I would be curious to know CEARCHās take on the meat-eater problem. For the 35.07 G poultry birds and 7.84 G humans in 2020, and Rethink Prioritiesā median moral weight of 0.332 chickens, one can conclude the total moral weight of chickens is 1.49 (= 35.07*0.332/ā7.84) times that of humans. So extending the life of humans may be net negative in the nearterm.
In any case, considering the impact on wild arthropods is pretty uncertain (quick illustration here), and may well be more important than the impact on chickens (see here), I would say the impact of life extension in the nearterm is pretty uncertain too.
Personally, I would like to see analyses looking into the longterm effects of life extension, along these lines.
Hi Vascoāthis is something Iāve thought a lot about! My rough answer is that, having done some BOTECs myself, I do think that saving lives is net positive. Note that you canāt just take the RP figures and use them like this (i.e. comparing moral weight of humans x no. of humans, vs moral weight of chickens vs no. of chickens), since the RP weights only look at peak intensity, and doesnāt factor in the degree to which that peak is reached, or for how longānor does it take into account non-experiential goods (e.g. life per se, or liberty, or achievement, or love etc). If you factor all this in, (probably) saving lives isnāt net negativeābut itās very subjective, since obviously we canāt really measure the qualitative experience of animals and have to extrapolate/āguess.
Nice, I think it would maybe be worth including in the post something about that, as it could change the results significantly.
since the RP weights only look at peak intensity, and doesnāt factor in the degree to which that peak is reached, or for how longānor does it take into account non-experiential goods (e.g. life per se, or liberty, or achievement, or love etc).
Thanks for clarifying. Intuitively, factory-farmed animals have more intense experiences (relative to their moral weight /ā peak welfare capacity), so I think accounting for intensity would make saving lives even more negative than my BOTEC suggested. Moreover, in general, I would claim non-experiential goods tend to be correlated with experiential ones, so I do not think accounting for them would favour saving human lives (also, factory-farmed animals have little liberty and achievement, and die more often). In any case, all goods are experiential in the sense words like ālife per se, or liberty, or achievement, or love etcā refer to subsets of experiences.
If you factor all this in, (probably) saving lives isnāt net negativeābut itās very subjective, since obviously we canāt really measure the qualitative experience of animals and have to extrapolate/āguess.
Have you considered the effects on wild (terresthrial and marine) arthropods and nematodes (due to deforestation, fishing, and global warming)? Accounting for these, I think the sign of the expected value will be quite uncertainā¦ We may conclude that our best guess for it is negative/āpositive, but that would not offer a strong basis for action. If there is lots of uncertainty, I think it makes more sense to say that we do not know, and carry out more research to increase the resilience of our estimates.
Hi Joel,
I would be curious to know CEARCHās take on the meat-eater problem. For the 35.07 G poultry birds and 7.84 G humans in 2020, and Rethink Prioritiesā median moral weight of 0.332 chickens, one can conclude the total moral weight of chickens is 1.49 (= 35.07*0.332/ā7.84) times that of humans. So extending the life of humans may be net negative in the nearterm.
In any case, considering the impact on wild arthropods is pretty uncertain (quick illustration here), and may well be more important than the impact on chickens (see here), I would say the impact of life extension in the nearterm is pretty uncertain too.
Personally, I would like to see analyses looking into the longterm effects of life extension, along these lines.
Hi Vascoāthis is something Iāve thought a lot about! My rough answer is that, having done some BOTECs myself, I do think that saving lives is net positive. Note that you canāt just take the RP figures and use them like this (i.e. comparing moral weight of humans x no. of humans, vs moral weight of chickens vs no. of chickens), since the RP weights only look at peak intensity, and doesnāt factor in the degree to which that peak is reached, or for how longānor does it take into account non-experiential goods (e.g. life per se, or liberty, or achievement, or love etc). If you factor all this in, (probably) saving lives isnāt net negativeābut itās very subjective, since obviously we canāt really measure the qualitative experience of animals and have to extrapolate/āguess.
Thanks for the reply!
Nice, I think it would maybe be worth including in the post something about that, as it could change the results significantly.
Thanks for clarifying. Intuitively, factory-farmed animals have more intense experiences (relative to their moral weight /ā peak welfare capacity), so I think accounting for intensity would make saving lives even more negative than my BOTEC suggested. Moreover, in general, I would claim non-experiential goods tend to be correlated with experiential ones, so I do not think accounting for them would favour saving human lives (also, factory-farmed animals have little liberty and achievement, and die more often). In any case, all goods are experiential in the sense words like ālife per se, or liberty, or achievement, or love etcā refer to subsets of experiences.
Have you considered the effects on wild (terresthrial and marine) arthropods and nematodes (due to deforestation, fishing, and global warming)? Accounting for these, I think the sign of the expected value will be quite uncertainā¦ We may conclude that our best guess for it is negative/āpositive, but that would not offer a strong basis for action. If there is lots of uncertainty, I think it makes more sense to say that we do not know, and carry out more research to increase the resilience of our estimates.