I’m surprised to not see much discussion about the highly dual-use and commercial-involvement aspects of AI in section 2 (unless I just missed it?). I have come to see that as one of the major differences between the Manhattan project/nuclear race and the hypothetical AI race. (Before I go into that point, I’ll just ask: did that come up in your research or did I just miss it?)
I agree this is a very important difference. I talk about it a little, but mostly not in section 2, which is more about categories of information (abstract vs. concrete vs. tacit, etc) than about institutional contexts for research. The most extensive discussion of issues of this kind is in section 3.4 where I basically say that in the private sector (where most AI development happens) financial motivations for spying are likely to be more important than they were in the Manhattan Project case because:
1. money is in general more salient as a motivation in the private sector
2. expected penalties are lower (being fired or sued rather than being imprisoned or executed) so it is easier to use money to outweigh the penalties and induce people to serve as spies
There are a few other places where I touch on this issue as it relates to things like international trade in AI chips, or which countries will be favored by AI spying. But, aside from the stuff about financial motivations, it is treated in an ad hoc manner, in a sentence or two when it seems relevant to some other topic. If you have more general thoughts on the significance for AI espionage of the fact that AI has more important civilian applications than nuclear energy does, I would be very interested.
Something that I researched a bit, but which did not make the final draft, is a case where the dual-use nature of nuclear energy enabled nuclear espionage. A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani engineer, worked at a Dutch civilian nuclear power plant. The plant did not have very stringent security because the Netherlands did not have nuclear weapons or particularly care about nuclear secrecy (at least at the time). Khan used what he learned in his role at the Dutch plant to serve as one of the most significant figures in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program (maybe the most significant, accounts differ). He went on to work as a sort of black market nuclear weapons consultant for (if I recall correctly) Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq.
I wonder if one additional disanalogy between corporate espionage and government espionage is that government espionage is freer to break the law in order to create incentives for people to start and continue spying. Especially blackmail, but maybe also things like threats to family member or use of honeytraps/seduction (though maybe that’s also easy for corporate espionage efforts to use?).
Would-be puppet masters of corporate espionage having less access to such tools might reduce the prevalence of corporate espionage (not necessarily making it less prevalent overall than government espionage, but serving as one factor pushing in that direction).
That said, this is just about who is arranging the spying, not about who is being spied on. It seems plausible/likely that there’d be government-led or government-endorsed espionage against corporate labs, in which case this disanalogy doesn’t apply.
(Epistemic status: Probably overly influenced by TV, movies, and books...)
I’m surprised to not see much discussion about the highly dual-use and commercial-involvement aspects of AI in section 2 (unless I just missed it?). I have come to see that as one of the major differences between the Manhattan project/nuclear race and the hypothetical AI race. (Before I go into that point, I’ll just ask: did that come up in your research or did I just miss it?)
I agree this is a very important difference. I talk about it a little, but mostly not in section 2, which is more about categories of information (abstract vs. concrete vs. tacit, etc) than about institutional contexts for research. The most extensive discussion of issues of this kind is in section 3.4 where I basically say that in the private sector (where most AI development happens) financial motivations for spying are likely to be more important than they were in the Manhattan Project case because:
1. money is in general more salient as a motivation in the private sector
2. expected penalties are lower (being fired or sued rather than being imprisoned or executed) so it is easier to use money to outweigh the penalties and induce people to serve as spies
There are a few other places where I touch on this issue as it relates to things like international trade in AI chips, or which countries will be favored by AI spying. But, aside from the stuff about financial motivations, it is treated in an ad hoc manner, in a sentence or two when it seems relevant to some other topic. If you have more general thoughts on the significance for AI espionage of the fact that AI has more important civilian applications than nuclear energy does, I would be very interested.
Something that I researched a bit, but which did not make the final draft, is a case where the dual-use nature of nuclear energy enabled nuclear espionage. A. Q. Khan, a Pakistani engineer, worked at a Dutch civilian nuclear power plant. The plant did not have very stringent security because the Netherlands did not have nuclear weapons or particularly care about nuclear secrecy (at least at the time). Khan used what he learned in his role at the Dutch plant to serve as one of the most significant figures in the Pakistani nuclear weapons program (maybe the most significant, accounts differ). He went on to work as a sort of black market nuclear weapons consultant for (if I recall correctly) Iran, Syria, North Korea, Libya, and Iraq.
I wonder if one additional disanalogy between corporate espionage and government espionage is that government espionage is freer to break the law in order to create incentives for people to start and continue spying. Especially blackmail, but maybe also things like threats to family member or use of honeytraps/seduction (though maybe that’s also easy for corporate espionage efforts to use?).
Would-be puppet masters of corporate espionage having less access to such tools might reduce the prevalence of corporate espionage (not necessarily making it less prevalent overall than government espionage, but serving as one factor pushing in that direction).
That said, this is just about who is arranging the spying, not about who is being spied on. It seems plausible/likely that there’d be government-led or government-endorsed espionage against corporate labs, in which case this disanalogy doesn’t apply.
(Epistemic status: Probably overly influenced by TV, movies, and books...)