Youâre the one whoâs redefining utilitarianism- which is commonly defined as maximization of happiness and well-being of conscious beings. You can consider integrating other terminal values into what youâd like to do, but youâre not really discussing utilitarianism at that point, as itâs commonly used. For instance, Greenberg points to truth as a potential terminal value, which would be at odds with utilitarianism as itâs typically used.
I think Singer is a hedonic utilitarian for what itâs worth, and I think I subscribe to it while acknowledging that weighing the degrees of positive and negatively subjective experiences of many kinds is daunting.
As for having other instrumental values (which is why I donât really think the âburnoutâ argument is very good as against utilitarianism, I agree with you on that one.
I agree that âutilitarianismâ often gets elided into meaning a variation of hedonic utilitarianism. I would like to hold philosophical discourse to a higher bar. In particular, once someone mentions hedonic utilitarianism, Iâm going to hold them to the standard of separating out hedonic utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism, for example.
I agree hedonic utilitarians exist. Iâm just saying the utilitarians Iâve talked to always add more terms than pleasure and suffering to their utility function. Most are preference utilitarians.
Preference utilitarianism and valuism donât have much in common.
Preference utilitarianism: maximize the interests/âpreferences of all beings impartially.
First, preferences and intrinsic values are not the same thing. For instance, you may have a preference to eat Cheetos over eating nachos, but that doesnât mean you intrinsically value eating Cheetos or that eating Cheetos necessarily gets you more of what you intrinsically value than eating nachos will. Human choice is driven by a lot of factors other than just intrinsic values (though intrinsic values play a role).
Second, preference utilitarianism is not about your own preferences, itâs about the preferences of all beings impartially.
Youâre the one whoâs redefining utilitarianism- which is commonly defined as maximization of happiness and well-being of conscious beings. You can consider integrating other terminal values into what youâd like to do, but youâre not really discussing utilitarianism at that point, as itâs commonly used. For instance, Greenberg points to truth as a potential terminal value, which would be at odds with utilitarianism as itâs typically used.
I think Singer is a hedonic utilitarian for what itâs worth, and I think I subscribe to it while acknowledging that weighing the degrees of positive and negatively subjective experiences of many kinds is daunting.
As for having other instrumental values (which is why I donât really think the âburnoutâ argument is very good as against utilitarianism, I agree with you on that one.
I agree that âutilitarianismâ often gets elided into meaning a variation of hedonic utilitarianism. I would like to hold philosophical discourse to a higher bar. In particular, once someone mentions hedonic utilitarianism, Iâm going to hold them to the standard of separating out hedonic utilitarianism and preference utilitarianism, for example.
I agree hedonic utilitarians exist. Iâm just saying the utilitarians Iâve talked to always add more terms than pleasure and suffering to their utility function. Most are preference utilitarians.
Preference utilitarianism and valuism donât have much in common.
Preference utilitarianism: maximize the interests/âpreferences of all beings impartially.
First, preferences and intrinsic values are not the same thing. For instance, you may have a preference to eat Cheetos over eating nachos, but that doesnât mean you intrinsically value eating Cheetos or that eating Cheetos necessarily gets you more of what you intrinsically value than eating nachos will. Human choice is driven by a lot of factors other than just intrinsic values (though intrinsic values play a role).
Second, preference utilitarianism is not about your own preferences, itâs about the preferences of all beings impartially.