Do you think that trying to supplant others’ plans with your own is uncooperative? Coercing them for some greater good? We oughtn’t define ‘cooperative’ as ‘good’, lest it lose all meaning.
Paul could argue that cooperating with someone means helping them achieve their values. Cooperative approaches would be to help people to live out their values, and if you don’t agree with their values, then you can trade your plans with theirs to get some Pareto-optimal outcome. That’s probably a simple definition of cooperation in some economic fields… A more interesting edge case is trying to help them weigh together their meta-ethical views to arrive at ethical principles, which feels cooperative to me intuitively.
The distinction here is a bit fuzzy. Some sorts of values spreading care clearly uncooperative, but other times it’s unclear. Like what about trying to convince selfish people to be more cooperative? That’s uncooperative in that it works against their goals, but if you’re a “cooperation consequentialist” then you’re still doing good because you’re increasing the total amount of cooperation in the world.
Yeah that’s true. So it depends on whether you’re talking about increasing the total amount of cooperation in the world, or increasing your personal level of cooperation with other agents. It seems to me that the former matters more than the latter.
Do you think that trying to supplant others’ plans with your own is uncooperative? Coercing them for some greater good? We oughtn’t define ‘cooperative’ as ‘good’, lest it lose all meaning.
Paul could argue that cooperating with someone means helping them achieve their values. Cooperative approaches would be to help people to live out their values, and if you don’t agree with their values, then you can trade your plans with theirs to get some Pareto-optimal outcome. That’s probably a simple definition of cooperation in some economic fields… A more interesting edge case is trying to help them weigh together their meta-ethical views to arrive at ethical principles, which feels cooperative to me intuitively.
The distinction here is a bit fuzzy. Some sorts of values spreading care clearly uncooperative, but other times it’s unclear. Like what about trying to convince selfish people to be more cooperative? That’s uncooperative in that it works against their goals, but if you’re a “cooperation consequentialist” then you’re still doing good because you’re increasing the total amount of cooperation in the world.
If you’re a war criminal, and I slap you, it’s still violence, irrespective of whether I call myself a “pacifism conseqentialist”!
Yeah that’s true. So it depends on whether you’re talking about increasing the total amount of cooperation in the world, or increasing your personal level of cooperation with other agents. It seems to me that the former matters more than the latter.