I think this is an interesting point but I’m not convinced that it’s true with high enough probability that the alternative isn’t worth considering.
In particular, I can imagine luck/happenstance to shake out enough that arbitrarily powerful agents on one dimension are less powerful/rational on other dimensions.
Another issue is the nature of precommitments[1]. It seems that under most games/simple decision theories for playing those games (eg “Chicken” in CDT), being the first to credibly precommit gives you a strategic edge under most circumstances. But if you’re second in those situations, it’s not clear whether “I don’t negotiate with terrorists” is a better or worse stance than swerving.
(And in the former case, with both sides precommitting, a lot of torture will still happen).
[1] using what I assume is the technical definition of precommitment
I think this is an interesting point but I’m not convinced that it’s true with high enough probability that the alternative isn’t worth considering.
In particular, I can imagine luck/happenstance to shake out enough that arbitrarily powerful agents on one dimension are less powerful/rational on other dimensions.
Another issue is the nature of precommitments[1]. It seems that under most games/simple decision theories for playing those games (eg “Chicken” in CDT), being the first to credibly precommit gives you a strategic edge under most circumstances. But if you’re second in those situations, it’s not clear whether “I don’t negotiate with terrorists” is a better or worse stance than swerving.
(And in the former case, with both sides precommitting, a lot of torture will still happen).
[1] using what I assume is the technical definition of precommitment