High-stakes instrumentalism could still be consistent with objecting to billionaire philanthropy if policies are available that (i) also prevent high-stakes errors and (ii) are ‘more democratic’ than billionaire philanthropy. These would be ‘intermediate policies’ in between the extremes you’ve considered: billionaire philanthropy on one hand, and the other hand funds under full democratic control.
There are plausible examples: e.g. it could be stipulated by law that a fund must be used for a certain cause area such as global health, with democratic control only applying within those bounds.
This seems broadly similar to arguments for representative rather than direct democracy.
High-stakes instrumentalism could still be consistent with objecting to billionaire philanthropy if policies are available that (i) also prevent high-stakes errors and (ii) are ‘more democratic’ than billionaire philanthropy. These would be ‘intermediate policies’ in between the extremes you’ve considered: billionaire philanthropy on one hand, and the other hand funds under full democratic control.
There are plausible examples: e.g. it could be stipulated by law that a fund must be used for a certain cause area such as global health, with democratic control only applying within those bounds.
This seems broadly similar to arguments for representative rather than direct democracy.