I havenāt read those links, but I think that that approach sounds pretty intuitive and like itās roughly what I would do anyway. So I think this would leave my credence at 0.01. (But itās hard to say, both because I havenāt read those links and because, as noted, I feel unsure what the claim even means anyway.)
(Btw, Iāve previously tried to grapple with and lay out my views on the question Can we always assign, and make sense of, subjective probabilities?, including for āsupernatural-type claimsā such as ānon-naturalistic moral realismā. Though that was one of the first posts I wrote, so is lower on concision, structure, and informed-ness than my more recent posts tend to be.)
(Also, just a heads up that the links you shared donāt work as given, since the Forum made the punctuation after the links part of the links themselves.)
Ah, good! Hmm, then this means that you really find the arguments against normative realism convincing! That is quite interesting, Iāll delve into those links you mentioned sometime to have a look. As is often the case in philosophy, though, I suspect the low credence is explained not so much by the strength of the arguments, but by the understanding of the target concept or theory (normative realism). Especially in this case as you say that you are quite unsure what it even means. There are concepts of normativity that I would give a 0.01 credence to as well, but then there are also concepts of normativity which I think imply that normative realism is trivially true. It seems to me that you could square your commitments and restore coherence to your belief set by some good old fashioned conceptual analysis on the very notion of normativity itself. That is, anyways, what I would do in this epistemic state. I myself think that you can get most of the ethics in the column with quite modest concepts of normativity that is quite compatible with a modern scientific worldview!
I havenāt read those links, but I think that that approach sounds pretty intuitive and like itās roughly what I would do anyway. So I think this would leave my credence at 0.01. (But itās hard to say, both because I havenāt read those links and because, as noted, I feel unsure what the claim even means anyway.)
(Btw, Iāve previously tried to grapple with and lay out my views on the question Can we always assign, and make sense of, subjective probabilities?, including for āsupernatural-type claimsā such as ānon-naturalistic moral realismā. Though that was one of the first posts I wrote, so is lower on concision, structure, and informed-ness than my more recent posts tend to be.)
(Also, just a heads up that the links you shared donāt work as given, since the Forum made the punctuation after the links part of the links themselves.)
Ah, good! Hmm, then this means that you really find the arguments against normative realism convincing! That is quite interesting, Iāll delve into those links you mentioned sometime to have a look. As is often the case in philosophy, though, I suspect the low credence is explained not so much by the strength of the arguments, but by the understanding of the target concept or theory (normative realism). Especially in this case as you say that you are quite unsure what it even means. There are concepts of normativity that I would give a 0.01 credence to as well, but then there are also concepts of normativity which I think imply that normative realism is trivially true. It seems to me that you could square your commitments and restore coherence to your belief set by some good old fashioned conceptual analysis on the very notion of normativity itself. That is, anyways, what I would do in this epistemic state. I myself think that you can get most of the ethics in the column with quite modest concepts of normativity that is quite compatible with a modern scientific worldview!
I updated the links, thanks!