The original argument you’re reacting to is flawed, which carries over into your second one. To make both arguments clearer, we need to know the significance of an embryo being human, why this matters to utilitarians, and what sort of utilitarians you mean. Does an embryo being human mean it has the same moral status as an adult human? Does it mean it has a similar interest in continued living as an adult embryo does? Does it mean it is harmed by death—and if so, does this harm of death leave it worse off than if it were never conceived at all?
And what type of utilitarians do you have in mind? Total hedonic utilitarians presumably wouldn’t be that worried about miscarriages for the sake of the embryos themselves even if the embryos were human, had the same moral status as adult humans, and had an interest in continued existence. That’s because embryos are usually relatively replaceable and their deaths are usually less traumatic for others than the deaths of those who are already born.
As for the harm of death, total utilitarians care about intrinsic value of outcomes, and most philosophers of death don’t think of death as an intrinsic harm. This means that for a total utilitarian, if someone pops into existence, has a good fleeting moment of existence and then dies painlessly without anything else being affected, the only thing that counts is the good moment. We don’t count the death as something bad, or something worse than the being never existing in the first place. It would be better if the being lived longer and had more good experiences, but it’s not worth preventing an existence just to prevent a death.
Total hedonic utilitarians care about saving lives because that seems like an effective way to increase good. Stopping miscarriages does not seem like an effective way to do that.
But maybe you have other sorts of utilitarians in mind. There could be some utilitarians with certain person-affecting views, or who think of death as an intrinsic harm, who might be more worried about this. But even then it would be important for them what the moral status of embryos is and whether embryos have an interest in continued existence. I would expect them to think an interest in continued existence would require sentience at least, or a greater conscious awareness than we expect embryos to have.
Hey, thanks for answering my post. Means a lot, especially since you seem to be more familiar with philosophy than me.
“Total utilitarians care about intrinsic value of outcomes.” - But a) death is painful b) death is the loss of future life c) parents grieve over miscarriages just as people grieve over the loss of a friend.
“Embryos must have an interest in continued existence.” - Hm, but I argue this is a temporary state. Say I give that mother nutrition and I wait 9 months. That embryo now has an interest in continued existence. In a similar vein, suicidal people have no interest in continued existence. But if I give that suicidal person therapy and wait some time, that person now has an interest in continued existence.
It isn’t a temporary state if the embryo dies, though, so this seems to reduce back to a potentiality argument, if we’re using a standard based on sentience for moral status.
A suicidal person may have an interest in continued existence that is contingent on them becoming better off. They may rank outcomes as
status quo < death < happiness.
The original argument you’re reacting to is flawed, which carries over into your second one. To make both arguments clearer, we need to know the significance of an embryo being human, why this matters to utilitarians, and what sort of utilitarians you mean. Does an embryo being human mean it has the same moral status as an adult human? Does it mean it has a similar interest in continued living as an adult embryo does? Does it mean it is harmed by death—and if so, does this harm of death leave it worse off than if it were never conceived at all?
And what type of utilitarians do you have in mind? Total hedonic utilitarians presumably wouldn’t be that worried about miscarriages for the sake of the embryos themselves even if the embryos were human, had the same moral status as adult humans, and had an interest in continued existence. That’s because embryos are usually relatively replaceable and their deaths are usually less traumatic for others than the deaths of those who are already born.
As for the harm of death, total utilitarians care about intrinsic value of outcomes, and most philosophers of death don’t think of death as an intrinsic harm. This means that for a total utilitarian, if someone pops into existence, has a good fleeting moment of existence and then dies painlessly without anything else being affected, the only thing that counts is the good moment. We don’t count the death as something bad, or something worse than the being never existing in the first place. It would be better if the being lived longer and had more good experiences, but it’s not worth preventing an existence just to prevent a death.
Total hedonic utilitarians care about saving lives because that seems like an effective way to increase good. Stopping miscarriages does not seem like an effective way to do that.
But maybe you have other sorts of utilitarians in mind. There could be some utilitarians with certain person-affecting views, or who think of death as an intrinsic harm, who might be more worried about this. But even then it would be important for them what the moral status of embryos is and whether embryos have an interest in continued existence. I would expect them to think an interest in continued existence would require sentience at least, or a greater conscious awareness than we expect embryos to have.
Hey, thanks for answering my post. Means a lot, especially since you seem to be more familiar with philosophy than me.
“Total utilitarians care about intrinsic value of outcomes.”
- But a) death is painful b) death is the loss of future life c) parents grieve over miscarriages just as people grieve over the loss of a friend.
“Embryos must have an interest in continued existence.”
- Hm, but I argue this is a temporary state. Say I give that mother nutrition and I wait 9 months. That embryo now has an interest in continued existence. In a similar vein, suicidal people have no interest in continued existence. But if I give that suicidal person therapy and wait some time, that person now has an interest in continued existence.
It isn’t a temporary state if the embryo dies, though, so this seems to reduce back to a potentiality argument, if we’re using a standard based on sentience for moral status.
A suicidal person may have an interest in continued existence that is contingent on them becoming better off. They may rank outcomes as status quo < death < happiness.
Relevant:
Where Are the Pro-Life Utilitarians?