I remain a non-doomer (and am considering such bets more recently), but support this comment. I don’t think the above criticisms make sense, but with a couple of caveats:
1) Zach Stein-Perlman’s above borrowing in general seems reasonable. If your response is that it’s high risk, it seems like making a bet is de-facto asking the better to shoulder that risk for you
2) ‘This would not be good for you unless you were an immoral sociopath with no concern for the social opprobrium that results from not honouring the bet.’ - I know you were responding to his ‘can’t possibly be good for you’ comment (emph mine), but I don’t see why this isn’t a rational behaviour if you think the world is going to end in <4 years. Both from a selfish perspective—is it selfishly rational to be concerned about a couple of years of reduced reputation vs extinction beyond that?; and from an altruistic perspective—if you think the world is almost certainly doomed, that the counterfactual world in which we survive is extremely +EV, and that spending the extra money could move the needle on preventing doom, it seems crazy not to just spend it and figure out the reputational details on the slim chance we survive.
The second is one of the main sources of counterparty risk that makes me wary of such bets—it seems like it would be irrational for anyone to accept them with me in good faith.
it seems crazy not to just spend it and figure out the reputational details on the slim chance we survive.
Even if I thought it was 90%+ doomed, it’s this kind of attitude that has got us into this whole mess in the first place! People burning the commons for short term gain is directly leading to massive amounts of x-risk.
Reading the Eliezer thread, I think I agree with him that there’s no obvious financial gain for you if you hard-lock the money you’d have to pay back.
I don’t follow this comment. You’re saying Vasco gives you X now, 2X to be paid back after k years. You plan to spend X/2 now, and lock up X/2, but somehow borrow 3/(2X) money now, such that you can pay the full amount back in k years? I’m presumably misunderstanding—I don’t see why you’d make the bet now if you could just borrow that much, or why anyone would be willing to lend to you based on money that you were legally/technologically committed to giving away in k years.
One version that makes more sense to me is planning to pay back in installments, on the understanding that you’d be making enough money to do so at the agreed rate—though a) that comes with obviously increased counterparty risk, and b) it still doesn’t make much sense if your moneymaking strategy is investing money which you have rather than selling service/labour, since, again, it seems irrational for you to have any money at the end of the k-year period.
I don’t follow this comment. You’re saying Vasco gives you X now, 2X to be paid back after k years. You plan to spend X/2 now, and lock up X/2, but somehow borrow 3/(2X) money now, such that you can pay the full amount back in k years?
Nitpick. (3/2) X, not 3/(2 X).
If one expects investments to grow more (in real terms) than the product “cost-effectiveness of altruistic spending conditional on survival”*”probability of survival” will decrease, it makes sense to invest as much as possible now, and then donate as much as possible later. Funders of altruistic interventions should try to equalise the product I just mentioned across years (otherwise, they should move their spending from the worst to the best years).
On the 1st point, I think one should borrow money from banks until the conditions for borrowing additional money become as good as those of the available bets, and then get money both ways afterwards. Refusing a bet which is beneficial relative to nothing because there are loans with better conditions suggests one should be asking for more loans.
On the 2nd point, I wondered about the possibility of Greg not fulfilling the bet in order to decrease AI risk further, but I believe the world will look roughly the same way as now in terms of risk. So I expect Greg will not be much more worried than now, and therefore will fulfill the bet.
I remain a non-doomer (and am considering such bets more recently), but support this comment. I don’t think the above criticisms make sense, but with a couple of caveats:
1) Zach Stein-Perlman’s above borrowing in general seems reasonable. If your response is that it’s high risk, it seems like making a bet is de-facto asking the better to shoulder that risk for you
2) ‘This would not be good for you unless you were an immoral sociopath with no concern for the social opprobrium that results from not honouring the bet.’ - I know you were responding to his ‘can’t possibly be good for you’ comment (emph mine), but I don’t see why this isn’t a rational behaviour if you think the world is going to end in <4 years. Both from a selfish perspective—is it selfishly rational to be concerned about a couple of years of reduced reputation vs extinction beyond that?; and from an altruistic perspective—if you think the world is almost certainly doomed, that the counterfactual world in which we survive is extremely +EV, and that spending the extra money could move the needle on preventing doom, it seems crazy not to just spend it and figure out the reputational details on the slim chance we survive.
The second is one of the main sources of counterparty risk that makes me wary of such bets—it seems like it would be irrational for anyone to accept them with me in good faith.
I think it’s maybe 60% doomed.
Even if I thought it was 90%+ doomed, it’s this kind of attitude that has got us into this whole mess in the first place! People burning the commons for short term gain is directly leading to massive amounts of x-risk.
Reading the Eliezer thread, I think I agree with him that there’s no obvious financial gain for you if you hard-lock the money you’d have to pay back.
I don’t follow this comment. You’re saying Vasco gives you X now, 2X to be paid back after k years. You plan to spend X/2 now, and lock up X/2, but somehow borrow 3/(2X) money now, such that you can pay the full amount back in k years? I’m presumably misunderstanding—I don’t see why you’d make the bet now if you could just borrow that much, or why anyone would be willing to lend to you based on money that you were legally/technologically committed to giving away in k years.
One version that makes more sense to me is planning to pay back in installments, on the understanding that you’d be making enough money to do so at the agreed rate—though a) that comes with obviously increased counterparty risk, and b) it still doesn’t make much sense if your moneymaking strategy is investing money which you have rather than selling service/labour, since, again, it seems irrational for you to have any money at the end of the k-year period.
Where I say “some of which I borrow against now (with 100% interest over 5 years)”, I’m referring to the bet.
Nitpick. (3/2) X, not 3/(2 X).
If one expects investments to grow more (in real terms) than the product “cost-effectiveness of altruistic spending conditional on survival”*”probability of survival” will decrease, it makes sense to invest as much as possible now, and then donate as much as possible later. Funders of altruistic interventions should try to equalise the product I just mentioned across years (otherwise, they should move their spending from the worst to the best years).
Nice points, Sasha!
On the 1st point, I think one should borrow money from banks until the conditions for borrowing additional money become as good as those of the available bets, and then get money both ways afterwards. Refusing a bet which is beneficial relative to nothing because there are loans with better conditions suggests one should be asking for more loans.
On the 2nd point, I wondered about the possibility of Greg not fulfilling the bet in order to decrease AI risk further, but I believe the world will look roughly the same way as now in terms of risk. So I expect Greg will not be much more worried than now, and therefore will fulfill the bet.
As previously referred to, I can’t get bank loans (no stable income).