It seems to me that TRIA is really stretching the definition of ‘equality’. Could I not equally suggest a Citizenship-Relative-Interest-Account? This would fit well with people’s nationalistic intuitions. Indeed, if we look at the list of things GWWC claimed EAs do not discriminate based on, we could circumvent all of them with cunningly crafted X-Relative-Interest-Accounts.
I agree a moral discontinuity would be very perverse. But it seems there are many better options. For example, a totalist view—that people matter even before they are conceived—avoids this issue, and doesn’t suffer from the various inconsistencies that person-affecting views do. Alternatively, if you thought that we should not value people who don’t exist in any way, conception provides a clear discontinuity in many ways, such that it does not seem like it would be weird if there was a moral value discontinuity there also.
But I think the biggest problem is that, even if you accept TRIA, I suspect that most people’s moral intuitions would produce a very different weighting distribution. Specifically, they would be more averse to causing pain to 5 year olds than adults—especially adult men. If I have time I might look into whether there has been any empirical research on the subject; it could be a useful project.
First, I want to say that I do not endorse TRIA. This post wanted to look at applying the SWB approach given what people’s moral views seem to be, rather than evaluate how good those views are. GiveWell staff and many EAs (implictly) endorse TRIA, hence I discussed it.
FWIW, I don’t think the concern that TRIA ignores equality really hits the mark. If you think what matters is interest, then you weight by the strength of interest, and—adding some further theory—young children don’t seem to have such strong interest in survival as older humans. I think there are deep problems with TRIA, but I don’t think concerns about equality is one of them.
It seems to me that TRIA is really stretching the definition of ‘equality’. Could I not equally suggest a Citizenship-Relative-Interest-Account? This would fit well with people’s nationalistic intuitions. Indeed, if we look at the list of things GWWC claimed EAs do not discriminate based on, we could circumvent all of them with cunningly crafted X-Relative-Interest-Accounts.
I agree a moral discontinuity would be very perverse. But it seems there are many better options. For example, a totalist view—that people matter even before they are conceived—avoids this issue, and doesn’t suffer from the various inconsistencies that person-affecting views do. Alternatively, if you thought that we should not value people who don’t exist in any way, conception provides a clear discontinuity in many ways, such that it does not seem like it would be weird if there was a moral value discontinuity there also.
But I think the biggest problem is that, even if you accept TRIA, I suspect that most people’s moral intuitions would produce a very different weighting distribution. Specifically, they would be more averse to causing pain to 5 year olds than adults—especially adult men. If I have time I might look into whether there has been any empirical research on the subject; it could be a useful project.
First, I want to say that I do not endorse TRIA. This post wanted to look at applying the SWB approach given what people’s moral views seem to be, rather than evaluate how good those views are. GiveWell staff and many EAs (implictly) endorse TRIA, hence I discussed it.
FWIW, I don’t think the concern that TRIA ignores equality really hits the mark. If you think what matters is interest, then you weight by the strength of interest, and—adding some further theory—young children don’t seem to have such strong interest in survival as older humans. I think there are deep problems with TRIA, but I don’t think concerns about equality is one of them.