This all seems reasonable. But here’s why I’m going to continue thinking of myself as a longtermist.
(1) I generally agree, but at some point you become sufficiently certain in a set of beliefs, and they are sufficiently relevant to your decisions, that it’s useful to cache them. I happen to feel quite certain in each of the four beliefs you mention in (0), such that spending time questioning them generally has little expected value. But if given reason to doubt one, of course my identity “longtermist” shouldn’t interfere, and I think I’m sufficiently epistemically virtuous that I’d update.
(2) I agree that we should beware of “group-belief baggage.” Yesterday I told some EA friends that I strongly identify as an EA and with the EA project while being fundamentally agnostic on the EA movement/community. If someone identifies as an EA, or longtermist, or some other identity not exclusively determined by beliefs, I think they should be epistemically cautious. But I think it is possible to have such an identity while maintaining caution.
Put another way, I think your argument proves too much: it’s not clear what distinguishes “longtermist” from almost any other identity that implicates beliefs, so an implication of your argument seems to be that you shouldn’t adopt any such identity. And whatever conditions could make it reasonable for a person to adopt an identity, I think those conditions hold for me and longtermism.
(And when I think “I am a longtermist,” I roughly mean “I think the long-term future is a really big deal, both independent of my actions and in terms of what I should do, and I aspire to act accordingly.”)
Yesterday I told some EA friends that I strongly identify as an EA and with the EA project while being fundamentally agnostic on the EA movement/community
This seems like a useful distinction, which puts words to something on the back of my mind, thanks
Yes, the former are basically normative while the latter is largely empirical and I think it’s useful to separate them. (And Lizka does something similar in this post.)
I think you’re right that I’m proving too much with the broad argument, and I like your reframing of the arguments I’m making as things to be wary of. I’m still uncomfortable with longtermism-as-identity, though—possibly because I’m less certain of the four beliefs in (0).
I’d be interested in drawing the boundaries more carefully and trying to see when a worldview (that is dependent on empirical knowledge) can safely(ish) become an identity without messing too much with my ability to reason clearly.
Also, I think this all depends on the person in addition to the identity: both what someone believes and their epistemic/psychological characteristics are relevant to whether they should identify as [whatever]. So I would certainly believe you that you shouldn’t currently identify as a longtermist, and I might be convinced that a significant number of self-identified longtermists shouldn’t so identify, but I highly doubt that nobody should.
This all seems reasonable. But here’s why I’m going to continue thinking of myself as a longtermist.
(1) I generally agree, but at some point you become sufficiently certain in a set of beliefs, and they are sufficiently relevant to your decisions, that it’s useful to cache them. I happen to feel quite certain in each of the four beliefs you mention in (0), such that spending time questioning them generally has little expected value. But if given reason to doubt one, of course my identity “longtermist” shouldn’t interfere, and I think I’m sufficiently epistemically virtuous that I’d update.
(2) I agree that we should beware of “group-belief baggage.” Yesterday I told some EA friends that I strongly identify as an EA and with the EA project while being fundamentally agnostic on the EA movement/community. If someone identifies as an EA, or longtermist, or some other identity not exclusively determined by beliefs, I think they should be epistemically cautious. But I think it is possible to have such an identity while maintaining caution.
Put another way, I think your argument proves too much: it’s not clear what distinguishes “longtermist” from almost any other identity that implicates beliefs, so an implication of your argument seems to be that you shouldn’t adopt any such identity. And whatever conditions could make it reasonable for a person to adopt an identity, I think those conditions hold for me and longtermism.
(And when I think “I am a longtermist,” I roughly mean “I think the long-term future is a really big deal, both independent of my actions and in terms of what I should do, and I aspire to act accordingly.”)
This seems like a useful distinction, which puts words to something on the back of my mind, thanks
Yes, the former are basically normative while the latter is largely empirical and I think it’s useful to separate them. (And Lizka does something similar in this post.)
Thanks for this comment!
I think you’re right that I’m proving too much with the broad argument, and I like your reframing of the arguments I’m making as things to be wary of. I’m still uncomfortable with longtermism-as-identity, though—possibly because I’m less certain of the four beliefs in (0).
I’d be interested in drawing the boundaries more carefully and trying to see when a worldview (that is dependent on empirical knowledge) can safely(ish) become an identity without messing too much with my ability to reason clearly.
+1
Also, I think this all depends on the person in addition to the identity: both what someone believes and their epistemic/psychological characteristics are relevant to whether they should identify as [whatever]. So I would certainly believe you that you shouldn’t currently identify as a longtermist, and I might be convinced that a significant number of self-identified longtermists shouldn’t so identify, but I highly doubt that nobody should.