Asserting (as epicurean views do) death is not bad (in itself) for the being that dies is one thing. Asserting (as the views under discussion do) that death (in itself) is goodâand ongoing survival badâfor the being that dies is quite another.
Besides its divergence from virtually everyoneâs expressed beliefs and general behaviour, it doesnât seem to fare much better under deliberate reflection. For the sake of a less emotionally charged variant of Mathersâ example, responses to the Singerâs shallow pond case along the lines of, âI shouldnât step in, because my non-intervention is in the childâs best interest: the normal life they could âenjoyâ if they survive accrues more suffering in expectation than their imminent drowningâ appear deranged.
Asserting (as epicurean views do) death is not bad (in itself) for the being that dies is one thing.
But Epicureans tend to defend a stronger claim, namely that there is nothing suboptimal about death â or rather, about being dead â for the being who dies (which is consistent with Epicurean views of wellbeing). I believe this is the view defended in Hol, 2019.
Asserting (as the views under discussion do) that death (in itself) is good
But death is not good in itself on any of the views under discussion. First, death in itself has no value or disvalue on any of these views. Second, using the word âgoodâ is arguably misleading, since death (in terms of its counterfactual effects) can at most be less bad on minimalist views:
The death is only âgoodâ in the sense that, for example, we might say that it was âgoodâ that a moose who had been hit by a car was euthanized (assuming the moose would otherwise have died more painfully). It is more clear and charitable to use the phrase âless bad.â
Besides its [i.e. experientialist minimalismâs] divergence from virtually everyoneâs expressed beliefs and general behaviour
This may be too strong a statement. For instance, it seems that there is a considerable number of Buddhists (and others) who at least express, and aspire to act in alignment with, views centered on the minimization of suffering.
Regardless, I donât think divergence from most peopleâs behavior is a strong point against any given axiology. After all, most peopleâs behavior is inconsistent with impartial axiologies/âethics in general, as well as with classical utilitarian axiology/âethics in particular, even in their prudential concerns. As one would expect, we mostly seem to optimize for biological and social drives rather than for any reflectively endorsed axiology.
For the sake of a less emotionally charged variant of Mathersâ example, responses to the Singerâs shallow pond case along the lines of, âI shouldnât step in, because my non-intervention is in the childâs best interest: the normal life they could âenjoyâ if they survive accrues more suffering in expectation than their imminent drowningâ appear deranged.
As Teo has essentially spent much of his sequence arguing, minimalist axiologies would strongly agree that such a response is extremely implausible in any practically relevant case, for many reasons: it overlooks the positive roles of the childâs continued existence, the utility of strong norms of helping and protecting life, the value of trying to reduce clear and present suffering, etc. (Just to clarify that important point. I realize that there likely was an implicit âother things equalâ qualification in that thought experiment, but itâs arguably critical to make that radical assumption explicit.)
Additionally, minimalist axiology is compatible with moral duties or moral rights that would require us to help and protect others, which is another way in which someone who endorses an experientialist minimalist axiology may agree that it is wrong not to help.
In any case, the thought experiment above seems to ignore the question of comparative repugnance. For starters, a contrasting axiology such as CU would imply that it would be better to let the child drown (in the other things equal, isolated case) if the rest of the childâs life were going to be overall slightly ânet negativeâ otherwise (as we can stipulate that it would be in the hypothetical case weâre considering). This also seems repugnant.
Yet CU is subject to far more repugnant implications of this kind. For example, assume that other things are equal, and imagine that we walk past a person who is experiencing the most extreme suffering â suffering so extreme that the sufferer in that moment will give anything to make it stop. Imagine that we can readily step in and stop this suffering, in which case the person we are saving will live an untroubled life for the rest of their days. Otherwise, the sufferer will continue to experience extreme, incessant suffering, followed, eventually, by a large amount of bliss that according to CU would outweigh the suffering. (This is somewhat analogous to the first thought experiment found here.)
CU would say that it is better to leave that person to continue to be tormented for the sake of the eventual bliss, even though the person would rather be freed from the extreme suffering while in that state.
Is that a less repugnant implication?
In general, it seems important to compare the repugnant conclusions of different views. And as Teo has recently argued, when we compare the most repugnant conclusions of different views in population ethics, minimalist views are arguably less repugnant than offsetting views.
Asserting (as epicurean views do) death is not bad (in itself) for the being that dies is one thing. Asserting (as the views under discussion do) that death (in itself) is goodâand ongoing survival badâfor the being that dies is quite another.
Besides its divergence from virtually everyoneâs expressed beliefs and general behaviour, it doesnât seem to fare much better under deliberate reflection. For the sake of a less emotionally charged variant of Mathersâ example, responses to the Singerâs shallow pond case along the lines of, âI shouldnât step in, because my non-intervention is in the childâs best interest: the normal life they could âenjoyâ if they survive accrues more suffering in expectation than their imminent drowningâ appear deranged.
But Epicureans tend to defend a stronger claim, namely that there is nothing suboptimal about death â or rather, about being dead â for the being who dies (which is consistent with Epicurean views of wellbeing). I believe this is the view defended in Hol, 2019.
But death is not good in itself on any of the views under discussion. First, death in itself has no value or disvalue on any of these views. Second, using the word âgoodâ is arguably misleading, since death (in terms of its counterfactual effects) can at most be less bad on minimalist views:
This may be too strong a statement. For instance, it seems that there is a considerable number of Buddhists (and others) who at least express, and aspire to act in alignment with, views centered on the minimization of suffering.
Regardless, I donât think divergence from most peopleâs behavior is a strong point against any given axiology. After all, most peopleâs behavior is inconsistent with impartial axiologies/âethics in general, as well as with classical utilitarian axiology/âethics in particular, even in their prudential concerns. As one would expect, we mostly seem to optimize for biological and social drives rather than for any reflectively endorsed axiology.
As Teo has essentially spent much of his sequence arguing, minimalist axiologies would strongly agree that such a response is extremely implausible in any practically relevant case, for many reasons: it overlooks the positive roles of the childâs continued existence, the utility of strong norms of helping and protecting life, the value of trying to reduce clear and present suffering, etc. (Just to clarify that important point. I realize that there likely was an implicit âother things equalâ qualification in that thought experiment, but itâs arguably critical to make that radical assumption explicit.)
Additionally, minimalist axiology is compatible with moral duties or moral rights that would require us to help and protect others, which is another way in which someone who endorses an experientialist minimalist axiology may agree that it is wrong not to help.
In any case, the thought experiment above seems to ignore the question of comparative repugnance. For starters, a contrasting axiology such as CU would imply that it would be better to let the child drown (in the other things equal, isolated case) if the rest of the childâs life were going to be overall slightly ânet negativeâ otherwise (as we can stipulate that it would be in the hypothetical case weâre considering). This also seems repugnant.
Yet CU is subject to far more repugnant implications of this kind. For example, assume that other things are equal, and imagine that we walk past a person who is experiencing the most extreme suffering â suffering so extreme that the sufferer in that moment will give anything to make it stop. Imagine that we can readily step in and stop this suffering, in which case the person we are saving will live an untroubled life for the rest of their days. Otherwise, the sufferer will continue to experience extreme, incessant suffering, followed, eventually, by a large amount of bliss that according to CU would outweigh the suffering. (This is somewhat analogous to the first thought experiment found here.)
CU would say that it is better to leave that person to continue to be tormented for the sake of the eventual bliss, even though the person would rather be freed from the extreme suffering while in that state.
Is that a less repugnant implication?
In general, it seems important to compare the repugnant conclusions of different views. And as Teo has recently argued, when we compare the most repugnant conclusions of different views in population ethics, minimalist views are arguably less repugnant than offsetting views.