I will probably rename this post eventually to “Why the Irreducible Normativity Wager Fails.” I now think there are three separate wagers related to moral realism:
An infinitely strong wager to act as though Irreducible Normativity applies
An infinitely strong wager to act as though normative qualia exist (this can be viewed as a subcategory of the Irreducible Normativity wager)
A conditionally strong wager to expect moral convergence
I will argue that this is not per se a wager for “moral realism” but actually equivalent to a wager for valuing moral reflection under anti-realism; the degree to which it applies depends on one’s prior intuitions and normative convictions.
I don’t find the first two wagers convincing. The last wager definitely works in my view, but since it’s only conditionally strong, it doesn’t quite work the way people think it does. I will devote future posts to wagers 2 and 3 in the list above. This post here only covers the first wager.
I will probably rename this post eventually to “Why the Irreducible Normativity Wager Fails.” I now think there are three separate wagers related to moral realism:
An infinitely strong wager to act as though Irreducible Normativity applies
An infinitely strong wager to act as though normative qualia exist (this can be viewed as a subcategory of the Irreducible Normativity wager)
A conditionally strong wager to expect moral convergence
I will argue that this is not per se a wager for “moral realism” but actually equivalent to a wager for valuing moral reflection under anti-realism; the degree to which it applies depends on one’s prior intuitions and normative convictions.
I don’t find the first two wagers convincing. The last wager definitely works in my view, but since it’s only conditionally strong, it doesn’t quite work the way people think it does. I will devote future posts to wagers 2 and 3 in the list above. This post here only covers the first wager.