Masrani seems to confuse (1) pure time discounting /â a pure rate of time preference with (2) time discounting for other reasons (e.g., due to the possibility that the future wonât come to pass due to a catastrophe; see Greaves).
In particular, Masrani seems to claim that Greaves and MacAskillâs paper is wrong to reject pure time discounting, but bases that claim partly on the fact that there could be a catastrophe in future (which is a separate matter from pure time discounting).
E.g., Masrani writes: âWe should be biased towards the present for the simple reason that tomorrow may not arrive. The further out into the future we go, the less certain things become, and the smaller the chance is that weâll actually make it there. Preferring good things to happen sooner rather than later follows directly from the finitude of life.â
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Another, separate point about discounting:
Masrani writes:
If one does not discount the future, then one is equally concerned about every moment in time
But as far as I can tell, this is false, at least taken if literally; instead, how concerned one should be about a given moment in time depends in part on whatâs happening at the time (e.g. how many moral patients there are, and what theyâre experiencing).
Masrani seems to confuse (1) pure time discounting /â a pure rate of time preference with (2) time discounting for other reasons (e.g., due to the possibility that the future wonât come to pass due to a catastrophe; see Greaves).
In particular, Masrani seems to claim that Greaves and MacAskillâs paper is wrong to reject pure time discounting, but bases that claim partly on the fact that there could be a catastrophe in future (which is a separate matter from pure time discounting).
E.g., Masrani writes: âWe should be biased towards the present for the simple reason that tomorrow may not arrive. The further out into the future we go, the less certain things become, and the smaller the chance is that weâll actually make it there. Preferring good things to happen sooner rather than later follows directly from the finitude of life.â
---
Another, separate point about discounting:
Masrani writes:
But as far as I can tell, this is false, at least taken if literally; instead, how concerned one should be about a given moment in time depends in part on whatâs happening at the time (e.g. how many moral patients there are, and what theyâre experiencing).