Thanks for this detailed response! I think there are a few points where a response from me may be useful.
1. âextinction being bad because of the effects of it (no future human happiness, flourishing etc) is putting a disvalue on extinction, because it inherently causes those effectsâ
I think this is just one of our cruxes- I think that extinction, like death, is not disvaluable in itself, but is generally linked to another disvalue. If we want to engage in trade-offs, make informed decisions etc⊠then we should look for the ultimate value/â dis-value, and not focus on something which almost always correlates.
2. âif an animal species has net positive lives, then extinction is inherently bad, and where there is uncertainty, an animal species should be assumed to have net positive livesâ
To me, it sounds as though you are treating extinction as contingently bad (in this case, bad because the animals of the species do or may have net positive lives). If you knew for sure that the animals had net negative lives, would you still think their extinction was bad?
FWIW Iâd agree that, for chestertonâs fencey reasons, it is better not to cause animal extinctions. But we were discussing whether we should treat animal extinctions with the weight of an X-risk (i.e. a human extinction). For that, we need a little more than an assumption that the animalâs lives are net positive.
3. Amoebas
I think this may be a straightforward misunderstanding. In McMahanâs paper, in the last paragraph on page 9 in the pdf or 276 in the book, he is making a quick argument against caring about extinction intrinsically. I do not think that people who are concerned with biodiversity and extinction value either intrinsically, and therefore was not suggesting that they should attempt to return us to amoeba-world. (plus, to be pernickety, someone who cared about extinction intrinsically wouldnât want to return us anywhere, they would just want to stop evolution where it wasâassuming avoiding extinction is their sole value) In my opinion they are tracking nearby values with those terms (and would often be better off directly pursuing those values).
4. As I think the happiness/âfuture value argument can still apply to animals, I still think animal extinction should be seen as bad (although it is less bad than human extinction)
This is a good point, and it definitely still should in many cases. However, I think the questions of the value that individuals of that species get from their lives, and the counter-factual impact of an extinction (will that ecological niche be otherwise occupied) are clearly important. This logic also applies to human extinction. For example, we can discuss whether it is bad for humans to go extinct by being replaced by another species (AI, Aliens etc..) or if we should worry less about human extinction because of the chance another species evolves intelligence sufficient to take our place.
5. âweâ in the first paragraph implies more consensus than the actually is
I think it is pretty core to EA-related approaches to X-risk that extinction is not intrinsically bad, but is bad because of further reasons.
I donât think that part is our disagreement. Maybe the way I would phrase the question is whether there should be an additional multiplier put on extinction in addition to the expected future loss of wellbeing. If I was to model it, the answer would be ânoâ to avoid double counting (i.e. the effect of extinction is the effect of future loss of wellbeing). The disagreement is how this is not by default assumed to apply to animals as well.
âIf you knew for sure that the animals had net negative lives, would you still think their extinction was bad?â Not sure how likely such a situation is to come up, as Iâm not sure how I would know this for sure. Because that seems like not just being sure that every of that species that exists now has a net negative life, itâs assuming that every of that species that might exist in the future also will have. But to answer the question philosophically and not practically, I would not say that the extinction of a species that will definitely have guaranteed suffering is bad.
âBut we were discussing whether we should treat animal extinctions with the weight of an X-risk (i.e. a human extinction). For that, we need a little more than an assumption that the animalâs lives are net positive.â Definitely agreed for prioritising between things that more than the just the assumption of net positive is required. But research would be required to know that, and as far as I can tell there has been very little done (and there are ~8.7 million animal species).
I see thanksâI can now find the section you were referring to. I donât think I agree the full argument as made follows, but I havenât made the full thing and I donât want this to be a thread discussing this one particular paper!
Agreed there are nuances re animals. However, outside philosophy Iâm not sure how many people youâd have arguing against âhuman extinction is bad even if humans are replaced by another speciesâ!
My bad, I meant primarily the second paragraph (referring to how animal extinction was valued, and given the lack of discussions around thisâI had it more general then decided to specify the paragraph⊠then picked the wrong one!). Agreed with your response here, will edit the original.
Thanks for this detailed response! I think there are a few points where a response from me may be useful.
1. âextinction being bad because of the effects of it (no future human happiness, flourishing etc) is putting a disvalue on extinction, because it inherently causes those effectsâ
I think this is just one of our cruxes- I think that extinction, like death, is not disvaluable in itself, but is generally linked to another disvalue. If we want to engage in trade-offs, make informed decisions etc⊠then we should look for the ultimate value/â dis-value, and not focus on something which almost always correlates.
2. âif an animal species has net positive lives, then extinction is inherently bad, and where there is uncertainty, an animal species should be assumed to have net positive livesâ
To me, it sounds as though you are treating extinction as contingently bad (in this case, bad because the animals of the species do or may have net positive lives). If you knew for sure that the animals had net negative lives, would you still think their extinction was bad?
FWIW Iâd agree that, for chestertonâs fencey reasons, it is better not to cause animal extinctions. But we were discussing whether we should treat animal extinctions with the weight of an X-risk (i.e. a human extinction). For that, we need a little more than an assumption that the animalâs lives are net positive.
3. Amoebas
I think this may be a straightforward misunderstanding. In McMahanâs paper, in the last paragraph on page 9 in the pdf or 276 in the book, he is making a quick argument against caring about extinction intrinsically. I do not think that people who are concerned with biodiversity and extinction value either intrinsically, and therefore was not suggesting that they should attempt to return us to amoeba-world. (plus, to be pernickety, someone who cared about extinction intrinsically wouldnât want to return us anywhere, they would just want to stop evolution where it wasâassuming avoiding extinction is their sole value) In my opinion they are tracking nearby values with those terms (and would often be better off directly pursuing those values).
4. As I think the happiness/âfuture value argument can still apply to animals, I still think animal extinction should be seen as bad (although it is less bad than human extinction)
This is a good point, and it definitely still should in many cases. However, I think the questions of the value that individuals of that species get from their lives, and the counter-factual impact of an extinction (will that ecological niche be otherwise occupied) are clearly important. This logic also applies to human extinction. For example, we can discuss whether it is bad for humans to go extinct by being replaced by another species (AI, Aliens etc..) or if we should worry less about human extinction because of the chance another species evolves intelligence sufficient to take our place.
5. âweâ in the first paragraph implies more consensus than the actually is
I think it is pretty core to EA-related approaches to X-risk that extinction is not intrinsically bad, but is bad because of further reasons.
Hey, thanks also for the detailed response.
I donât think that part is our disagreement. Maybe the way I would phrase the question is whether there should be an additional multiplier put on extinction in addition to the expected future loss of wellbeing. If I was to model it, the answer would be ânoâ to avoid double counting (i.e. the effect of extinction is the effect of future loss of wellbeing). The disagreement is how this is not by default assumed to apply to animals as well.
âIf you knew for sure that the animals had net negative lives, would you still think their extinction was bad?â Not sure how likely such a situation is to come up, as Iâm not sure how I would know this for sure. Because that seems like not just being sure that every of that species that exists now has a net negative life, itâs assuming that every of that species that might exist in the future also will have. But to answer the question philosophically and not practically, I would not say that the extinction of a species that will definitely have guaranteed suffering is bad.
âBut we were discussing whether we should treat animal extinctions with the weight of an X-risk (i.e. a human extinction). For that, we need a little more than an assumption that the animalâs lives are net positive.â Definitely agreed for prioritising between things that more than the just the assumption of net positive is required. But research would be required to know that, and as far as I can tell there has been very little done (and there are ~8.7 million animal species).
I see thanksâI can now find the section you were referring to. I donât think I agree the full argument as made follows, but I havenât made the full thing and I donât want this to be a thread discussing this one particular paper!
Agreed there are nuances re animals. However, outside philosophy Iâm not sure how many people youâd have arguing against âhuman extinction is bad even if humans are replaced by another speciesâ!
My bad, I meant primarily the second paragraph (referring to how animal extinction was valued, and given the lack of discussions around thisâI had it more general then decided to specify the paragraph⊠then picked the wrong one!). Agreed with your response here, will edit the original.