Masrani focuses quite a bit on the idea that longtermism relies on comparisons to an infinite amount of potential future good. But Greaves and MacAskill’s paper doesn’t actually mention infinity at any point, and neither their argument nor the othe standard arguments I’ve seen rely at all on infinities.
E.g., Masrani writes: “By “this observation” I just mean the fact that longtermism is a really really bad idea because it lets you justify present day suffering forever, by always comparing it to an infinite amount of potential future good (forever).”
(I won’t say more on this here, since the comments section of the link-post for Masrani’s post already contains an extensive discussion of whether and how infinities might be relevant relation to longtermism.)
Masrani focuses quite a bit on the idea that longtermism relies on comparisons to an infinite amount of potential future good. But Greaves and MacAskill’s paper doesn’t actually mention infinity at any point, and neither their argument nor the othe standard arguments I’ve seen rely at all on infinities.
E.g., Masrani writes: “By “this observation” I just mean the fact that longtermism is a really really bad idea because it lets you justify present day suffering forever, by always comparing it to an infinite amount of potential future good (forever).”
(I won’t say more on this here, since the comments section of the link-post for Masrani’s post already contains an extensive discussion of whether and how infinities might be relevant relation to longtermism.)