I’m curious whether, however, some political philosophers effectively limit the scope of relevant high-stakes errors to people within the same polity. If, as you suggest in a comment, their main intuition is to avoid a tyranny of the majority, it’s not so clear if they’re moved to consider errors affecting the citizens of other nations or non-human animals.
If so, this could mean that some of these philosophers would disagree that even EA-ish billionaire philanthropy does in fact prevent high-stakes errors, and thus they might object to it after all.
Indeed, if your characterization of their views is correct, then it seems that these philosophers would have to endorse a utilitarian dictator who implements policies of massive expropriation and redistribution of resources. Surely they would think this proves too much? (But maybe you think they are just making an empirical mistake, or that this is fact what they’d have to accept.)
More broadly, my loose impression was that non-consequentialist philosophers often think there are important distinctions between members of one’s own polity and others. E.g. my impression was that it’s quite controversial how to apply Rawls’s theory of justice to between-nation issues, and certainly many people deny that his leximin principle applies globally. (But I’ve read barely any political philosophy, so correct me if I’m wrong.)
Hi, this is a good question. On within-nation rights only, firstly, I think almost all of the democratic theorists think there are at least limited cosmopolitan duties of justice to benefit the very badly off in poor countries at least up to some arbitrary sufficientarian standard. Hardcore nationalism also isn’t that popular in political philosophy, and the moderate intrinsic proceduralists out there don’t believe in it. Secondly, for theorists who endorse an act/omission distinction with respect to national responsibility, there is still the Thomas Pogge point that the global system of institutions in part causes poverty. in that context, aid is a corrective to an injustice.
Thirdly, this raises the question of how we should define the demos. One common view is that decisions that affect all should be decided by all. But then decisions in the US about budgetary spending also affect people in poor countries, animals and future generations, so they should on this standard have a say in the decision or a proxy should have a say for them. This speaks for global enfranchisement rather than US national democracy. Another view is that decisions that coerce others should be decided democratically. But then immigration restrictions coerce prospective immigrants, so again this speaks in favour of global enfranchisement.
On animals, it is very uncommon to hold that animals have no moral status at all, and that abuse of animals could never be classed as a high stakes error. Most philosophers are committed to the moral status of severely disabled humans, dogs and cats, but this clearly implies that chickens and pigs also have moral status.
On Rawls, I’m a bit allergic to Rawls exegesis after years of doing political philosophy, so I’ll leave that one.
Thanks, very interesting.
I’m curious whether, however, some political philosophers effectively limit the scope of relevant high-stakes errors to people within the same polity. If, as you suggest in a comment, their main intuition is to avoid a tyranny of the majority, it’s not so clear if they’re moved to consider errors affecting the citizens of other nations or non-human animals.
If so, this could mean that some of these philosophers would disagree that even EA-ish billionaire philanthropy does in fact prevent high-stakes errors, and thus they might object to it after all.
Indeed, if your characterization of their views is correct, then it seems that these philosophers would have to endorse a utilitarian dictator who implements policies of massive expropriation and redistribution of resources. Surely they would think this proves too much? (But maybe you think they are just making an empirical mistake, or that this is fact what they’d have to accept.)
More broadly, my loose impression was that non-consequentialist philosophers often think there are important distinctions between members of one’s own polity and others. E.g. my impression was that it’s quite controversial how to apply Rawls’s theory of justice to between-nation issues, and certainly many people deny that his leximin principle applies globally. (But I’ve read barely any political philosophy, so correct me if I’m wrong.)
Hi, this is a good question. On within-nation rights only, firstly, I think almost all of the democratic theorists think there are at least limited cosmopolitan duties of justice to benefit the very badly off in poor countries at least up to some arbitrary sufficientarian standard. Hardcore nationalism also isn’t that popular in political philosophy, and the moderate intrinsic proceduralists out there don’t believe in it. Secondly, for theorists who endorse an act/omission distinction with respect to national responsibility, there is still the Thomas Pogge point that the global system of institutions in part causes poverty. in that context, aid is a corrective to an injustice.
Thirdly, this raises the question of how we should define the demos. One common view is that decisions that affect all should be decided by all. But then decisions in the US about budgetary spending also affect people in poor countries, animals and future generations, so they should on this standard have a say in the decision or a proxy should have a say for them. This speaks for global enfranchisement rather than US national democracy. Another view is that decisions that coerce others should be decided democratically. But then immigration restrictions coerce prospective immigrants, so again this speaks in favour of global enfranchisement.
On animals, it is very uncommon to hold that animals have no moral status at all, and that abuse of animals could never be classed as a high stakes error. Most philosophers are committed to the moral status of severely disabled humans, dogs and cats, but this clearly implies that chickens and pigs also have moral status.
On Rawls, I’m a bit allergic to Rawls exegesis after years of doing political philosophy, so I’ll leave that one.