My worry is that I see you claimed with Jacy that “(iv) That setting out to improve animal welfare (in the short or medium term) seems extremely unlikely to be the best sub-goal to aim for to meet the goal of making the long-term future flourish.”
I do find this claim to be plausible, but, to the best of my understanding, I see nowhere in “Human and animal interventions: the long-term view” that you actually defend that claim.
Hence the worry of you asserting more than you have demonstrated, and the source of confusion.
Thanks for clarifying. You’re right that the argument at that step isn’t spelled out explicitly. It’s supposed to go:
1. Short/medium term animal welfare improvements have small long-run effects compared to other things we can effect in the short/medium term.
2. It would be very surprising if optimising for something which doesn’t have long-run effects could be comparably good with optimising for the best identifiable thing which does have long-run effects. (Even if at certain times optimising for these two things would recommend the same interventions.)
Both those claims make sense, and I agree you have demonstrated them, but I could see them being easily misinterpreted based on what I said in the beginning.
My worry is that I see you claimed with Jacy that “(iv) That setting out to improve animal welfare (in the short or medium term) seems extremely unlikely to be the best sub-goal to aim for to meet the goal of making the long-term future flourish.”
I do find this claim to be plausible, but, to the best of my understanding, I see nowhere in “Human and animal interventions: the long-term view” that you actually defend that claim.
Hence the worry of you asserting more than you have demonstrated, and the source of confusion.
Thanks for clarifying. You’re right that the argument at that step isn’t spelled out explicitly. It’s supposed to go:
1. Short/medium term animal welfare improvements have small long-run effects compared to other things we can effect in the short/medium term.
2. It would be very surprising if optimising for something which doesn’t have long-run effects could be comparably good with optimising for the best identifiable thing which does have long-run effects. (Even if at certain times optimising for these two things would recommend the same interventions.)
Both those claims make sense, and I agree you have demonstrated them, but I could see them being easily misinterpreted based on what I said in the beginning.