Ember

Karma: 81

Ember 18 Oct 2022 20:13 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: turchin’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
“I am randomly selected from all animals” I don’t endorse this claim. It implies that my essence is prior to my existence, and I disagree with this assumption. I do believe I was once a soul placed into a random body within a set.
My essence follows from my existence, if I was different I would be someone else. I do stand by the claim, “I can reason as if I am randomly selected from all animals” this is true for any set I am a part of, if you did select a random member of that set I am a possible result, some sets just give unintuitive results, but that’s simply because reasoning from a particular positionality only gives part of the picture.
Anthropic shadow only requires the later epistemic claim to be valid and is not dependent on the metaphysical claim.

Ember 17 Oct 2022 1:31 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: turchin’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
The fact that I am not an ant doesn’t undermine it because I know that I am human. Humans will always be humans, and so have a tendency to discover themselves to be humans. This selection effect is even more extreme than the tendency for humans to find themselves in worlds without a nuclear war.
I could not be anything but what I am, as then I would not be myself. A reference class of just me is however not useful. So to do anthropic reasoning I conceive of myself as one of a set to which I belong and consider how general observation biases within that set might be misleading me.
In the fine-tuned planet case the fact that Animals couldn’t have occurred on a planet without liquid water is useful. The various contingencies around the seeming fine-tuning of the earth are explained by my being an animal. I am where animals, and by extension me, could exist.

Ember 15 Oct 2022 18:33 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: turchin’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
Yes. I am a random animal within the set of animals. I am also a random human, a random American, a random anthropics enthusiast, a random person on the EA forum, a random non-binary person, a random Jewish person… etc
When considering different problems I experience different forms of selection effects in different ways. For example, Insofar as I am Jewish I am more likely to exist in a world where the nazis lost ww2.
I am unsure how these different categories interact. I imagine that I am more likely to live in a world with more humans, but fewer total animals than I am to live in a world with more animals but fewer humans. I take any category to be a legitimate starting point and am unsure how to weigh them against each other.

Ember 14 Oct 2022 22:00 UTC
3 points
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in reply to: turchin’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
I am skeptical of this first claim about anthropics. To me, it seems like every observer type can be relevant. The particular type used in the context of anthropic reasoning is ultimately subjective and is chosen insofar as it is illuminating. I agree that people thinking about anthropics are particularly unlikely after nuclear war.
Yes, I agree. This paper is framed around the fine-tuning argument because the multiverse undermining the teleological interpretation is uncontroversial within the theory, and so extending this argument to nuclear war doesn’t require someone who accepts anthropic shadow to accept the conclusion of this paper. I happen to believe in anthropic shadow, and such a belief implies our situation is worse than what is implied by this paper.

Ember 14 Oct 2022 21:38 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: turchin’s comment on: A Pin and a Balloon: Anthropic Fragility Increases Chances of Runaway Global Warming
Ah, that’s too bad, do you have the email of anyone who would?

Ember 30 Sep 2022 17:33 UTC
2 points
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in reply to: turchin’s comment on: A Pin and a Balloon: Anthropic Fragility Increases Chances of Runaway Global Warming
I understand it could be done by one strong actor unilaterally, I simply wonder if I could reasonably support such an action being taken unilaterally. This paper is what sold me on this position https://nickbostrom.com/papers/unilateralist.pdf
I think you are overestimating what could be accomplished during this time period, I imagine that most people would become hostile to any movement which just intentionally triggered a nuclear winter.
Do you have a source on how disruptive nuclear winters would be to food production, I am skeptical.
On an unrelated note, I see that you sight “Nuclear war near misses and anthropic shadows” which is marked as being in preparation. I wrote an essay that I imagine is similar titled “Nuclear fine-tuning”. I am wondering if you have access to this document and if you could send it my way, as I would like to read it to see what gaps in my arguments it might fill in.
My essay can be found here: https://forum.effectivealtruism.org/posts/Gg2YsjGe3oahw2kxE/nuclear-fine-tuning-how-many-worlds-have-been-destroyed

Ember 26 Sep 2022 5:04 UTC
11 points
2 ∶ 0
on: 9/26 is Petrov Day
Tomorrow(September 26th 2022) is also Rosh Hashanah(the Jewish new year). Appropriate to begin the new year celebrating someone who made it possible.

Ember 25 Sep 2022 23:46 UTC
1 point
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on: A Pin and a Balloon: Anthropic Fragility Increases Chances of Runaway Global Warming
I agree with this assessment insofar as we might be far closer to climate tipping points than it at first seems. I am curious about how a society might use and recover from urgent geo-engineering.
It seems like any scenario where urgent geo-engineering is used would have drastic effects. Who do you imagine would make this decision? If it is the governments like the UN what efforts might be made to get them to seriously consider this proposal? If you Imagine that it would be individual actors this seems like it might do more harm than good insofar as it violates the principle of conformity.
On a separate note, it doesn’t seem like it would be easy to recover from the use of urgent geo-engineering in such a way that doesn’t put us past the tipping point again. It seems like the use of such technology would drastically reduce our ability to research after its use, as it seems like it would totally destroy the supply chain. I am curious if I am missing anything there.
As a result, I wonder if urgent geoengineering might not be a solution even if we are very close to tipping points.

Ember 13 Sep 2022 20:31 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Donald Hobson’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
To clarify I’m of the view that during this time period the unplanned detonation of a nuclear weapon on American soil would have prompted a nuclear exchange between the US and the Soviet Union. I think this is a relatively safe assumption due to how high the tensions were and how gunho the US was with nuclear weapons. I think the coincidences surrounding nuclear weapons also support this interpretation.

The alternative explanations you suggest are ad-hawk and don’t hold up to scrutiny. Disarmament supporters wouldn’t favor a system with more close calls so that fear over those close calls might lead to disarmament. This only make sense if they support disarmament for reasons other then being worried about nuclear risk. The bombs being duds also doesn’t make sense, none of the bombs in these cases turn out to be duds, if this is the case then this would be a massive conspiracy and such a conspiracy would be hard to keep under raps.(it also conflicts with the US’s general nuclear strategy)

Ember 25 Aug 2022 0:31 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: Gordon Seidoh Worley’s comment on: EA is Insufficiently Value Neutral in Practice
Can you define methodology? If you are defining the term so broadly that monarchy, catholic rule, and republic are methodologies then you don’t have to bite the bullet on the “effective nazi” objection. You can simply say, “fascism is a methodology I oppose” however at this point it seems like the term is so broad that your objection to EA fails to have meaning.
I don’t think this example holds up to historical scrutiny, but it’s so broad Idk how to argue on that front so I’m simply going to agree to disagree.
If the object-level-agreeing, method-disagreeing “allies” turn on me, I have no recourse to shared methods.
You can work to understand other people’s philosophical assumptions and work within those parameters.

Ember 23 Aug 2022 17:09 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: tobycrisford’s comment on: Against Anthropic Shadow
These arguments don’t cancel out. The argument
1. The sky is blue
2. The sky tends to be blue in worlds that have had less catastrophic events
3. C: Catastrophic events are less likely
Is identical in form to,
1. The historical record lacks catastrophic events
2. The historical record will tend to lack catastrophic events in worlds that have less catastrophic events
3. C: Catastrophic events are less likely
However, there is the other argument
1. The historical record lacks catastrophic events
2. The historical record will tend to lack catastrophic events in worlds that have less catastrophic events
3. C: This world will have had fewer catastrophic events than average
These can’t perfectly cancel out or we could never know anything, the net result of these two arguments must still be a decrease in how likely we take catastrophic risks. I do think it’s because we can’t discover we don’t exist that is the relevant distinction.
If I can only exist in a world with a blue sky then the fact that the sky is blue should not make me think it is more likely for worlds to have a blue sky. This is why the argument, that life is likely to exist throughout the universe because it happened here doesn’t work. If I can only exist in a world with life then the fact that life exists in this world shouldn’t influence how likely I think it is to be in another world, other than me knowing it is possible.
I responded to your comment on the other post I am happy to continue chatting in DMs if you like.

Ember 23 Aug 2022 16:53 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: tobycrisford’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
It was never guaranteed that observers would survive until now, and the fact that we have is evidence of a low catastrophe rate.
This is why this paper assumes there are an arbitrarily large number of worlds. If there are an arbitrarily large number of worlds then if it is possible for a particular event to occur it becomes guaranteed that it will occur in a particular world.
To formalize my claim if
1. it is possible for observers to survive until now, and
2. There are an arbitrarily large number of worlds, then
3. All possibilities will occur in some world
Of course, if you don’t believe in many worlds this argument remains valid but isn’t sound. This is the same line of argument that allows the many world’s views to block the inference to God from universal fine-tuning. Do you have a view on the fine-tuning cases?
I will respond to your comment on the other post, we can move into DMs if you are interested in discussing this further as that would consolidate the conversation.

Ember 19 Aug 2022 22:35 UTC
0 points
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on: Forms and Sources of North-Atlantic Bias
I enjoyed reading this. This is a good critique and one I would like to see EA do more to address.

Ember 19 Aug 2022 21:16 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: AdrianJones’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
I don’t maintain that the B-2 crash lead to nuclear detonation in most worlds, the examples are treated in the paper as straight coinflips but this is mostly to illustrate the general threat of accidental nuclear war. Zeroing in on this case I’d be surprised if it is more likely than not for this crash to lead to a nuclear detonation than not, while the safety mechanisms were inadequate for something as dangerous as a nuclear device they are still a relevant factor.
Throughout this whole project, this is a question that has continued to bug me. Would the US have had the ability to understand that it had nuked itself rather than blaming it on the Soviet Union? I honestly don’t know how to go about answering this question, my gut says no, and this is why there’s never been an accidental nuclear detonation on US soil. This is an assumption that carries through this paper, but I’d be interested to read a more nuanced take on it. It might also be that while the B-2 crash leading to a nuclear detonation wouldn’t have immediately led to nuclear war it would have increased tensions during the Cuban missile crisis(i.e. it might not immediately lead to nuclear war but it does decrease the odds). If the nuclear detonation(in the B-2 case) is even correlated with nuclear war then we should expect persons to disproportionately live in worlds where it doesn’t occur.
It is very weird that there has never been an accidental nuclear detonation on American soil, one accidental detonation would significantly change my assessment. As a result, I still think the B-2 crash is still evidence in favor of my hypothesis.
This is a promising counterargument, I think ultimately making it would require a complex assessment of US cold-war propaganda and deep dive into those in positions of power during different parts of the cold war.
I’m not exactly sure if my distinction between descriptive claims and predictive claims really works. My intuition is that descriptive claims are simply safer than predictive claims as they are less vulnerable to unseen factors. I will think about this more.
I think it is due to how nuclear war(in the past) would mean that I specifically wouldn’t exist. On the other hand if theirs a trillion people in the future I still would.

Ember 19 Aug 2022 18:21 UTC
1 point
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on: Against Anthropic Shadow
EDIT:Added comments on the Russian roulette case
My intuition is that the arguments
1. P1: The sky is blue
2. P2: The sky is more likely to be blue in worlds that have had less catastrophic events
3. C: This world will have had fewer catastrophic events than average
and
1. P1: The sky is blue
2. P2: The sky tends to be blue in worlds that have had less catastrophic events
3. C: Catastrophic events are less likely
Are both valid and don’t actually conflict. They are entitled to both decrease how likely they take the catastrophes to be(due to no catastrophe changing the color of the sky), but they should also think that they are more likely than their historical record indicates.
This is because, if you are in a world where X is true your being in that world should increase how likely you think being in a world where X is true, but it should also make you think you have a data set biased in favor of events correlated with X being true.
I think the anthropic nature of anthropic shadow comes in due to if X is, you exist. Then it doesn’t indicate that it is more likely, only that it is possible because unlike the sky you couldn’t be in a world where you didn’t exist.
I think the Russian roulette can be untangled if we frame it differently, I think you definitely have information that the gun is the 1/1000 because you are more likely to be an observer moment in a universe where it was that gun rather than the other. But you shouldn’t be surprised that you exist, if you learn that it was the 999/1000 gun, you should be suppressed that it was that you are in a universe where your existence is unlikely rather than likely.

Ember 19 Aug 2022 17:50 UTC
2 points
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in reply to: tobycrisford’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
This paper isn’t using anthropic shadow as its framing as it’s looking at the issue through the lens of the fine-tuning argument, rather than through the methodology in the anthropic shadow paper. I didn’t bring in anthropic shadow as I didn’t want to parse exactly how my view was the same or different from it and figured adding discussion of an additional paper would add unneeded complexity.
Notably, my paper uses close calls that seem to have been avoided only by luck as evidence that risk is higher than it appears and then explains our luck through our position as observers, rather than simply using our position as observers as evidence that risk is higher than it appears.
I am curious to know how close calls avoided only through luck, like the Damascus missile explosion affect your assessment. I will read and respond to your paper.(EDIT: I left a comment)

Ember 18 Aug 2022 22:43 UTC
2 points
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in reply to: pete’s comment on: The Credibility of Apocalyptic Claims: A Critique of Techno-Futurism within Existential Risk
Thank you for the high praise.
This certainly seems to be an area ripe for further exploration, and I am curious about how it applies to other parts of EA

Ember 18 Aug 2022 20:07 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: KARF’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
1. The formula is just the fraction of people who live in a world where a given event happened. You take, (the number average number of persons in a world where an event took place * the probability of the event taking place), and divide it by, (the number average number of persons in a world where an event took place times the probability of the event taking place + the average number of persons in a world where the event didn’t take place * the probability of the event not taking place) Math is admittedly not my strong suit.
2. the two island example is just to give the simplest possible example, this is why there are only two. You are correct that there could be more people in post-catastrophe worlds.
3. Yeah, certainly we might rather know the percentage of worlds where the catastrophe occurred. The formula is useful because it lets you convert between the percentage of worlds in which a thing happens and the percentage of persons that thing happens to(if you know the average populations of worlds where the thing both happens and doesn’t)
4. I imagine the set of worlds to be identical up until the precise moment of the trinity test(July 16th, 1945 5:29 AM), however, this is just a narrative choice, and ultimately it’s kind of arbitrary. My suspicion is that the doomsday argument is valid due to space colonization being logistically impossible(or at least so implausible that it basically never happens/when space colonization does happen very few people actually live off-world due to logistical complications), and this is why we don’t find ourselves in a roman world. We might also just be in an unlikely circumstance.

Ember 18 Aug 2022 15:32 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: KARF’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
This is my bad I have discovered that the area around the equation has a lot of typos. So Y=AX/((AX)+(B(1-X)) with Y being the probability of an event being in one’s history, X is the probability of having an event occurring, A being the mean population of worlds within the set where the event occurs and B being the mean population of worlds in which the event doesn’t occur:
So let’s say there are two islands Island A has had a volcanic eruption Island B hasn’t. As a result, A has a population of 5 while B has a population of 10.
We can plug in 50% for X as half the islands have had eruptions. So we get
Y=(5*.5)/((5*.5)+((10*(1-.5))
So the probability of being on an island that has had a volcanic eruption is ¹⁄₃
So in the Playing with my Toy Model section, I’m saying that if worlds without nuclear wars have a population of 8bil and worlds that haven’t have a population of .4bil(i.e. nuclear war kills 95% of people) then
Y=(8*.05)/((8*.05)+(.4*.95))
Y=.51
So If nuclear war kills 95% of people you are more likely to be living in a world where nuclear war doesn’t occur if nuclear war destroys 95% of worlds.
Basically, all I’m saying with “We can’t know that it is more likely that we are in a world that hasn’t experienced nuclear war, we are however justified in believing that it is more likely that we would be in a world that hasn’t experienced nuclear war.” is that it wouldn’t be that surprising for us to be in a world where nuclear war hadn’t occurred if it turned out that there was only a 40% chance to be in a world where nuclear war didn’t occur and 60% of people were in a worlds where it had occurred. This point might be pedantic.

Ember 18 Aug 2022 14:43 UTC
1 point
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in reply to: KARF’s comment on: Nuclear Fine-Tuning: How Many Worlds Have Been Destroyed?
We don’t necessarily need to assume that time moves the same in all worlds we can simply use the relevant observer class of persons living 60 years into nuclear deterrence.
I worry about the assumption that “it is more probable to be in a world that hasn’t experienced a nuclear war”. We can’t know that it is more likely that we are in a world that hasn’t experienced nuclear war, we are however justified in believing that it is more likely that we would be in a world that hasn’t experienced nuclear war(as that’s our immediate context). So if nuclear war kills 5 billion people, we can say that it is unlikely that nuclear war has destroyed more than 73% of world, but it shouldn’t be treated as an upper limit.
EDIT: I initially thought this was a recreation of the “playing with my toy model section” and then realized you were saying something different. I cut the part of this comment where I addressed that