Nice response, thanks a lot! :) I might share some more thoughts soon (e.g., maybe the assumption that pain is a one-dimensional quantity could be doing some additional heavy lifting here; and I guess others have discussed problems with aggregationism, which may still apply even if all pains are comparable in the sense that you mean).
I strongly endorse expectationaltotalhedonisticutilitarianism. So I would say the pain of an individual has 3 relevant dimensions. Probability, duration, and hedonistic intensity. I personally only care about the product between these. However, I think my argument works even for more dimensions. I believe any pains are quantitatively comparable if the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states are quantitatively comparable.
I believe any pains are quantitatively comparable if the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states are quantitatively comparable.
I think the weakest part of the strongest version of my argument is that it requires the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states to be quantitatively comparable with certainty. If they are only quantitatively comparable with, for example, probability 99 %, pains which are 1 k infinitesimal steps apart would only be quantitatively comparable with probability 0.00432 % (= 0.99^(1*10^3)).
Nice response, thanks a lot! :) I might share some more thoughts soon (e.g., maybe the assumption that pain is a one-dimensional quantity could be doing some additional heavy lifting here; and I guess others have discussed problems with aggregationism, which may still apply even if all pains are comparable in the sense that you mean).
I strongly endorse expectationaltotal hedonistic utilitarianism. So I would say the pain of an individual has 3 relevant dimensions. Probability, duration, and hedonistic intensity. I personally only care about the product between these. However, I think my argument works even for more dimensions. I believe any pains are quantitatively comparable if the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states are quantitatively comparable.
I think the weakest part of the strongest version of my argument is that it requires the pains of any 2 infinitesimally different states to be quantitatively comparable with certainty. If they are only quantitatively comparable with, for example, probability 99 %, pains which are 1 k infinitesimal steps apart would only be quantitatively comparable with probability 0.00432 % (= 0.99^(1*10^3)).