However, I think the large effects on animals should be seen as a motivation to help animals as cost-effectively as possible, and I do not see how killing people would fit this bill.
In my moral philosophy, the local negative utility of Hitlerâs death is stable, no matter what happens to the external consequences and hence to the expected utility.
Now, you could argue that similarly to this case, the expected utility of saving the child might be negative even if local utility is pretty positive. It seems to me that this is convicting someone of something bad (eating a chicken) that he has not had time to do yet, and furthermore, on very handwavy probability calculations that could turn out to be wrong!
A clear-thinking EA should strongly oppose âends justify the meansâ reasoning.
First, naive calculations that justify some harmful action because it has good consequences are, in practice, almost never correct.
Second, plausibly it is wrong to do harm even when doing so will bring about the best outcome.
Finally, let me say the post itself seems to pit animal welfare against global poverty causes, which I found divisive and probably counterproductive.
I downvoted this post because it is not representative of the values I believe EA should strive for. It may have been sufficient to show disagreement, but if someone goes for the first time into the forum and sees the post with many upvotes, their impression will be negative and may not become engaged with the community. If a reporter reads the forum and reads this, they will negatively cover both EA and animal welfare. And if someone was considering taking the 10% pledge or changing their career to support either animal welfare or global health and read this, they will be less likely to do so.
I am sorry, but I will strongly oppose âends justify the meansâ argument put forward by this post.
I donât think this is the kind of âends justify the meansâ reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to. @Vasco Grilođ¸is not arguing that we should break the law. He is just doing a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Arguing that people should not donate to global health doesnât even contradict common-sense morality because as we see from the world around us, common-sense morality holds that itâs perfectly permissible to let hundreds or thousands of children die of preventable diseases. Utilitarians and other consequentialists are the ones who hold âweirdâ views here, because we reject the act/âomission distinction in the first place.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that Iâm net-positive from the perspective of someone like Vasco as well as global health advocates.)
I donât think this is the kind of âends justify the meansâ reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to.
There is also the question of what are the means and ends here. Does the end âincreasing human welfareâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
As I commented above, it would not make any sense for someone caring about animals to kill people.
You only did so on the ground of not being an effective method, and because it would decrease support for animal welfare. Presumably, if you could press a button to kill many people without anyone attributing it to the animal welfare movement you would, then?
Presumably, if you could press a button to kill many people without anyone attributing it to the animal welfare movement you would, then?
No. I guess that would increase welfare neaterm, but could increase or decrease it overall due to uncertain longer term effects. More importantly, killing people would make me feel bad even if I was the only who would ever know about it. This would decrease my productivity and donations to the best animal welfare interventions, which would be the dominant consideration given my estimate that one can neutralise the negative effects on animals of one person in 2022 with just a few cents.
I strongly endorse impartiality. So, if forced to pick between X and Y, and it is stipulated that X increases impartial welfare more than Y despite involving killing people, I would pick X. However, I do not see anything in the real world coming anywhere close to that.
Do you not worry about moral uncertainty? Unless youâre certain about consequentialism, surely you should put some weight on avoiding killing even if it maximises impartial welfare?
I fully endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU) in principle. However, I think it is often good to think about the implications of other moral theories as heuristics to follow ETHU well in practice.
Unless youâre certain about consequentialism, surely you should put some weight on avoiding killing even if it maximises impartial welfare?
I think saving human lives increases the number of beings killed via increasing the number of farmed and wild animals killed.
I agree that thinking about other moral theories is useful for working out what utilitarianism would actually recommend.
Thatâs an interesting point re increasing the total amount of killing, I hadnât considered that! But I was actually picking up on your comment which seemed to say something more generalâthat you wouldnât intrinsically take into account whether an option involved (you) killing people, youâd just look at the consequences (and killing can lead to worse consequences, including in indirect ways, of course).
But it sounds like maybe your response to that is youâre not worried about moral uncertainty /â youâre sure about utilitarianism /â you donât have any reason to avoid killing people, other than the (normally very significant) utilitarian reasons not to kill?
But it sounds like maybe your response to that is youâre not worried about moral uncertainty /â youâre sure about utilitarianism /â you donât have any reason to avoid killing people, other than the (normally very significant) utilitarian reasons not to kill?
It is not a matter of cost effectiveness, it is a matter that letting a child die of malaria because they could each chicken is a terrible idea in many (most) ethical frameworks.
I understand I endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism much more strongly than most people. However, I think one should be very wary of pursuing actions which can easily increase suffering a lot nearterm in the hope that integrating moral uncertainty makes it worthwhile.
Now, you could argue that similarly to this case, the expected utility of saving the child might be negative even if local utility is pretty positive. It seems to me that this is convicting someone of something bad (eating a chicken) that he has not had time to do yet, and furthermore, on very handwavy probability calculations that could turn out to be wrong!
The specific numbers I presented may well be off, as there is lots of uncertainty.
However, this means extending human lives globally, and in China, India and Nigeria may be, in the nearterm, not only beneficial, but also hugely harmful. Using RPâs 5th and 95th percentile welfare range of shrimp of 0 and 1.15, and maintaining all the other inputs, the harms caused to poultry birds and farmed aquatic animals as a fraction of the direct benefits of human life in 2022 would be:
Globally, 5.61 to 372.
In China, 12.3 and 841.
In India, 1.70 and 131.
In Nigeria, 1.12 and 45.3.
It seems to me that this is convicting someone of something bad (eating a chicken) that he has not had time to do yet
I assumed the lives saved in a given country would consume as much animals as random people in that country in 2022, although I expect the consumption per capita to increase as real GDP per capita increases. I do not think it would make sense to assume a major decrease in the beneficiariesâ consumption of animals after their lives are saved.
A clear-thinking EA should strongly oppose âends justify the meansâ reasoning.
Agreed. Does the end âincreasing human welfareâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
First, naive calculations that justify some harmful action because it has good consequences are, in practice, almost never correct.
Agreed. However, I think you are implying not saving human lives is the harmful action. In my view, saving human lives can easily be the harmful action via causing lots of suffering to farmed animals.
Second, plausibly it is wrong to do harm even when doing so will bring about the best outcome.
Is it right to cause lots of harm nearterm in the hope that it increases welfare due to longterm effects?
Agreed. Does the end âsaving human livesâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
I think this is mixing things up. Switching âsaving livesâ with âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ is not symmetric because of two key points. First, one is the cause (saving the life) and the other the consequence, and as such the increasing suffering is not really a means. Second, and most importantly, the suffering only happens if the saved child decides he will actually each chicken. This highlights the key issue I have with this line of reasoning: I think people can make decisions. After all, I heard the arguments for animal welfare and I switched to a plant-based diet. Convicting people because of something people in their statistical group class do is morally wrong. For example, I would find it wrong to argue against letting an immigrant into a country because his or her reference class commits crimes with a certain frequency. And I would similarly find it dystopian to preventatively incarcerate people because the statistical group they belong to tends to commit certain crimes.
When you argue that âwe should let a child who lives in a certain village in Nigeria dieâ of malaria because Nigerians eat chicken, you are convicting the child for something he has not done yet, just something people in her country do. This I strongly find morally repugnant. This is probably a result of using utilitarianism, but even utilitarianism has limits and I strongly feel this is one of them.
The specific numbers I presented may well be off, as there is lots of uncertainty.
Let me emphasize: this is not an issue of cost-effectiveness or cause prioritization. You are not saying that it is preferable to prioritize spending the resources on cause X rather than on cause Y. You are saying that it is preferable to not spend the resources at all, and let the child die. I donât like that. You would be telling Peter Singer that actually, the drowning child should drown not because of the suit or whatever, but because the child might act unmorally in the future.
First, one is the cause (saving the life) and the other the consequence, and as such the increasing suffering is not really a means.
Fair enough. I have changed âsaving human livesâ to âincreasing human welfareâ, which is as much of a consequence/âeffect as increasing nearterm animal consumption.
This highlights the key issue I have with this line of reasoning: I think people can make decisions. After all, I heard the arguments for animal welfare and I switched to a plant-based diet.
I think it is great you switched to a plant-based diet, but this is the exception. The vast majority of people eat animal-based foods, so one should not assume the people whose lives are saved will follow a plant-based diet. People can certainly make decisions, but these resemble the past decisions of people in similar conditions, so one should not depart a lot from these (such as by assuming the people who are saved will follow a plant-based diet) without good reasons.
You are saying that it is preferable to not spend the resources at all, and let the child die. I donât like that.
I am very uncertain about whether saving the lives of children globally, and in China, India and Nigeria is good or bad, although I guess it is harmful nearterm. So I do not know whether it is better or worse than just burning the granted money, but this has implications for cause prioritisation, as I think there are interventions which are much more robustly beneficial. In particular, ones improving the conditions of animals.
I think this is trying to dodge a bullet. It is not a matter of cost effectiveness, it is a matter that letting a child die of malaria because they could each chicken is a terrible idea in many (most) ethical frameworks. Let me reemphasize, but in Elizer Yudkowski words (https://ââwww.lesswrong.com/ââposts/ââTc2H9KbKRjuDJ3WSS/ââleaky-generalizations) now:
Now, you could argue that similarly to this case, the expected utility of saving the child might be negative even if local utility is pretty positive. It seems to me that this is convicting someone of something bad (eating a chicken) that he has not had time to do yet, and furthermore, on very handwavy probability calculations that could turn out to be wrong!
Let me also quote William MacAskill comments on âWhat We Owe the Futureâ and his reflections on FTX (https://ââforum.effectivealtruism.org/ââposts/ââWdeiPrwgqW2wHAxgT/ââa-personal-statement-on-ftx):
Finally, let me say the post itself seems to pit animal welfare against global poverty causes, which I found divisive and probably counterproductive.
I downvoted this post because it is not representative of the values I believe EA should strive for. It may have been sufficient to show disagreement, but if someone goes for the first time into the forum and sees the post with many upvotes, their impression will be negative and may not become engaged with the community. If a reporter reads the forum and reads this, they will negatively cover both EA and animal welfare. And if someone was considering taking the 10% pledge or changing their career to support either animal welfare or global health and read this, they will be less likely to do so.
I am sorry, but I will strongly oppose âends justify the meansâ argument put forward by this post.
I donât think this is the kind of âends justify the meansâ reasoning that MacAskill is objecting to. @Vasco Grilođ¸is not arguing that we should break the law. He is just doing a fairly standard EA cause prioritization analysis. Arguing that people should not donate to global health doesnât even contradict common-sense morality because as we see from the world around us, common-sense morality holds that itâs perfectly permissible to let hundreds or thousands of children die of preventable diseases. Utilitarians and other consequentialists are the ones who hold âweirdâ views here, because we reject the act/âomission distinction in the first place.
(For my part, I try to donate in such a way that Iâm net-positive from the perspective of someone like Vasco as well as global health advocates.)
Thanks, JBentham.
There is also the question of what are the means and ends here. Does the end âincreasing human welfareâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
Right. As I commented above, it would not make any sense for someone caring about animals to kill people.
You only did so on the ground of not being an effective method, and because it would decrease support for animal welfare. Presumably, if you could press a button to kill many people without anyone attributing it to the animal welfare movement you would, then?
No. I guess that would increase welfare neaterm, but could increase or decrease it overall due to uncertain longer term effects. More importantly, killing people would make me feel bad even if I was the only who would ever know about it. This would decrease my productivity and donations to the best animal welfare interventions, which would be the dominant consideration given my estimate that one can neutralise the negative effects on animals of one person in 2022 with just a few cents.
I strongly endorse impartiality. So, if forced to pick between X and Y, and it is stipulated that X increases impartial welfare more than Y despite involving killing people, I would pick X. However, I do not see anything in the real world coming anywhere close to that.
Do you not worry about moral uncertainty? Unless youâre certain about consequentialism, surely you should put some weight on avoiding killing even if it maximises impartial welfare?
Hi Isaac.
I fully endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism (ETHU) in principle. However, I think it is often good to think about the implications of other moral theories as heuristics to follow ETHU well in practice.
I think saving human lives increases the number of beings killed via increasing the number of farmed and wild animals killed.
Thanks Vasco! :)
I agree that thinking about other moral theories is useful for working out what utilitarianism would actually recommend.
Thatâs an interesting point re increasing the total amount of killing, I hadnât considered that! But I was actually picking up on your comment which seemed to say something more generalâthat you wouldnât intrinsically take into account whether an option involved (you) killing people, youâd just look at the consequences (and killing can lead to worse consequences, including in indirect ways, of course). But it sounds like maybe your response to that is youâre not worried about moral uncertainty /â youâre sure about utilitarianism /â you donât have any reason to avoid killing people, other than the (normally very significant) utilitarian reasons not to kill?
Yes.
Hi Pablo.
I understand I endorse expected total hedonistic utilitarianism much more strongly than most people. However, I think one should be very wary of pursuing actions which can easily increase suffering a lot nearterm in the hope that integrating moral uncertainty makes it worthwhile.
The specific numbers I presented may well be off, as there is lots of uncertainty.
I assumed the lives saved in a given country would consume as much animals as random people in that country in 2022, although I expect the consumption per capita to increase as real GDP per capita increases. I do not think it would make sense to assume a major decrease in the beneficiariesâ consumption of animals after their lives are saved.
Agreed. Does the end âincreasing human welfareâ justify the means âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ?
Agreed. However, I think you are implying not saving human lives is the harmful action. In my view, saving human lives can easily be the harmful action via causing lots of suffering to farmed animals.
Is it right to cause lots of harm nearterm in the hope that it increases welfare due to longterm effects?
I think this is mixing things up. Switching âsaving livesâ with âincreasing nearterm suffering a lotâ is not symmetric because of two key points. First, one is the cause (saving the life) and the other the consequence, and as such the increasing suffering is not really a means. Second, and most importantly, the suffering only happens if the saved child decides he will actually each chicken. This highlights the key issue I have with this line of reasoning: I think people can make decisions. After all, I heard the arguments for animal welfare and I switched to a plant-based diet. Convicting people because of something people in their statistical group class do is morally wrong. For example, I would find it wrong to argue against letting an immigrant into a country because his or her reference class commits crimes with a certain frequency. And I would similarly find it dystopian to preventatively incarcerate people because the statistical group they belong to tends to commit certain crimes.
When you argue that âwe should let a child who lives in a certain village in Nigeria dieâ of malaria because Nigerians eat chicken, you are convicting the child for something he has not done yet, just something people in her country do. This I strongly find morally repugnant. This is probably a result of using utilitarianism, but even utilitarianism has limits and I strongly feel this is one of them.
Let me emphasize: this is not an issue of cost-effectiveness or cause prioritization. You are not saying that it is preferable to prioritize spending the resources on cause X rather than on cause Y. You are saying that it is preferable to not spend the resources at all, and let the child die. I donât like that. You would be telling Peter Singer that actually, the drowning child should drown not because of the suit or whatever, but because the child might act unmorally in the future.
Fair enough. I have changed âsaving human livesâ to âincreasing human welfareâ, which is as much of a consequence/âeffect as increasing nearterm animal consumption.
I think it is great you switched to a plant-based diet, but this is the exception. The vast majority of people eat animal-based foods, so one should not assume the people whose lives are saved will follow a plant-based diet. People can certainly make decisions, but these resemble the past decisions of people in similar conditions, so one should not depart a lot from these (such as by assuming the people who are saved will follow a plant-based diet) without good reasons.
I am very uncertain about whether saving the lives of children globally, and in China, India and Nigeria is good or bad, although I guess it is harmful nearterm. So I do not know whether it is better or worse than just burning the granted money, but this has implications for cause prioritisation, as I think there are interventions which are much more robustly beneficial. In particular, ones improving the conditions of animals.