Also, I’d guess most people who value diversity of experience mean that only for positive experiences. I doubt most would mean repeated bad experiences aren’t as bad as diverse bad experiences, all else equal.
Probably, yeah. But that seems hard to square with a consistent theory of moral value, given that there’s a continuum between “good” and “bad” experiences.
I think you gave up on your theory being maximally consistent when you opted for diversity of experience as a metavalue. Most people don’t actually consider their own positive experiences cheapened by someone on the other side of the world having a similar experience.
Also, if you’re doing morality by intuition (a methodology I think has no future), then I suspect most people would much sooner drop ‘diversity of experience good’ than ‘torture bad’.
Also, I’d guess most people who value diversity of experience mean that only for positive experiences. I doubt most would mean repeated bad experiences aren’t as bad as diverse bad experiences, all else equal.
Probably, yeah. But that seems hard to square with a consistent theory of moral value, given that there’s a continuum between “good” and “bad” experiences.
I think you gave up on your theory being maximally consistent when you opted for diversity of experience as a metavalue. Most people don’t actually consider their own positive experiences cheapened by someone on the other side of the world having a similar experience.
Also, if you’re doing morality by intuition (a methodology I think has no future), then I suspect most people would much sooner drop ‘diversity of experience good’ than ‘torture bad’.
What do you mean? The continuum passes through morally neutral experiences, so we can just treat good and bad asymmetrically.
If an experience can be simultaneously good and bad, we can just treat its goodness and badness asymmetrically, too.