Iâve now turned this into a top-level post, and anyone who wants to read this should now read that version rather than this shortform.
Adding important nuances to âpreserve option valueâ arguments
Summary
I fairly commonly hear (and make) arguments like âThis action would be irreversible. And if we donât take the action now, we can still do so later. So, to preserve option value, we shouldnât take that action, even if it would be good to do the action now if now was our only chance.â[1]
doing field-building to a new target audience for some important cause area
publicly discussing of some important issue in cases where that discussion could involve infohazards, cause polarization, or make our community seem wacky
I think this sort of argument is often getting at something important, but in my experience such arguments are usually oversimplified in some important ways. This shortform is a quickly written[2] attempt to provide a more nuanced picture of that kind of argument. My key points are:
â(Ir)reversibilityâ is a matter of degree (not a binary), and a matter of the expected extent to which the counterfactual effects weâre considering causing would (a) fade by default if we stop fuelling them, and/âor (b) could be reversed by us if we actively tried to reverse them.
Sometimes we may be surprised to find that something does seem decently reversible.
The âoption valueâ we retain is also a matter of degree, and we should bear in mind that delays often gradually reduce total benefits and sometimes mean missing key windows of opportunity.
Delaying can only be better than acting now if we expect weâll be able to make a better-informed decision later and/âor we expect the action to become more net-positive later.
If we donât expect our knowledge will improve in relevant ways nor the act will become more valuable/âless harmful, or we expect minor improvements that are outweighed by the downsides or delay, we should probably just act now if the action does seem good.
But again, I still think âoption valueâ arguments are often getting at something important; I just think we may often make better decisions if we also consider the above three nuances when making âoption valueâ arguments. And, to be clear, I definitely still think itâs often worth avoiding, delaying, or consulting people about risky-seeming actions rather than just taking them right now.
Iâd welcome feedback on these ideas. Also please let me know if you think this should be a top-level post.
1. On âirreversibilityâ
In some sense, all actions are themselves irreversibleâif you do that action, you can never make it literally the case that you didnât do that action. But, of course, that doesnât matter. The important question is instead something like âIf we cause this variable to move from x to y, to what extent would our counterfactual impact remain even if we later start to wish we hadnât had that impact and we adjust our behaviors accordingly?â E.g., if we make a given issue something thatâs known by and salient to a lot of politicians and policymakers, to what extent, in expectation, will that continue to be true even if we later realise we wish it wasnât true?
And this is really a question of degree, not a binary.
There are two key reasons why something may be fairly reversible:
Our counterfactual effects may naturally wash out
The variable may gradually drift back to the setting it was at before our intervention
Or it may remain at the setting we put it to, but with it becoming increasingly likely over time that that wouldâve happened even in the absence of our intervention, such that our counterfactual impact declines
For example, letâs say we raise the salience of some issue to politicians and policymakers because it seems ~60% likely that thatâs a good idea, ~20% likely itâs ~neutral, and ~20% likely itâs a bad idea. Then we later determine it seems it was a bad idea after all, so we stop taking any actions to keep salience high. In that case:
The issue may gradually fall off these peopleâs radars again, as other priorities force themselves higher up the agenda
Even if the issue remains salient or increases in salience, it could be that this or some fraction of it wouldâve happened anyway, just on a delay
This is likely for issues that gradually become obviously real and important and where we notice the issues sooner than other key communities do
We could imagine a graph with one line showing how salience of the issue wouldâve risen by default without us, another line showing how salience rises earlier or higher if we make that happen, and a third line for if we take the action but then stop. That third line would start the same as the âwe make that happenâ line, then gradually revert toward the âwhat wouldâve happened by defaultâ line.
We may be able to actively (partially) reverse our effects
I expect this effect would usually be less important than the ânaturally wash outâ effect.
Basically because when I tried to think of some examples, they all seemed either hard to achieve big results from or like theyâd require âweirdâ or âcommon sense badâ actions like misleading people.
But perhaps sometimes decently large effects could be achieved from this?
For example, we could try to actively reduce the salience of an issue we previously increased the salience of, such as by contacting the people who we convinced and who most started to increase the issueâs salience themselves (e.g., academics who started publishing relevant papers), and explaining to them our reasoning for now thinking itâs counterproductive to make this issue more salient.
2. On âwe can still do it laterâ
In some sense, itâs always the case that if you donât take an action at a given time, you canât later do exactly that same action or achieve exactly the same effects anymore. Sometimes this hardly matters, but sometimes itâs important. The important question is something like âIf we donât take this action now, to what extent could we still achieve similar expected benefits with similarly low expected harms via taking a similar action later on?â
I think very often significant value is lost by delaying net-positive actions. E.g., in general and all other factors held constant:
delaying field-building will reduce the number of full-time-equivalent years spent on key issues before itâs âtoo late anywayâ (e.g., because an existential catastrophe has happened or the problem has already been solved)
delaying efforts to improve prioritization & understanding of some issue will reduce the number of âpolicy windowsâ that occur between those efforts & the time when itâs too late anyway
I also think that sometimes delay could mean we miss a âwindow of opportunityâ for taking an action with a similar type and balance of benefits to harms of the action we have in mind. That is, there may not just be a decay in the benefits, but rather a somewhat âqualitativeâ shift in whether âsomething like this actionâ is even on the table. For example, we may miss the one key policy window we were aiming to affect.
3. Will we plausibly have more reason to do it later than we do now?
Delaying can only be better than acting now if at least one of the following is true:
We expect weâll be able to make a better-informed decision later
e.g., because our relevant knowledge will improve
We expect the action to become more net-positive later
e.g., because we expect favorable changes in background variablesâthe time will become âmore ripeâ
The more we expect those effects, the stronger the case for delay. The less we expect those effects, the weaker the case for delay. (A simplified way of saying this is âWhy bother delaying your decision if youâd just later be facing the same or worse decision with the same or worse info?â)
This can be weighed up against the degree to which we should worry about irreversibility and the degree to which we should worry about the costs of delay, in order to decide whether to act now. (Assuming the act does seem net positive & worth prioritizing, according to our current all-things-considered best guess.)
I think itâs usually true that weâll (in expectation) be able to make a better-informed decision later, but how true that is can vary a lot between cases, and that magnitude matters if there are costs to delay.
I think itâs sometimes true that the action will become more net-positive later, but probably usually the opposite is true (as discussed in the prior section).
I read that post ~4 years ago and remember thinking it made good points and is valuable. I expect if I re-read it Iâd still agree with it. I donât think Iâd explicitly noticed the nuances this shortform expresses when I read that post, and I didnât check today whether that post already accounts for these nuances well.
I expect that some of my points are obvious and that some readers might find it arrogant/ânaive/âweird that I wrote this without citing x y z literatures. It also seems plausible some of my points or uses of terminology are mistaken. Please feel free to mention relevant literatures and feel encouraged to highlight potential mistakes!
Iâve now turned this into a top-level post, and anyone who wants to read this should now read that version rather than this shortform.
Adding important nuances to âpreserve option valueâ arguments
Summary
I fairly commonly hear (and make) arguments like âThis action would be irreversible. And if we donât take the action now, we can still do so later. So, to preserve option value, we shouldnât take that action, even if it would be good to do the action now if now was our only chance.â[1]
This is relevant to actions such as:
doing field-building to a new target audience for some important cause area
publicly discussing of some important issue in cases where that discussion could involve infohazards, cause polarization, or make our community seem wacky
I think this sort of argument is often getting at something important, but in my experience such arguments are usually oversimplified in some important ways. This shortform is a quickly written[2] attempt to provide a more nuanced picture of that kind of argument. My key points are:
â(Ir)reversibilityâ is a matter of degree (not a binary), and a matter of the expected extent to which the counterfactual effects weâre considering causing would (a) fade by default if we stop fuelling them, and/âor (b) could be reversed by us if we actively tried to reverse them.
Sometimes we may be surprised to find that something does seem decently reversible.
The âoption valueâ we retain is also a matter of degree, and we should bear in mind that delays often gradually reduce total benefits and sometimes mean missing key windows of opportunity.
Delaying can only be better than acting now if we expect weâll be able to make a better-informed decision later and/âor we expect the action to become more net-positive later.
If we donât expect our knowledge will improve in relevant ways nor the act will become more valuable/âless harmful, or we expect minor improvements that are outweighed by the downsides or delay, we should probably just act now if the action does seem good.
But again, I still think âoption valueâ arguments are often getting at something important; I just think we may often make better decisions if we also consider the above three nuances when making âoption valueâ arguments. And, to be clear, I definitely still think itâs often worth avoiding, delaying, or consulting people about risky-seeming actions rather than just taking them right now.
Iâd welcome feedback on these ideas. Also please let me know if you think this should be a top-level post.
1. On âirreversibilityâ
In some sense, all actions are themselves irreversibleâif you do that action, you can never make it literally the case that you didnât do that action. But, of course, that doesnât matter. The important question is instead something like âIf we cause this variable to move from x to y, to what extent would our counterfactual impact remain even if we later start to wish we hadnât had that impact and we adjust our behaviors accordingly?â E.g., if we make a given issue something thatâs known by and salient to a lot of politicians and policymakers, to what extent, in expectation, will that continue to be true even if we later realise we wish it wasnât true?
And this is really a question of degree, not a binary.
There are two key reasons why something may be fairly reversible:
Our counterfactual effects may naturally wash out
The variable may gradually drift back to the setting it was at before our intervention
Or it may remain at the setting we put it to, but with it becoming increasingly likely over time that that wouldâve happened even in the absence of our intervention, such that our counterfactual impact declines
For example, letâs say we raise the salience of some issue to politicians and policymakers because it seems ~60% likely that thatâs a good idea, ~20% likely itâs ~neutral, and ~20% likely itâs a bad idea. Then we later determine it seems it was a bad idea after all, so we stop taking any actions to keep salience high. In that case:
The issue may gradually fall off these peopleâs radars again, as other priorities force themselves higher up the agenda
Even if the issue remains salient or increases in salience, it could be that this or some fraction of it wouldâve happened anyway, just on a delay
This is likely for issues that gradually become obviously real and important and where we notice the issues sooner than other key communities do
We could imagine a graph with one line showing how salience of the issue wouldâve risen by default without us, another line showing how salience rises earlier or higher if we make that happen, and a third line for if we take the action but then stop. That third line would start the same as the âwe make that happenâ line, then gradually revert toward the âwhat wouldâve happened by defaultâ line.
We may be able to actively (partially) reverse our effects
I expect this effect would usually be less important than the ânaturally wash outâ effect.
Basically because when I tried to think of some examples, they all seemed either hard to achieve big results from or like theyâd require âweirdâ or âcommon sense badâ actions like misleading people.
But perhaps sometimes decently large effects could be achieved from this?
For example, we could try to actively reduce the salience of an issue we previously increased the salience of, such as by contacting the people who we convinced and who most started to increase the issueâs salience themselves (e.g., academics who started publishing relevant papers), and explaining to them our reasoning for now thinking itâs counterproductive to make this issue more salient.
2. On âwe can still do it laterâ
In some sense, itâs always the case that if you donât take an action at a given time, you canât later do exactly that same action or achieve exactly the same effects anymore. Sometimes this hardly matters, but sometimes itâs important. The important question is something like âIf we donât take this action now, to what extent could we still achieve similar expected benefits with similarly low expected harms via taking a similar action later on?â
I think very often significant value is lost by delaying net-positive actions. E.g., in general and all other factors held constant:
delaying field-building will reduce the number of full-time-equivalent years spent on key issues before itâs âtoo late anywayâ (e.g., because an existential catastrophe has happened or the problem has already been solved)
delaying efforts to improve prioritization & understanding of some issue will reduce the number of âpolicy windowsâ that occur between those efforts & the time when itâs too late anyway
I also think that sometimes delay could mean we miss a âwindow of opportunityâ for taking an action with a similar type and balance of benefits to harms of the action we have in mind. That is, there may not just be a decay in the benefits, but rather a somewhat âqualitativeâ shift in whether âsomething like this actionâ is even on the table. For example, we may miss the one key policy window we were aiming to affect.
(Somewhat relevant: Crucial questions about optimal timing of work and donations.)
3. Will we plausibly have more reason to do it later than we do now?
Delaying can only be better than acting now if at least one of the following is true:
We expect weâll be able to make a better-informed decision later
e.g., because our relevant knowledge will improve
We expect the action to become more net-positive later
e.g., because we expect favorable changes in background variablesâthe time will become âmore ripeâ
The more we expect those effects, the stronger the case for delay. The less we expect those effects, the weaker the case for delay. (A simplified way of saying this is âWhy bother delaying your decision if youâd just later be facing the same or worse decision with the same or worse info?â)
This can be weighed up against the degree to which we should worry about irreversibility and the degree to which we should worry about the costs of delay, in order to decide whether to act now. (Assuming the act does seem net positive & worth prioritizing, according to our current all-things-considered best guess.)
I think itâs usually true that weâll (in expectation) be able to make a better-informed decision later, but how true that is can vary a lot between cases, and that magnitude matters if there are costs to delay.
I think itâs sometimes true that the action will become more net-positive later, but probably usually the opposite is true (as discussed in the prior section).
See for example this post: Hard-to-reverse decisions destroy option value
I read that post ~4 years ago and remember thinking it made good points and is valuable. I expect if I re-read it Iâd still agree with it. I donât think Iâd explicitly noticed the nuances this shortform expresses when I read that post, and I didnât check today whether that post already accounts for these nuances well.
I expect that some of my points are obvious and that some readers might find it arrogant/ânaive/âweird that I wrote this without citing x y z literatures. It also seems plausible some of my points or uses of terminology are mistaken. Please feel free to mention relevant literatures and feel encouraged to highlight potential mistakes!