I like the general thrust of your argument and would like to point out that within moral philosophy there is already an (in my view) satisfactory way to incorporate judgements associated with deontology and virtue ethics within a utilitarian frameworkâby going from âsingle-level utilitarianismâ to âmulti-level utilitarianismâ:
Iâm currently writing a text on this topic and will copy an excerpt here:
âUtilitarians believe that their moral theory is the appropriate standard of moral rightness, in that it specifies what makes an act (or rule, policy, etc) right or wrong. However, as Henry Sidgwick noted, âit is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aimâ.
Most, if not all, utilitarians discourage the use of utilitarianism as a decision procedure to guide all their everyday actions. Using utilitarianism as a decision procedure means always calculating the expected consequences of our day-to-day actions in an attempt to deliberately try to promote overall wellbeing. For example, we might pick what breakfast cereal to buy at the grocery store by trying to determine which one best contributes to overall wellbeing. To try and do so would be to follow single-level utilitarianism, which treats the utilitarian theory as both a standard of moral rightness and a decision procedure. But using such a decision procedure for all our decisions is a bad and fruitless idea, which explains why almost no one ever defended it. Jeremy Bentham rejected it, writing that âit is not to be expected that this process [of calculating expected consequences] should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.â Deliberately calculating the expected consequences of our actions is error-prone and takes a lot of time. Thus, we have reason to think that following single-level utilitarianism would itself not lead to the best consequences, which is why the theory is often criticized as âself-defeatingâ.
For these reasons, many advocates of utilitarianism have instead argued for multi-level utilitarianism, which is defined as follows:
Multi-level utilitarianism is the view that, in most situations, individuals should follow tried-and-tested heuristics rather than trying to calculate which action will produce the most wellbeing.
Multi-level utilitarianism implies that we should, under most circumstances, follow a set of simple moral heuristicsâdo not lie, steal, kill etc.âknowing that this will lead to the best outcomes overall. To this end, we should use the commonsense moral norms and laws of our society as rules of thumb to guide our actions. Following these norms and laws will save time and usually lead to good outcomes, in part because they are based on societyâs experience of what promotes individual wellbeing. The fact that honesty, integrity, keeping promises and sticking to the law have generally good consequences explains why in practice utilitarians value such things highly and use them to guide their everyday actions.â
Thanks Darius! I agree that this is probably one of the strongest arguments against my model; what I gather from your reply is that we donât need other moral theories since everything can already be explained by utilitarianism.
I agree with you that some sort of a consequentalist moral theory probably underpins the other moral theories (why should we be virtuous if it didnât have a good consequences?). HoweverâI think this is not giving enough credit to those theories, since if their moral prescriptions are correct according to utilitarianism, the theories themselves should be considered correct.
To take another example from physics: of course we know that quantum mechanics is more fundamental than classical mechanics (classical mechanics is the limit of quantum mechanics at large scales). This doesnât mean that people consider classical mechanics âjust quantum mechanics with some heuristicsââit is considered to be a field in its own right. The reason is that at the physical scale at which classical mechanics becomes useful, quantum mechanics becomes too cumbersome to use. Students who are asked to calculate the motion of a ball down an inclined plane donât start with quantum mechanics, they go directly to classical mechanics, which is infinitely more useful for solving problems at that scale.
My argument is that at certain scales, virtue ethics and deontology should be considered emergent moral theories, either from utilitarianism or some other theory. But this doesnât mean that they are âjust utilitarianism with some heuristicsâ. They should be studied and practiced in their own rights, since the insights they give are more useful for how to live our daily lives or how we should structure a society. If utilitarianism + heuristics is just virtue ethics at some scale, why not just call it virtue ethics and use utilitarianism to justify why it is correct at that scale?
I like the general thrust of your argument and would like to point out that within moral philosophy there is already an (in my view) satisfactory way to incorporate judgements associated with deontology and virtue ethics within a utilitarian frameworkâby going from âsingle-level utilitarianismâ to âmulti-level utilitarianismâ:
Iâm currently writing a text on this topic and will copy an excerpt here:
âUtilitarians believe that their moral theory is the appropriate standard of moral rightness, in that it specifies what makes an act (or rule, policy, etc) right or wrong. However, as Henry Sidgwick noted, âit is not necessary that the end which gives the criterion of rightness should always be the end at which we consciously aimâ.
Most, if not all, utilitarians discourage the use of utilitarianism as a decision procedure to guide all their everyday actions. Using utilitarianism as a decision procedure means always calculating the expected consequences of our day-to-day actions in an attempt to deliberately try to promote overall wellbeing. For example, we might pick what breakfast cereal to buy at the grocery store by trying to determine which one best contributes to overall wellbeing. To try and do so would be to follow single-level utilitarianism, which treats the utilitarian theory as both a standard of moral rightness and a decision procedure. But using such a decision procedure for all our decisions is a bad and fruitless idea, which explains why almost no one ever defended it. Jeremy Bentham rejected it, writing that âit is not to be expected that this process [of calculating expected consequences] should be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment.â Deliberately calculating the expected consequences of our actions is error-prone and takes a lot of time. Thus, we have reason to think that following single-level utilitarianism would itself not lead to the best consequences, which is why the theory is often criticized as âself-defeatingâ.
For these reasons, many advocates of utilitarianism have instead argued for multi-level utilitarianism, which is defined as follows:
Multi-level utilitarianism is the view that, in most situations, individuals should follow tried-and-tested heuristics rather than trying to calculate which action will produce the most wellbeing.
Multi-level utilitarianism implies that we should, under most circumstances, follow a set of simple moral heuristicsâdo not lie, steal, kill etc.âknowing that this will lead to the best outcomes overall. To this end, we should use the commonsense moral norms and laws of our society as rules of thumb to guide our actions. Following these norms and laws will save time and usually lead to good outcomes, in part because they are based on societyâs experience of what promotes individual wellbeing. The fact that honesty, integrity, keeping promises and sticking to the law have generally good consequences explains why in practice utilitarians value such things highly and use them to guide their everyday actions.â
Thanks, Darius. I would advise the OP to read up on this literature. As stated, this has been extensively discussed.
I like Aaronâs recent reply here: https://ââforum.effectivealtruism.org/ââposts/ââmG6mckPHAisEbtKv5/ââshould-you-familiarize-yourself-with-the-literature-before#gKYcFEXGtQZLmjzM7
I am glad this post way made, and glad for Dariusâs comment.
Thanks Darius! I agree that this is probably one of the strongest arguments against my model; what I gather from your reply is that we donât need other moral theories since everything can already be explained by utilitarianism.
I agree with you that some sort of a consequentalist moral theory probably underpins the other moral theories (why should we be virtuous if it didnât have a good consequences?). HoweverâI think this is not giving enough credit to those theories, since if their moral prescriptions are correct according to utilitarianism, the theories themselves should be considered correct.
To take another example from physics: of course we know that quantum mechanics is more fundamental than classical mechanics (classical mechanics is the limit of quantum mechanics at large scales). This doesnât mean that people consider classical mechanics âjust quantum mechanics with some heuristicsââit is considered to be a field in its own right. The reason is that at the physical scale at which classical mechanics becomes useful, quantum mechanics becomes too cumbersome to use. Students who are asked to calculate the motion of a ball down an inclined plane donât start with quantum mechanics, they go directly to classical mechanics, which is infinitely more useful for solving problems at that scale.
My argument is that at certain scales, virtue ethics and deontology should be considered emergent moral theories, either from utilitarianism or some other theory. But this doesnât mean that they are âjust utilitarianism with some heuristicsâ. They should be studied and practiced in their own rights, since the insights they give are more useful for how to live our daily lives or how we should structure a society. If utilitarianism + heuristics is just virtue ethics at some scale, why not just call it virtue ethics and use utilitarianism to justify why it is correct at that scale?