People who support restrictive norms on conversations about race do so for partially epistemic reasons. Just like stigmatising certain arguments or viewpoints makes it more difficult to hear those viewpoints, a lot of the race-talk also makes the movement less diverse and some people feel less safe in voicing their opinions. If you prioritise having a epistemically diverse community, you can’t just let anyone speak their mind. You need to actively enforce norms of inclusiveness so that highest diversity of opinions can be safely voiced.
Norms on conversations about race shouldn’t be supported by “popularity” reasons. They should be supported out of a respect for the needs of the relevant moral patients. This is not about “don’t be reckless when talking about race because this will hurt object-level work”. It’s about being respectful for the needs of the people of color who get affected by these statements.
“People who support restrictive norms on conversations about race do so for partially epistemic reasons”—This is true and does score some points for the side wishing to restrict conversations. However, I would question how many people making this argument, when push came to shove, had epistemics as their first priority. I’m sure, there must be at least one person fitting this description, but I would be surprised if it were very many.
Point 2 is a good point. Maybe I should have divided this into three different camps instead? I’m starting to think that this might be a neater way of dividing the space.
I find this framing misleading for two reasons:
People who support restrictive norms on conversations about race do so for partially epistemic reasons. Just like stigmatising certain arguments or viewpoints makes it more difficult to hear those viewpoints, a lot of the race-talk also makes the movement less diverse and some people feel less safe in voicing their opinions. If you prioritise having a epistemically diverse community, you can’t just let anyone speak their mind. You need to actively enforce norms of inclusiveness so that highest diversity of opinions can be safely voiced.
Norms on conversations about race shouldn’t be supported by “popularity” reasons. They should be supported out of a respect for the needs of the relevant moral patients. This is not about “don’t be reckless when talking about race because this will hurt object-level work”. It’s about being respectful for the needs of the people of color who get affected by these statements.
“People who support restrictive norms on conversations about race do so for partially epistemic reasons”—This is true and does score some points for the side wishing to restrict conversations. However, I would question how many people making this argument, when push came to shove, had epistemics as their first priority. I’m sure, there must be at least one person fitting this description, but I would be surprised if it were very many.
Point 2 is a good point. Maybe I should have divided this into three different camps instead? I’m starting to think that this might be a neater way of dividing the space.