It is not a matter of cost effectiveness, it is a matter that letting a child die of malaria because they could each chicken is a terrible idea in many (most) ethical frameworks.
I understand I endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism much more strongly than most people. However, I think one should be very wary of pursuing actions which can easily increase suffering a lot nearterm in the hope that integrating moral uncertainty makes it worthwhile.
Now, you could argue that similarly to this case, the expected utility of saving the child might be negative even if local utility is pretty positive. It seems to me that this is convicting someone of something bad (eating a chicken) that he has not had time to do yet, and furthermore, on very handwavy probability calculations that could turn out to be wrong!
The specific numbers I presented may well be off, as there is lots of uncertainty.
However, this means extending human lives globally, and in China, India and Nigeria may be, in the nearterm, not only beneficial, but also hugely harmful. Using RPâs 5th and 95th percentile welfare range of shrimp of 0 and 1.15, and maintaining all the other inputs, the harms caused to poultry birds and farmed aquatic animals as a fraction of the direct benefits of human life in 2022 would be:
Globally, 5.61 to 372.
In China, 12.3 and 841.
In India, 1.70 and 131.
In Nigeria, 1.12 and 45.3.
It seems to me that this is convicting someone of something bad (eating a chicken) that he has not had time to do yet
I assumed the lives saved in a given country would consume as much animals as random people in that country in 2022, although I expect the consumption per capita to increase as real GDP per capita increases. I do not think it would make sense to assume a major decrease in the beneficiariesâ consumption of animals after their lives are saved.
A clear-thinking EA should strongly oppose âends justify the meansâ reasoning.
Agreed. Does the end âincreasing human welfareâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
First, naive calculations that justify some harmful action because it has good consequences are, in practice, almost never correct.
Agreed. However, I think you are implying not saving human lives is the harmful action. In my view, saving human lives can easily be the harmful action via causing lots of suffering to farmed animals.
Second, plausibly it is wrong to do harm even when doing so will bring about the best outcome.
Is it right to cause lots of harm nearterm in the hope that it increases welfare due to longterm effects?
Agreed. Does the end âsaving human livesâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
I think this is mixing things up. Switching âsaving livesâ with âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ is not symmetric because of two key points. First, one is the cause (saving the life) and the other the consequence, and as such the increasing suffering is not really a means. Second, and most importantly, the suffering only happens if the saved child decides he will actually each chicken. This highlights the key issue I have with this line of reasoning: I think people can make decisions. After all, I heard the arguments for animal welfare and I switched to a plant-based diet. Convicting people because of something people in their statistical group class do is morally wrong. For example, I would find it wrong to argue against letting an immigrant into a country because his or her reference class commits crimes with a certain frequency. And I would similarly find it dystopian to preventatively incarcerate people because the statistical group they belong to tends to commit certain crimes.
When you argue that âwe should let a child who lives in a certain village in Nigeria dieâ of malaria because Nigerians eat chicken, you are convicting the child for something he has not done yet, just something people in her country do. This I strongly find morally repugnant. This is probably a result of using utilitarianism, but even utilitarianism has limits and I strongly feel this is one of them.
The specific numbers I presented may well be off, as there is lots of uncertainty.
Let me emphasize: this is not an issue of cost-effectiveness or cause prioritization. You are not saying that it is preferable to prioritize spending the resources on cause X rather than on cause Y. You are saying that it is preferable to not spend the resources at all, and let the child die. I donât like that. You would be telling Peter Singer that actually, the drowning child should drown not because of the suit or whatever, but because the child might act unmorally in the future.
First, one is the cause (saving the life) and the other the consequence, and as such the increasing suffering is not really a means.
Fair enough. I have changed âsaving human livesâ to âincreasing human welfareâ, which is as much of a consequence/âeffect as increasing nearterm animal consumption.
This highlights the key issue I have with this line of reasoning: I think people can make decisions. After all, I heard the arguments for animal welfare and I switched to a plant-based diet.
I think it is great you switched to a plant-based diet, but this is the exception. The vast majority of people eat animal-based foods, so one should not assume the people whose lives are saved will follow a plant-based diet. People can certainly make decisions, but these resemble the past decisions of people in similar conditions, so one should not depart a lot from these (such as by assuming the people who are saved will follow a plant-based diet) without good reasons.
You are saying that it is preferable to not spend the resources at all, and let the child die. I donât like that.
I am very uncertain about whether saving the lives of children globally, and in China, India and Nigeria is good or bad, although I guess it is harmful nearterm. So I do not know whether it is better or worse than just burning the granted money, but this has implications for cause prioritisation, as I think there are interventions which are much more robustly beneficial. In particular, ones improving the conditions of animals.
Hi Pablo.
I understand I endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism much more strongly than most people. However, I think one should be very wary of pursuing actions which can easily increase suffering a lot nearterm in the hope that integrating moral uncertainty makes it worthwhile.
The specific numbers I presented may well be off, as there is lots of uncertainty.
I assumed the lives saved in a given country would consume as much animals as random people in that country in 2022, although I expect the consumption per capita to increase as real GDP per capita increases. I do not think it would make sense to assume a major decrease in the beneficiariesâ consumption of animals after their lives are saved.
Agreed. Does the end âincreasing human welfareâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
Agreed. However, I think you are implying not saving human lives is the harmful action. In my view, saving human lives can easily be the harmful action via causing lots of suffering to farmed animals.
Is it right to cause lots of harm nearterm in the hope that it increases welfare due to longterm effects?
I think this is mixing things up. Switching âsaving livesâ with âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ is not symmetric because of two key points. First, one is the cause (saving the life) and the other the consequence, and as such the increasing suffering is not really a means. Second, and most importantly, the suffering only happens if the saved child decides he will actually each chicken. This highlights the key issue I have with this line of reasoning: I think people can make decisions. After all, I heard the arguments for animal welfare and I switched to a plant-based diet. Convicting people because of something people in their statistical group class do is morally wrong. For example, I would find it wrong to argue against letting an immigrant into a country because his or her reference class commits crimes with a certain frequency. And I would similarly find it dystopian to preventatively incarcerate people because the statistical group they belong to tends to commit certain crimes.
When you argue that âwe should let a child who lives in a certain village in Nigeria dieâ of malaria because Nigerians eat chicken, you are convicting the child for something he has not done yet, just something people in her country do. This I strongly find morally repugnant. This is probably a result of using utilitarianism, but even utilitarianism has limits and I strongly feel this is one of them.
Let me emphasize: this is not an issue of cost-effectiveness or cause prioritization. You are not saying that it is preferable to prioritize spending the resources on cause X rather than on cause Y. You are saying that it is preferable to not spend the resources at all, and let the child die. I donât like that. You would be telling Peter Singer that actually, the drowning child should drown not because of the suit or whatever, but because the child might act unmorally in the future.
Fair enough. I have changed âsaving human livesâ to âincreasing human welfareâ, which is as much of a consequence/âeffect as increasing nearterm animal consumption.
I think it is great you switched to a plant-based diet, but this is the exception. The vast majority of people eat animal-based foods, so one should not assume the people whose lives are saved will follow a plant-based diet. People can certainly make decisions, but these resemble the past decisions of people in similar conditions, so one should not depart a lot from these (such as by assuming the people who are saved will follow a plant-based diet) without good reasons.
I am very uncertain about whether saving the lives of children globally, and in China, India and Nigeria is good or bad, although I guess it is harmful nearterm. So I do not know whether it is better or worse than just burning the granted money, but this has implications for cause prioritisation, as I think there are interventions which are much more robustly beneficial. In particular, ones improving the conditions of animals.