In the Welfare Footprint framework, pain intensities are defined as absolute measures, meaning that one hour of Excruciating pain in humans is assumed to be hedonically equivalent to one hour of Excruciating pain in shrimps, if shrimps were capable of experiencing Excruciating pain. This approach treats pain intensities as fixed, anchoring them to human experience rather than scaling them based on a speciesā welfare range, to ensure comparability across species.
Coming back to the 1st situation I presented, if 1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think 1 h of disabling pain in shrimps should also be 10 times as bas as 1 h of hurtful pain in shrimps.
Even with humans, there is high variability in preference for intense but short aversiveness, as compared to moderate but longer aversion.
There may be a misunderstanding. In the 2nd situation I presented, the experiences being compared have the same duration. If 1 h of disabling pain in humans was x times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think N h of disabling pain in humans should also be x times as bad as N h of hurtful pain in humans. I believe the badness of a painful experience with a given intensity is proportional to its duration.
Nevermind. I have been using your estimates for the time in pain as if they do not account for any considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, the sentence below made me think no adjustments were needed to compare your estimates for the time humans and shrimp spend in excruciating pain. So I mistakenly inferred you were accounting for considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, as you say in the same paragraph, you āhold this assumption as temporary until better evidence allows for a more accurate placement of each experience on an absolute scaleā.
In the Welfare Footprint framework, pain intensities are defined as absolute measures, meaning that one hour of Excruciating pain in humans is assumed to be hedonically equivalent to one hour of Excruciating pain in shrimps, if shrimps were capable of experiencing Excruciating pain.
Hi Cynthia.
This seems in tension with what you and @Wladimir J. Alonso say here.
Coming back to the 1st situation I presented, if 1 h of disabling pain in humans was 10 times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think 1 h of disabling pain in shrimps should also be 10 times as bas as 1 h of hurtful pain in shrimps.
There may be a misunderstanding. In the 2nd situation I presented, the experiences being compared have the same duration. If 1 h of disabling pain in humans was x times as bad as 1 h of hurtful pain in humans, I think N h of disabling pain in humans should also be x times as bad as N h of hurtful pain in humans. I believe the badness of a painful experience with a given intensity is proportional to its duration.
Nevermind. I have been using your estimates for the time in pain as if they do not account for any considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, the sentence below made me think no adjustments were needed to compare your estimates for the time humans and shrimp spend in excruciating pain. So I mistakenly inferred you were accounting for considerations relevant for interspecies welfare comparisons. However, as you say in the same paragraph, you āhold this assumption as temporary until better evidence allows for a more accurate placement of each experience on an absolute scaleā.