I’ve replied to your comment on the other post now.
I don’t want to repeat myself here too much, but my feeling is that explaining our luck in close calls using our position as observers does have the same problems that I think the anthropic shadow argument does.
It was never guaranteed that observers would survive until now, and the fact that we have is evidence of a low catastrophe rate.
It was never guaranteed that observers would survive until now, and the fact that we have is evidence of a low catastrophe rate.
This is why this paper assumes there are an arbitrarily large number of worlds. If there are an arbitrarily large number of worlds then if it is possible for a particular event to occur it becomes guaranteed that it will occur in a particular world.
To formalize my claim if
it is possible for observers to survive until now, and
There are an arbitrarily large number of worlds, then
All possibilities will occur in some world
Of course, if you don’t believe in many worlds this argument remains valid but isn’t sound. This is the same line of argument that allows the many world’s views to block the inference to God from universal fine-tuning. Do you have a view on the fine-tuning cases?
I will respond to your comment on the other post, we can move into DMs if you are interested in discussing this further as that would consolidate the conversation.
I’ve replied to your comment on the other post now.
I don’t want to repeat myself here too much, but my feeling is that explaining our luck in close calls using our position as observers does have the same problems that I think the anthropic shadow argument does.
It was never guaranteed that observers would survive until now, and the fact that we have is evidence of a low catastrophe rate.
This is why this paper assumes there are an arbitrarily large number of worlds. If there are an arbitrarily large number of worlds then if it is possible for a particular event to occur it becomes guaranteed that it will occur in a particular world.
To formalize my claim if
it is possible for observers to survive until now, and
There are an arbitrarily large number of worlds, then
All possibilities will occur in some world
Of course, if you don’t believe in many worlds this argument remains valid but isn’t sound. This is the same line of argument that allows the many world’s views to block the inference to God from universal fine-tuning. Do you have a view on the fine-tuning cases?
I will respond to your comment on the other post, we can move into DMs if you are interested in discussing this further as that would consolidate the conversation.