I agree that traditional/pure/naive/act utilitarians are not going to believe in any special obligations to parents—the same way they don’t believe in special obligations to be honest, or keep promises, or be a good friend. If you object to special obligations to parents because they are ‘forc[ing] an unformed, non-consenting minor to sign a binding, life long conflict’, you should be much more averse to traditional utilitarianism, which is one of the most totalising moral philosophies. On the other hand, if you want to make modifications to utilitarianism, special treatment for family seems pretty plausible.
Larks
Good comment—I agree this is a meaningful distinction, though I don’t think it cuts as strongly as you do.
Firstly, I’m not sure where you are getting ‘impossible to discharge’ from. If you borrow $100, you would typically discharge that obligation by repaying $100 (plus interest). Similarly, if you believed in natalist obligations to parents, it seems logical that an obligation created by your parents investing say 19 years in raising you, could be discharged by through similar amount of investment.
Secondly, many of the obligations I mentioned cannot easily be avoided either. Moving to another country might get you out of paying taxes in one place, but you’ll probably have to pay them in the new place—and some countries like the US will continue to tax you even if you leave! Similarly national service is often based on citizenship, not residency, and obligations like decency and pond intervention cannot be discharged (though I guess you could choose to live in a location with few ponds and very buoyant children).
It’s even the case that many people seem to view leaving, and thereby escaping from location-based obligations, as immoral—see for example brain drain criticism, or criticism of fighting-age men for fleeing their country rather than defend it.
I don’t mean to take a strong stance here defending any particular one of these obligations. My point is just that a lot of people do believe in them.
Hiii! Do you know someplace where I can read up on that? Ty!
I’m afraid I don’t have anything great to hand. I can give you a quick summary of the arguments though. (I realise this is not what you asked for, but I figure better than nothing, which is realistically my alternative action).
There are I think three main arguments:
UNRWA operates very differently from all other UN refugee programs because it viewed refugee status as hereditary. For most conflicts, the aim is to find a safe place for displaced people to live… their children should become citizens of their new home. Only in this case are the grandchildren viewed as having a strong moral claim to return to a land they have never seen, which (combined with their high birth rate) means the size of the refugee population has increased over time, rather than decreasing. Apparently even if someone requests to be de-listed as a refugee because they are happily settled elsewhere, UNRWA will refuse and still count them (and their descendents). This is convenient for Israel’s enemies who like the perpetuation of the problem.
UNRWA distributes textbooks and pays teachers that promote hatred of Israel and Jews, celebrate terrorists and jihad, and denies the viability of peace. Some of these textbooks are part of the Palestinian government curriculum which UNRWA claims it has no choice but to distribute; other material is produced by UNRWA employees directly.
Hamas directly operate communications, command centers, and weapon storage out of or underneath UNRWA offices, with at least the tacit support of UNRWA.
There are other criticisms of them (e.g. they allow aid to be expropriated by Hamas, UNRWA employees took part in the October 7th massacre, UNRWA helped hold hostages) but the three I mentioned above are the key ones for UNRWA having negative long-term effects.
If you’re worried about population issues, just donate $10k to bednets. That’s roughly the equivalent of two extra children existing in the world.
[assuming fertility does not fall as child mortality falls]
If you think you “owe it” to your parents, consider how unethical it is for somebody in a position of power to force an uninformed, non-consenting minor to sign a binding, life long contract.
This feels a bit like an isolated demand for rigour to me. Most people believe that ’uninformed, non-consenting minor’s do acquire obligations, for example:
To pay taxes, and support their share (as determined by the government) of the national debt.
To serve in the military in the event of conscription.
To do jury duty.
To vote, ideally in a well-informed fashion.
To save nearby drowning children in pools if it is cheap to do so.
To avoid being grossly rude to strangers for no reason.
If you are an Randian libertarian, who rejects these sorts of obligations, then it seems reasonable to also reject obligations to parents. But if you believe in any sort of non-contractual positive duty, duties to your parents should not seem weird… in fact it seems much more plausible that you might have special duties to the parents to whom you owe your life and childhood than to strangers who have done nothing for you.
This seems like a very surface look at the issue, and not a very good advert for trusting LLM outputs. For example, I don’t see how you can recommend UNRWA without at least considering the idea that, by promoting revanchism and ethnic hatred, they are one of the long-term causes of Palestinian terrorism and thereby suffering in both Israel and Gaza.
(And more generally, I disagree with the use of the EA forum to promote causes without even attempting to argue they might be potential EA causes).
And yet . . . if you put these same ideas into the mouth of a random person, I suspect the vast majority of the Forum readership and commentariat would dismiss them as ridiculous ramblings, the same way we would treat the speech of your average person holding forth about the end of days on an urban street corner.
I think this is a reasonable objection to make in general—I made similar objections in a similar case here.
But I think your argument that Peter hasn’t done anything to earn any epistemic credit is mistaken:
To the extent that we’re analyzing what Thiel is selling with any degree of seriousness because of his wealth and influence rather than the merit of his ideas, does that pose any epistemic concerns? To my (Christian) ears, this should be taken about as seriously as a major investor in the Coca-Cola Company spouting off that Pepsi is the work of Antichrist
This seems quite dis-analogous to me. Peter has made his money largely by making a small number of investments that have done extraordinarily well. Skill at this involves understanding leaders and teams, future technological developments, economics and other fields. It’s always possible to get lucky, but his degree of success provides I think significant evidence of skill. In contrast, over the last 25 years Coca-Cola has significantly underperformed the S&P500, so your hypothetical Pepsi critic does not have the same standing.
Thanks a lot for all your comments on this post, I found them very informative. (And the top-level post from Ben as well).
Are people generally in favour of the bombings? Or do you really mean *Americans*? What do people in liberal democracies like say Spain that didn’t participate in WW2 think? People in Nigeria? India? Personally, I doubt you could construct a utilitarian defense of first dropping the bombs on cities rather than starting with a warning shot demonstration at the very least.
I don’t know about globally, but there are a lot of Chinese people, and they generally support the bombings, which has to take us a fair bit of the the way towards general support. (I’m not aware of any research into the views of Indians or Nigerians). And the classic utilitarian defense is that there were a limited number of bombs of unknown reliability, so they couldn’t be wasted—though to be honest, asking for warning shots seems a bit like special pleading. Warning shots are for deterring aggression in the first place—not for after the attacker has already struck, and shows no sign of stopping.
Thanks for the response!
Reparations and direct cash transfers seem like totally different things to me. GiveDirectly is about rich people giving to poor people; reparations are about (the descendants of) bad people giving to (the descendants of) their victims. Even if you believe in this sort of inter-generational blood debt and handwave aside the non-identity problem, there is the direction of payment will often diverge from GiveDirectly. For example, many of the descendants of slavers presumably remain in Africa and are quite poor, while the descendants of many of their victims now live in America and have significantly higher incomes.
Your complaint here should be with the OP, not Geoffrey. “Don’t discuss colonialism” might be a plausible principle for EA; “you can discuss colonialism, but only if you say it is bad” is terrible community epistemics.
I feel like you are reacting to my comment in isolation, rather than as a response to a specific thing Will wrote. My comment is already significantly more concrete and less abstract than Will’s on the same topic.
When Will says ‘uncoordinated’, he clearly doesn’t mean ‘the OpenAI product team is not good at using Slack’, he means ‘competition between large groups’. Will’s key point is that marginally-saved worlds will be not very good; I am saying that the features that lead to danger here cause good things elsewhere, so marginally saved worlds might be very good. One of these features is competition-between-relevant-units. The ontological question of what the unit of competition is doesn’t seem particularly relevant to this—neither Will not I are disputing the importance of coordination within firms or individuals.
Thanks for sharing!
I’m not sure if you intend to do a separate post on it, so I’ll include this feedback here. You argue that:
Conditional on successfully preventing an extinction-level catastrophe, you should expect Flourishing to be (perhaps much) lower than otherwise, because a world that needs saving is more likely to be uncoordinated, poorly directed, or vulnerable in the long run
This seems quite unclear to me. In the supplement you describe one reason it might be false (uncertainty about future algorithmic efficiency). But it seems to me there is a much bigger one: competition.
In general, competition of various kinds seems like it has been one of the most positive forces for human development—competition between individuals for excellence, between scientists for innovation, between companies for cost-effectively meeting consumer wants, and between countries. Historically ‘uncoordinated’ competition has often had much better results than coordination! But it also drives AI risk. A world with a single leviathan seems like it would have higher chances of survival, but also lower flourishing.
via lost tax revenue, increased demand on need-based social service programs, etc.
I am skeptical of this style of argument, because it seems like it allows a sort of illiberal rhetorical transmutation. A government can take some private aspect of life that it does not have the right to regulate, subsidize part of it, and then claim that those who behave in undesired ways are ‘demanding’ social assistance, negatively affecting the taxpayer, and hence can be regulated.
Thanks for sharing!
One note: I am sceptical that hangovers should be counted as negative externalities:
Outside of the huge economic costs imposed by death, worse health, and violence related to alcohol, hangovers alone lead to $220 billion in lost productivity each year in the U.S., or $650 for every person in the country per year. Adding this number to the costs of drunk driving alone means that alcohol externalities are costing society over $1000 per year per person. Each person you know is effectively paying $1000 per year for alcohol to be a normal part of our culture, over and above the actual cost of drinks.
Assuming functioning labour markets, much of the effect of hangovers on productivity seems like it should be internalised by the worker. If you show up to hungover, you will be less likely to be promoted, more likely to be fired, receive smaller bonuses etc.
(I agree you are right in cases where labour markets do not function as well and reward is less well tied to productivity, like with trade unions or government employees)
Presumably in 250 million years humans, if we survive that long, will be capable of addressing any issues posed by the end of plate techtonics.
Housing is cheap in Texas because the regulatory burden of getting permission to build is low, so the price of housing stays near the cost of building more. In San Fransisco it is almost impossible to get permission to build, so the price is bid up by demand to a level far exceeding the physical cost of construction. Land taxes are not a major driver of this.
When thinking about the ‘neocolonialist criticism’, I think it’s worth taking some time to critically evaluate the ideological power structures that lead to people talking about ‘neocolonialism’.
Because what I think is quite clear ‘neocolonialism’ doesn’t really make sense from a truth-seeking perspective. To run very quickly through the post, we start with a definition of ‘colonialism’ which should raise some red flags:
Colonialism, as defined by political philosophers, is the reduction of one people’s sovereignty by another, typically through direct political and military domination.
What I think immediately jumps out here is… the absence of any mention of colonists? According to this definition, Icelandic colonization of Greenland was… not colonialism. But the Allied invasion of Germany in 1945 was colonialism?
But then it gets worse. We two different, incredibly vague definitions, neither of which are equivalent to each other:
Neocolonialism, by contrast, operates after formal independence. It sustains the same power dynamics through economic control, international institutions, and cultural influence.
As philosopher Oseni Taiwo Afisi writes, neocolonialism refers to “the actions and effects of certain remnant features and agents of the colonial era in a given society.” It’s colonialism without conquest.I’m not going to spend a lot of time on these definitions, except to note they also don’t really make sense—are Roman roads and Catholic churches in England, a remnant feature of Roman Imperialism, neocolonialism?
We then jump to an allegation that poverty in Africa is due to colonialism (and, perhaps, also neocolonialism):
This framing matters. Sub-Saharan Africa, the region where EA often focuses its efforts, continues to bear the scars of colonialism.
But the chart attached doesn’t show this at all. It shows there is a higher fraction of people in poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa than elsewhere. But there is no reason to think this is because of colonialism—after all, throughout history people all over the world have been repeatedly had their sovereignty reduced through military and political domination, it’s not unique to sub-Saharan Africa. Even if you for some reason ignored all non-European colonialism, Sub-Saharan Africa was actually colonized for a much shorter period of time than many other parts of the world because of Malaria—Canada is rich and Ethiopia is poor, but Canada is a deeply colonial country in a way that Ethiopia is not.
So why do people like to use such a vague and misleading concept? I think the answer is it serves a very convenient ideological purpose.
In the aftermath of the second world war, a lot of people wanted to claim that the reason Africa was poor compared to other parts of the world was because of imperialism. Unfortunately, their predictions that Africa would rapidly develop once granted their independence were falsified, and most of the standard explanations for this were not congruent with nationalist or leftist ideology. As such, neocolonialism becomes a very convenient god-of-the-gaps—it allows them to explain why Africa is poor because Europeans are extracting resources and directly administering territory and why Africa is poor because Europeans are giving foreign aid after giving independence.
Importantly, no measure of degree is required for allegations of neocolonialism. Any sensible accounting would show that the degree of European control over sub-Saharan Africa has fallen dramatically post independence, and the continuing interactions (e.g. as export markets, or as providers of advanced technologies and foreign aid) have little in common with the behaviours that motivated opposition to colonialism in the first place.
What does this mean from an EA perspective? Arguments about whether EA should ‘listen to poor people’ more are a sensible thing to discuss. But framing this in terms of as fundamentally flawed a concept as ‘neocolonialism’ casts more shadow than light over the issue.
I’m not sure that ‘high likelihood of failure’ situations necessarily yield negative welfare as you suggest. For example, objectively speaking, most startup founders work extremely hard creating an unprofitable company that then fails. But I don’t think it would be value enhancing for the founders to prevent them from founding companies—they seem to receive a huge amount of motivation from thinking about the small chance that they instead succeed in creating a very large and profitable company. Their incentive structure is not so much a negative feedback ‘avoid things that will be bad for the company’ as a positive feedback ‘do things that have a small chance of making the company very successful’.
I don’t see how this can possible be a knock on economics as a field (even if we grant for the sake of argument your somewhat selective citing of the academic literature here) since your sources for the ‘actual empirical evidence’ are economics papers published by economists in economics journals. It looks like you, like other social scientists, agree that the gold standard for ‘actual empirical evidence’ on social questions is citations to economics papers.