I agree that the cause area as a whole is neglected and share the concerns around reduced funding. But within the broader cause area of ânuclear conflictâ the tail-risks and the preparedness/âresponse are even more neglected. Barely anyone is working on this and I think this is one strength of the EA community to look into highly neglected areas and add more value per person working on the problem. I donât have numbers but I would expect there to be at least 100 times more people working on preventing nuclear war and informing policy makers about the potential negative consequences because as you rightly stated that one does not need to be utilitarian, consequentialist, or longtermist to not want nukes to be used under any circumstances.
I think nuclear tail risk may be fairly neglected because their higher severity may be more than outweighted by their lower likelihood. To illustrate, in the context of conventional wars:
Deaths follow a power law whose tail index is â1.35 to 1.74, with a mean of 1.60â. So the probability density function (PDF) of the deaths is proportional to âdeathsâ^-2.6 (= âdeathsâ^-(âtail indexâ + 1)), which means a conventional war exactly 10 times as deadly is 0.251 % (= 10^-2.6) as likely[1].
As a result, the expected value density of the deaths (âPDF of the deathsâ*âdeathsâ) is proportional to âdeathsâ^-1.6 (= âdeathsâ^-2.6*âdeathsâ).
I think spending by war severity should a priori be proportional to expected deaths, i.e. to âdeathsâ^-1.6. If so, spending to save lives in wars exactly 1 k times as deadly should be 0.00158 % (= (10^3)^(-1.6)) as high.
Nuclear wars arguably scale much faster than conventional ones (i.e. have a lower tail index), so I guess spending on nuclear wars involving 1 k nuclear detonations should be higher than 0.00158 % of the spending on ones involving a single detonation. However, it is not obvious to me whether it should be higher than e.g. 1 % (respecting the multiplier you mentioned of 100). I estimated the expected value density of the 90th, 99th and 99.9th percentile famine deaths due to the climatic effects of a large nuclear war are 17.0 %, 2.19 %, and 0.309 % that of the median deaths, which suggests spending on the 90th, 99th and 99.9th percentile large nuclear war should be 17.0 %, 2.19 %, and 0.309 % that on the median large nuclear war.
Note the tail distribution is proportional to âdeathsâ^-1.6 (= âdeathsâ^-âtail indexâ), so a conventional war at least 10 times as deadly is 2.51 % (= 10^-1.6) as likely.
Thanks for the detailed comment, Aron!
I think nuclear tail risk may be fairly neglected because their higher severity may be more than outweighted by their lower likelihood. To illustrate, in the context of conventional wars:
Deaths follow a power law whose tail index is â1.35 to 1.74, with a mean of 1.60â. So the probability density function (PDF) of the deaths is proportional to âdeathsâ^-2.6 (= âdeathsâ^-(âtail indexâ + 1)), which means a conventional war exactly 10 times as deadly is 0.251 % (= 10^-2.6) as likely[1].
As a result, the expected value density of the deaths (âPDF of the deathsâ*âdeathsâ) is proportional to âdeathsâ^-1.6 (= âdeathsâ^-2.6*âdeathsâ).
I think spending by war severity should a priori be proportional to expected deaths, i.e. to âdeathsâ^-1.6. If so, spending to save lives in wars exactly 1 k times as deadly should be 0.00158 % (= (10^3)^(-1.6)) as high.
Nuclear wars arguably scale much faster than conventional ones (i.e. have a lower tail index), so I guess spending on nuclear wars involving 1 k nuclear detonations should be higher than 0.00158 % of the spending on ones involving a single detonation. However, it is not obvious to me whether it should be higher than e.g. 1 % (respecting the multiplier you mentioned of 100). I estimated the expected value density of the 90th, 99th and 99.9th percentile famine deaths due to the climatic effects of a large nuclear war are 17.0 %, 2.19 %, and 0.309 % that of the median deaths, which suggests spending on the 90th, 99th and 99.9th percentile large nuclear war should be 17.0 %, 2.19 %, and 0.309 % that on the median large nuclear war.
Note the tail distribution is proportional to âdeathsâ^-1.6 (= âdeathsâ^-âtail indexâ), so a conventional war at least 10 times as deadly is 2.51 % (= 10^-1.6) as likely.