“I think the arguments we’ve discussed show reasonably conclusively that animal welfare isn’t the best instrumental goal—because we can see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.”
It seems the “improving animal welfare” interventions could very well be the best ways to improve those values. I think that’s a key point where we disagree. I’d be interested in hearing what you think are better alternatives at some point.
If there are clearly better options for proxies related to “improving animal welfare,” but not clearly better options for proxies related to “improving human welfare,” then “improving animal welfare” could still be the better option of the two. Analogy: if we have two car races with five separate cars each, the worst car in one race could still be better than all five in the other.
Did you read the first part of the post, on meanings of cause? I don’t disagree that that could be the best intervention cluster. But I think if we’re pursuing it, it should be for the right reasons—this will help us to make the correct decisions when new evidence comes to light.
I entirely agree that improving animal welfare could still beat improving human welfare. That’s exactly what I was saying in (vi).
I don’t “see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.” That’s where I was asking for better alternative subgoals to reaching value improvements.
I think we practically understand each other’s points now though. Thanks for the discussion and clarification.
“I think the arguments we’ve discussed show reasonably conclusively that animal welfare isn’t the best instrumental goal—because we can see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.”
It seems the “improving animal welfare” interventions could very well be the best ways to improve those values. I think that’s a key point where we disagree. I’d be interested in hearing what you think are better alternatives at some point.
If there are clearly better options for proxies related to “improving animal welfare,” but not clearly better options for proxies related to “improving human welfare,” then “improving animal welfare” could still be the better option of the two. Analogy: if we have two car races with five separate cars each, the worst car in one race could still be better than all five in the other.
Did you read the first part of the post, on meanings of cause? I don’t disagree that that could be the best intervention cluster. But I think if we’re pursuing it, it should be for the right reasons—this will help us to make the correct decisions when new evidence comes to light.
I entirely agree that improving animal welfare could still beat improving human welfare. That’s exactly what I was saying in (vi).
I don’t “see other things in the vicinity such as targeting value improvements where it’s almost certain that at least one of them is better.” That’s where I was asking for better alternative subgoals to reaching value improvements.
I think we practically understand each other’s points now though. Thanks for the discussion and clarification.