I’m thankful for this discussion. Previously, I was under the impression that most people who looked deeply into WAS concluded that there was definitely net suffering. However, now it’s clear to me this isn’t the case.
Brian—I’m wondering if you’ve explained elsewhere exactly what you mean by “extreme, unbearable suffering can’t be outweighed by other organism-moments experiencing pleasure.” Is this an expression of negative utilitarianism, or just the empirical claim that current organisms have greater suffering capacity than pleasure capacity?
I am a total hedonic utilitarian, and not negative leaning at all, so I’m wondering what conclusion this philosophical position would lead to, given all the empirical considerations.
You’re right that communication on this topic hasn’t always been the most clear. :)
This section of my reply to Michael Plant helps explain my view on those questions. I think assessments of the intensities of pain and pleasure necessarily involve significant normative judgment calls, unless you define pain and pleasure in a sufficiently concrete way that it becomes a factual matter. (But that begs the question of what concrete definition is the right one to choose.)
I guess most people who aim to quantify pleasure and pain don’t choose numbers such that unbearable suffering outweighs any amount of pleasure, so the statement you quoted could be said to be mainly about my negative-utilitarian values (though I would say that a view that pleasure can outweigh unbearable suffering is ultimately a statement about someone’s non-negative-utilitarian values).
I think this is a good place to start, although not written by Brian:
There’s ongoing sickening cruelty: violent child pornography, chickens are boiled alive, and so on. We should help these victims and prevent such suffering, rather than focus on ensuring that many individuals come into existence in the future. When spending resources on increasing the number of beings instead of preventing extreme suffering, one is essentially saying to the victims: “I could have helped you, but I didn’t, because I think it’s more important that individuals are brought into existence. Sorry.” (See this essay for a longer case for suffering-focused ethics.)
I’m thankful for this discussion. Previously, I was under the impression that most people who looked deeply into WAS concluded that there was definitely net suffering. However, now it’s clear to me this isn’t the case.
Brian—I’m wondering if you’ve explained elsewhere exactly what you mean by “extreme, unbearable suffering can’t be outweighed by other organism-moments experiencing pleasure.” Is this an expression of negative utilitarianism, or just the empirical claim that current organisms have greater suffering capacity than pleasure capacity?
I am a total hedonic utilitarian, and not negative leaning at all, so I’m wondering what conclusion this philosophical position would lead to, given all the empirical considerations.
You’re right that communication on this topic hasn’t always been the most clear. :)
This section of my reply to Michael Plant helps explain my view on those questions. I think assessments of the intensities of pain and pleasure necessarily involve significant normative judgment calls, unless you define pain and pleasure in a sufficiently concrete way that it becomes a factual matter. (But that begs the question of what concrete definition is the right one to choose.)
I guess most people who aim to quantify pleasure and pain don’t choose numbers such that unbearable suffering outweighs any amount of pleasure, so the statement you quoted could be said to be mainly about my negative-utilitarian values (though I would say that a view that pleasure can outweigh unbearable suffering is ultimately a statement about someone’s non-negative-utilitarian values).
I think this is a good place to start, although not written by Brian: