I think you’re right that I’m proving too much with the broad argument, and I like your reframing of the arguments I’m making as things to be wary of. I’m still uncomfortable with longtermism-as-identity, though—possibly because I’m less certain of the four beliefs in (0).
I’d be interested in drawing the boundaries more carefully and trying to see when a worldview (that is dependent on empirical knowledge) can safely(ish) become an identity without messing too much with my ability to reason clearly.
Also, I think this all depends on the person in addition to the identity: both what someone believes and their epistemic/psychological characteristics are relevant to whether they should identify as [whatever]. So I would certainly believe you that you shouldn’t currently identify as a longtermist, and I might be convinced that a significant number of self-identified longtermists shouldn’t so identify, but I highly doubt that nobody should.
Thanks for this comment!
I think you’re right that I’m proving too much with the broad argument, and I like your reframing of the arguments I’m making as things to be wary of. I’m still uncomfortable with longtermism-as-identity, though—possibly because I’m less certain of the four beliefs in (0).
I’d be interested in drawing the boundaries more carefully and trying to see when a worldview (that is dependent on empirical knowledge) can safely(ish) become an identity without messing too much with my ability to reason clearly.
+1
Also, I think this all depends on the person in addition to the identity: both what someone believes and their epistemic/psychological characteristics are relevant to whether they should identify as [whatever]. So I would certainly believe you that you shouldn’t currently identify as a longtermist, and I might be convinced that a significant number of self-identified longtermists shouldn’t so identify, but I highly doubt that nobody should.