Kaplan does discuss how the US was worried about a Soviet invasion of the USâs European allies, and how this was a part of the motivation for having a large nuclear arsenal and also for specific aspects of the arsenal (e.g. stationing nuclear weapons in Europe itself so that the US could threaten to launch from Europe, which was assumed to be more credible than threatening to launch from the US since it seemed somewhat less likely to trigger a strike against the mainland US in response).
He also discusses how this consideration was sometimes raised as an argument against various arms reductions proposals. E.g., he says what I paraphrased in my cards as:
In the 1986 memo to Reagan entitled âWhy We Canât Commit to Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons Within 10 Yearsâ, what 3 key arguments does Poindexter give?
Such an agreement couldnât be verified
Other nuclear armed states might not also eliminate their weapons, and thus they might gain superiority
This would create a major risk to Western Europe, given the Sovietsâ advantage in conventional forces [emphasis added]
I canât remember whether, in the later chapters about more recent events, he directly confronts the question of whether the US would currently be able to deter Russian aggression effectively if it massively reduced or eliminated its nuclear arsenal. Though to be fair to him, the book isnât explicitly about what we should do, but rather things like the decision-making that has occurred in relation to US nuclear weapons, so he doesnât exactly have an obligation to cover that. (Though it seems to me that he does at times very much imply certain recommendations, or that certain actions have been reckless or crazy or must not be repeated.)
Kaplan does discuss how the US was worried about a Soviet invasion of the USâs European allies, and how this was a part of the motivation for having a large nuclear arsenal and also for specific aspects of the arsenal (e.g. stationing nuclear weapons in Europe itself so that the US could threaten to launch from Europe, which was assumed to be more credible than threatening to launch from the US since it seemed somewhat less likely to trigger a strike against the mainland US in response).
He also discusses how this consideration was sometimes raised as an argument against various arms reductions proposals. E.g., he says what I paraphrased in my cards as:
Such an agreement couldnât be verified
Other nuclear armed states might not also eliminate their weapons, and thus they might gain superiority
This would create a major risk to Western Europe, given the Sovietsâ advantage in conventional forces [emphasis added]
I canât remember whether, in the later chapters about more recent events, he directly confronts the question of whether the US would currently be able to deter Russian aggression effectively if it massively reduced or eliminated its nuclear arsenal. Though to be fair to him, the book isnât explicitly about what we should do, but rather things like the decision-making that has occurred in relation to US nuclear weapons, so he doesnât exactly have an obligation to cover that. (Though it seems to me that he does at times very much imply certain recommendations, or that certain actions have been reckless or crazy or must not be repeated.)