The degree to which CFF values give us evidence about the subjective experience of time may also depend on the behavioral plasticity of the animal in question.
(...)
Much of the sensory information that animals (including humans) absorb is processed unconsciously. Differences in the speed of unconscious reactions don’t reveal anything about subjective experience.
Doesn’t using behavioural studies based on trained behaviour avoid this concern? I suppose trained behaviour might still be unconscious, but it seems less likely and especially for this task (it’s not pure reaction, the goal isn’t to answer faster, it’s just to give the right answer), assuming the animal is conscious at all. Well, even reinforced behaviours in humans may be unconscious/reflexive, e.g. flinching near someone who scares, tickles or hits you often. There’s also muscle memory, which might be largely unconscious, e.g. balance, riding a bike.
Did the CFF estimates in your table come from behavioural studies or ERG studies, or both?
EDIT: In one of your footnotes:
See Ros & Biewener 2016 and Ibbotson 2017 for more on hummingbird flight stabilization. Humans also have a sensory-motor system that governs balance, and this system operates below our conscious awareness. (People don’t typically realize how many microadjustments one’s body continually makes to successfully carry a load of laundry up a flight of stairs without falling over.) In birds, flight stabilization mechanisms are governed by a homologous brain region.
Doesn’t using behavioural studies based on trained behaviour avoid this concern?
Thanks, this is a good question. The short answer is no, it doesn’t. The longer answer is a bit more complicated.
Nobody denies that differences in CFF generate differences in perceptual experience. But differences in perceptual experience are cheap. As I say in the post, the values I discuss are maximum CFF thresholds (that is, the highest CFF an individual can register in any condition). One’s actual CFF threshold is constantly shifting due to differences in things like background lighting conditions. So a light that an individual perceives as flickering in one situation may be perceived as glowing steadily in a different situation. The question is whether maximum CFF thresholds correlate with differences in subjective temporal experience.
Differences in one’s perceptual experience affect what one’s body can do unconsciously. Balancing on one foot with one’s eyes open is much easier than balancing on one foot with one’s eyes closed. The reason is that your visual system allows your body to make continual microadjustments to stay balanced.
So if differences in visual temporal resolution (as measured by CFF) confer a fitness advantage only in virtue of improvements in unconscious movements, we shouldn’t expect differences in CFF to be correlated with differences in subjective temporal experience. As I explain in the post, the temporal resolution of one’s senses doesn’t directly govern the subjective experience of time. If differences in temporal resolution correlate with differences in subjective temporal experience, it’s probably because improvements in temporal resolution make improvements in the subjective experience of time more useful (and/or vice versa).
Did the CFF estimates in your table come from behavioural studies or ERG studies, or both?
(...)
Doesn’t using behavioural studies based on trained behaviour avoid this concern? I suppose trained behaviour might still be unconscious, but it seems less likely and especially for this task (it’s not pure reaction, the goal isn’t to answer faster, it’s just to give the right answer), assuming the animal is conscious at all. Well, even reinforced behaviours in humans may be unconscious/reflexive, e.g. flinching near someone who scares, tickles or hits you often. There’s also muscle memory, which might be largely unconscious, e.g. balance, riding a bike.
Did the CFF estimates in your table come from behavioural studies or ERG studies, or both?
EDIT: In one of your footnotes:
Thanks, this is a good question. The short answer is no, it doesn’t. The longer answer is a bit more complicated.
Nobody denies that differences in CFF generate differences in perceptual experience. But differences in perceptual experience are cheap. As I say in the post, the values I discuss are maximum CFF thresholds (that is, the highest CFF an individual can register in any condition). One’s actual CFF threshold is constantly shifting due to differences in things like background lighting conditions. So a light that an individual perceives as flickering in one situation may be perceived as glowing steadily in a different situation. The question is whether maximum CFF thresholds correlate with differences in subjective temporal experience.
Differences in one’s perceptual experience affect what one’s body can do unconsciously. Balancing on one foot with one’s eyes open is much easier than balancing on one foot with one’s eyes closed. The reason is that your visual system allows your body to make continual microadjustments to stay balanced.
So if differences in visual temporal resolution (as measured by CFF) confer a fitness advantage only in virtue of improvements in unconscious movements, we shouldn’t expect differences in CFF to be correlated with differences in subjective temporal experience. As I explain in the post, the temporal resolution of one’s senses doesn’t directly govern the subjective experience of time. If differences in temporal resolution correlate with differences in subjective temporal experience, it’s probably because improvements in temporal resolution make improvements in the subjective experience of time more useful (and/or vice versa).
Both.