I’d love to hear non-naturalist moral realists talk about how they think moral facts are epistemically accessible...
The lack of an answer to that is a lot of the reason I discount the view as either irrelevant or not effectively different from moral non-realism.
True, you could accept this moral view....
Thanks!
And as I noted on the other post, I think there’s a coherent argument that if we care about distinct moral experiences in some way, rather than just the sum, we get something like a limited effective utility, not at 10^12 people specifically, but plausibly somewhere far less than a galaxy full.
The lack of an answer to that is a lot of the reason I discount the view as either irrelevant or not effectively different from moral non-realism.
Thanks!
And as I noted on the other post, I think there’s a coherent argument that if we care about distinct moral experiences in some way, rather than just the sum, we get something like a limited effective utility, not at 10^12 people specifically, but plausibly somewhere far less than a galaxy full.