Thanks for your thoughtful reply—I agree that these are not directly related to EA and have edited to clarify that. I also agree that they are older and I was trying to give some exemplars in the discipline, not necessarily the relevance to EA. As to your comment about it being older, and about old examples—I agree, I looked back and realised my comment above didn’t acknowledge that, although I meant it to so I’ve edited to update. Apologies for the lack of clarity there.
Looking at what he says in the theoretical section—the talk of rationality/irrationality seems directly related to what Hanson has written on signaling theory and what Scott Alexander has written about tribalism. They are covering the same ground, this is not a topic that EAs have been ignoring. Arguably Hanson/Alexander have a more up-to-date and accurate view.
I didn’t refer to precise chapters, my apologies (that has also been updated, and thank you for the link). The most relevant sections are Chapter 10 and 11 on the organization of protests, specifically his discussions of membership and leadership-organized protests, more so than the rationality part (Chapter 9). I also agree that a paper would be more accessible—I will try to find some in the future when I have some time.
Also, could you expand on the signaling theory part and its link to rationality?
Finally, and this is a point I probably will not adequately express here, I think there is some use to older texts and scholarship if not for rapid adoption but from an academic standpoint. I find that well-written, logical texts often help me consider a separate problem with more clarity than recent scholarship that is about the same empirical topic. (On a more pragmatic note, my familiarity with older texts is because I’ve researched older social movements where these texts were useful, but I will be doing detailed research in the future on more recent scholarship). This is not time-efficient for people who aren’t already in the field, so perhaps the recommendations above were not accesible enough.
Oh you don’t need to apologize. All good. Looking forward to more reading suggestions.
Hanson’s book Elephant In The Brain is probably useful here for explaining why some people behave more rationally (or seem to behave more rationally) than others. When they join a protest, adopt its symbology and beliefs, that’s a very tribal sort of project, so it seems very amenable to this kind of analysis (though Hanson seems to think that his analysis applies to pretty much everything in the world). In the context of social movements it lets us talk about them as irrational actors while still having a scientific, predictive approach rather than telling just-so-stories.
In this review, the writer notes some implications for how to build the EA movement and institutions. I bet you could also apply this stuff to the way that radical activists and academics respond to EA.
But I say this speculatively because I haven’t really read the book, I just know the general thrust.
1) The discussions of rationality/irrationality in the links I cited don’t consider irrational actors at all, but rather to be motivated by a set of understandable and even rational beliefs and norms. Fireman and Gamson are critiquing the “irrational actor in social movement” paradigm. Their behavior is “irrational” (in the rationalist sense).
2) From the relevant portion of the article, it appears that this concern with rationality/irrationality is more about how to convince newcomers to join the movement. However, the main contribution of social movement theory is to improving the existing movement and the movement’s existing resources more effectively. And for that, I think there is a lot that the literature can contribute, even older literature because the medium of communicaton (Internet) hasn’t fundamentally changed the core of a social movement. Instead we can understand as altering the amount and form of the resources. For example, we can attract more resources and members through the internet, but local EA groups are still necessary to create a sense of personal community, provide grounds for collaboration and prevent drift out of the movement.
Thanks for your thoughtful reply—I agree that these are not directly related to EA and have edited to clarify that. I also agree that they are older and I was trying to give some exemplars in the discipline, not necessarily the relevance to EA. As to your comment about it being older, and about old examples—I agree, I looked back and realised my comment above didn’t acknowledge that, although I meant it to so I’ve edited to update. Apologies for the lack of clarity there.
I didn’t refer to precise chapters, my apologies (that has also been updated, and thank you for the link). The most relevant sections are Chapter 10 and 11 on the organization of protests, specifically his discussions of membership and leadership-organized protests, more so than the rationality part (Chapter 9). I also agree that a paper would be more accessible—I will try to find some in the future when I have some time.
Also, could you expand on the signaling theory part and its link to rationality?
Finally, and this is a point I probably will not adequately express here, I think there is some use to older texts and scholarship if not for rapid adoption but from an academic standpoint. I find that well-written, logical texts often help me consider a separate problem with more clarity than recent scholarship that is about the same empirical topic. (On a more pragmatic note, my familiarity with older texts is because I’ve researched older social movements where these texts were useful, but I will be doing detailed research in the future on more recent scholarship). This is not time-efficient for people who aren’t already in the field, so perhaps the recommendations above were not accesible enough.
Oh you don’t need to apologize. All good. Looking forward to more reading suggestions.
Hanson’s book Elephant In The Brain is probably useful here for explaining why some people behave more rationally (or seem to behave more rationally) than others. When they join a protest, adopt its symbology and beliefs, that’s a very tribal sort of project, so it seems very amenable to this kind of analysis (though Hanson seems to think that his analysis applies to pretty much everything in the world). In the context of social movements it lets us talk about them as irrational actors while still having a scientific, predictive approach rather than telling just-so-stories.
In this review, the writer notes some implications for how to build the EA movement and institutions. I bet you could also apply this stuff to the way that radical activists and academics respond to EA.
But I say this speculatively because I haven’t really read the book, I just know the general thrust.
Two points:
1) The discussions of rationality/irrationality in the links I cited don’t consider irrational actors at all, but rather to be motivated by a set of understandable and even rational beliefs and norms. Fireman and Gamson are critiquing the “irrational actor in social movement” paradigm. Their behavior is “irrational” (in the rationalist sense).
2) From the relevant portion of the article, it appears that this concern with rationality/irrationality is more about how to convince newcomers to join the movement. However, the main contribution of social movement theory is to improving the existing movement and the movement’s existing resources more effectively. And for that, I think there is a lot that the literature can contribute, even older literature because the medium of communicaton (Internet) hasn’t fundamentally changed the core of a social movement. Instead we can understand as altering the amount and form of the resources. For example, we can attract more resources and members through the internet, but local EA groups are still necessary to create a sense of personal community, provide grounds for collaboration and prevent drift out of the movement.