This is an interesting perspective. I have indeed noticed for a while that my moral uncertainty has the very weird feature that Iām not even sure what shape or type of solution Iām after, or what criteria Iād evaluate it against. And this seems to mesh well with your comments about this seeming to be ill-defined, and a matter where people donāt even know what theyāre uncertain about.
Thus far, Iāve basically responded to that issue with the thought that: āIām extremely confused about lots of things, including things that I have reason to believe really do correspond to reality like quantum mechanics or the ābeginningā or āendingā of the universe. So even if Iām extremely confused about this, maybe thereās still something real going on there that Iām uncertain about, rather than there just being nothing [in the sense of speaker-independent normativity] going on there.ā (Iām aware that anti-realism doesnāt mean āthereās no normativity at all going on hereā.)
But I definitely think that the case for believing in things like quantum mechanics despite not understanding them is much stronger than the case for believing in things like speaker-independent normativity despite not understanding it.
Also, just in case this wasnāt clear, by those sentences of mine that you quoted, I meant that Iām not sure Iād call āuncertainty thatās just about what should follow from our fundamental goalsā normative/āmoral uncertainty, rather than logical or empirical uncertainty. I would call āuncertainty about what our fundamental goals should beā normative/āmoral uncertainty. (And then thatās subject to your criticisms.)
This is an interesting perspective. I have indeed noticed for a while that my moral uncertainty has the very weird feature that Iām not even sure what shape or type of solution Iām after, or what criteria Iād evaluate it against. And this seems to mesh well with your comments about this seeming to be ill-defined, and a matter where people donāt even know what theyāre uncertain about.
Thus far, Iāve basically responded to that issue with the thought that: āIām extremely confused about lots of things, including things that I have reason to believe really do correspond to reality like quantum mechanics or the ābeginningā or āendingā of the universe. So even if Iām extremely confused about this, maybe thereās still something real going on there that Iām uncertain about, rather than there just being nothing [in the sense of speaker-independent normativity] going on there.ā (Iām aware that anti-realism doesnāt mean āthereās no normativity at all going on hereā.)
But I definitely think that the case for believing in things like quantum mechanics despite not understanding them is much stronger than the case for believing in things like speaker-independent normativity despite not understanding it.
Also, just in case this wasnāt clear, by those sentences of mine that you quoted, I meant that Iām not sure Iād call āuncertainty thatās just about what should follow from our fundamental goalsā normative/āmoral uncertainty, rather than logical or empirical uncertainty. I would call āuncertainty about what our fundamental goals should beā normative/āmoral uncertainty. (And then thatās subject to your criticisms.)