Your comment above makes all sense regarding the literal questions (even if not the implicit worries that I intended to respond to); thanks for elaborating. :)
Still, I would not reduce my (theoretical) response to the implicit worries all the way down to “yes, but actually that’s fine and you shouldn’t be worried about it”. The “yes” is buried in the middle in 2.3 because it’s not the end of the theoretical response. After that, the following sections 2.4–2.6 still address a lot of points that may be relevant for our potential intuitions (such as worries) about endorsing cessation even in theory.
For example, I certainly feel worried myself about endorsing cessation of the ‘near-perfect paradise’ (even in theory), but I don’t tell myself that I “shouldn’t be worried about it”. Instead, I note (as I do in 2.4) that it seems perfectly fine to both endorse experientialist minimalist consequentialism in theory and to simultaneously deeply account for all the practical reasons that we have to side less with the relatively unpopular ideal of emptiness and more with the equal* and more popular ideal of untroubled lives.
(* equal for minimalists.)
Regarding worried intuitions, I of course also encourage people to compare whether they feel more worried about the (theoretical) minimalist cessation implications than about the (likewise theoretical) implications of offsetting views presented in 2.5. The latter strike me and many others as far more worrisome, so I’d prefer to also highlight that contrast as far as the worries (and not only the literal questions) are concerned.
In any case, I really appreciate that you read my post even if we might have different intuitions about these thought experiments. :)
(Continued)
Your comment above makes all sense regarding the literal questions (even if not the implicit worries that I intended to respond to); thanks for elaborating. :)
Still, I would not reduce my (theoretical) response to the implicit worries all the way down to “yes, but actually that’s fine and you shouldn’t be worried about it”. The “yes” is buried in the middle in 2.3 because it’s not the end of the theoretical response. After that, the following sections 2.4–2.6 still address a lot of points that may be relevant for our potential intuitions (such as worries) about endorsing cessation even in theory.
For example, I certainly feel worried myself about endorsing cessation of the ‘near-perfect paradise’ (even in theory), but I don’t tell myself that I “shouldn’t be worried about it”. Instead, I note (as I do in 2.4) that it seems perfectly fine to both endorse experientialist minimalist consequentialism in theory and to simultaneously deeply account for all the practical reasons that we have to side less with the relatively unpopular ideal of emptiness and more with the equal* and more popular ideal of untroubled lives.
(* equal for minimalists.)
Regarding worried intuitions, I of course also encourage people to compare whether they feel more worried about the (theoretical) minimalist cessation implications than about the (likewise theoretical) implications of offsetting views presented in 2.5. The latter strike me and many others as far more worrisome, so I’d prefer to also highlight that contrast as far as the worries (and not only the literal questions) are concerned.
In any case, I really appreciate that you read my post even if we might have different intuitions about these thought experiments. :)