Unilateral action should be the last resort. The Iraqi BW program was successfully destroyed by 1996, and it was never reconstituted. Rolf Ekeus wrote a very good book on UNSCOM’s successful efforts.
The only place today that such unilateral action would even be considered is Syria’s rump chemical weapons program. The only other countries that have biological and chemical weapons also have nuclear weapons, so unilateral action would not be considered unless it were part of a larger direct conflict.
Our approach should be to do everything we can to strengthen the norm against developing and using biological and chemical weapons. Thankfully very few countries pursue these prohibited weapons.
I am also a strong believer in deterrence by denial, and the Council on Strategic Risks has written about this. We and our Allies and partners should have a visible, greatly expanded biodefense effort to deter bio attacks and deny our adversaries the mass casualty effects of such weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense spends less than 1⁄5 of one percent of its budget on chemical and biological defense. This needs to change. The recent Biodefense Posture Review is a good step in the right direction.
The only other countries that have biological and chemical weapons also have nuclear weapons, so unilateral action would not be considered unless it were part of a larger direct conflict.
This seems like a strong incentive for countries like Syria to try to acquire nuclear weapons.
Syria tried and failed to develop nuclear weapons. In 2007 the Israeli Defense Forces destroyed a nascent nuclear reactor under construction. Any renewed attempt would face a similar fate.
Unilateral action should be the last resort. The Iraqi BW program was successfully destroyed by 1996, and it was never reconstituted. Rolf Ekeus wrote a very good book on UNSCOM’s successful efforts. The only place today that such unilateral action would even be considered is Syria’s rump chemical weapons program. The only other countries that have biological and chemical weapons also have nuclear weapons, so unilateral action would not be considered unless it were part of a larger direct conflict.
Our approach should be to do everything we can to strengthen the norm against developing and using biological and chemical weapons. Thankfully very few countries pursue these prohibited weapons. I am also a strong believer in deterrence by denial, and the Council on Strategic Risks has written about this. We and our Allies and partners should have a visible, greatly expanded biodefense effort to deter bio attacks and deny our adversaries the mass casualty effects of such weapons. The U.S. Department of Defense spends less than 1⁄5 of one percent of its budget on chemical and biological defense. This needs to change. The recent Biodefense Posture Review is a good step in the right direction.
This seems like a strong incentive for countries like Syria to try to acquire nuclear weapons.
Syria tried and failed to develop nuclear weapons. In 2007 the Israeli Defense Forces destroyed a nascent nuclear reactor under construction. Any renewed attempt would face a similar fate.