infinite cardinal numbers?