So I don’t think it’s implausible to assign split-brain patients 2x moral weight.
What if we only destroyed 1%, 50% or 99% of their corpus callosum? Would that mean increasing degrees of moral weight from ~1x to ~2x? What is it about cutting these connections that increases moral weight? Is it the increased independence?
Maybe this an inherently normative question, and there’s no fact of the matter which has “more” experience? Or we can’t answer this through empirical research? Or we’re just nowhere near doing so?
It’s plausible to assign split-brain patients 2x moral weight because it’s plausible that split-brain patients contain two independent morally relevant seats of consciousness. (To be clear, I’m just claiming this is a plausible view; I’m not prepared to give an all-things-considered defense of the view.) I take it to be an empirical question how much of the corpus callosum needs to be severed to generate such a split. Exploring the answer to this empirical question might help us think about the phenomenal unity of creatures with less centralized brains than humans, such as cephalopods.
All fair points.
What if we only destroyed 1%, 50% or 99% of their corpus callosum? Would that mean increasing degrees of moral weight from ~1x to ~2x? What is it about cutting these connections that increases moral weight? Is it the increased independence?
Maybe this an inherently normative question, and there’s no fact of the matter which has “more” experience? Or we can’t answer this through empirical research? Or we’re just nowhere near doing so?
It’s plausible to assign split-brain patients 2x moral weight because it’s plausible that split-brain patients contain two independent morally relevant seats of consciousness. (To be clear, I’m just claiming this is a plausible view; I’m not prepared to give an all-things-considered defense of the view.) I take it to be an empirical question how much of the corpus callosum needs to be severed to generate such a split. Exploring the answer to this empirical question might help us think about the phenomenal unity of creatures with less centralized brains than humans, such as cephalopods.