Another explanation is that malevolent leaders in democracies see little gain from killing while malevolent leaders in certain types of dictatorships see much gain from killing. For example, Abraham Lincoln and Richard Nixon seem to have a lot of malevolent traits, but they mostly refrained from political killings. So the fourth section suggests too much causation on the personalities of leaders.
I did recently think it might be interesting to look into Nixon as a case study in how, and how well, democratic institutions can mitigate the harm caused by leaders with high levels of dark tetrad traits. (I just think it might be such a case study, because I haven’t yet really looked into evidence on Nixon’s personality—this is just a guess so far.) Thanks for highlighting Lincoln too—I wouldn’t have guessed he had high levels of dark traits, but I’ll look into it.
I’d definitely guess that the reasons there is less harm from malevolent leaders in democracies are both that democracies select for malevolence less, and that democracies don’t allow/incentivise malevolent behavioursas much.
In my head, I currently break intervention options in this cause area into:
Reducing how malevolent people are (via, e.g., very cautious and well thought-out and not-rushed genetic engineering)
Reducing the chances of malevolent people getting into positions where those traits create major risks (via, e.g., electoral reform, reducing instability and conflict)
Reducing the risks created when malevolent people get into those positions (via, e.g., checks and balances, maybe reducing centralisation of power)
I had felt like this post implied all three of those categories, not just the first two. But now that I re-skim the Political interventions section, I see that that might not have been made very explicit. So that critique of yours may be valid. (And I definitely agree with your point, separate from how it relates to potential oversights of this post.)
this research agenda must recognize that authoritarian cultures may accept or encourage violence against non-comformists or “disloyal” people. It’s a deeply sad fact, but important to understand. If torturing dissidents is an expected and approved behavior it is weaker evidence of a malevolent personality (fundamental attribution error).
I definitely agree that:
it’s important to consider multiple explanations of the various horrific or troubling behaviours
it can be easy to psychoanalyse/diagnose from a distance in a foolish way
the fundamental attribution error is worth keeping in mind here
I’m hoping to look a bit into how much we can trust speculative psychological profiles in general, maybe “best practices” for that shaky endeavour, and maybe how this relates to people like Hitler in particular. (Before getting into EA, I might’ve dismissed such psychological profiles. But I’ve moved towards thinking that, for many questions, it’s hard to do better than weak evidence, and it can be best to just gather diverse kinds of weak evidence, update incrementally, and remain aware of how uncertain we are.)
(Also, by the way, I read The Dictator’s Handbook last year and found it interesting. I agree that the models/ideas in that book seem relevant here.)
I did recently think it might be interesting to look into Nixon as a case study in how, and how well, democratic institutions can mitigate the harm caused by leaders with high levels of dark tetrad traits. (I just think it might be such a case study, because I haven’t yet really looked into evidence on Nixon’s personality—this is just a guess so far.) Thanks for highlighting Lincoln too—I wouldn’t have guessed he had high levels of dark traits, but I’ll look into it.
I’d definitely guess that the reasons there is less harm from malevolent leaders in democracies are both that democracies select for malevolence less, and that democracies don’t allow/incentivise malevolent behaviours as much.
In my head, I currently break intervention options in this cause area into:
Reducing how malevolent people are (via, e.g., very cautious and well thought-out and not-rushed genetic engineering)
Reducing the chances of malevolent people getting into positions where those traits create major risks (via, e.g., electoral reform, reducing instability and conflict)
Reducing the risks created when malevolent people get into those positions (via, e.g., checks and balances, maybe reducing centralisation of power)
I had felt like this post implied all three of those categories, not just the first two. But now that I re-skim the Political interventions section, I see that that might not have been made very explicit. So that critique of yours may be valid. (And I definitely agree with your point, separate from how it relates to potential oversights of this post.)
I definitely agree that:
it’s important to consider multiple explanations of the various horrific or troubling behaviours
it can be easy to psychoanalyse/diagnose from a distance in a foolish way
the fundamental attribution error is worth keeping in mind here
I’m hoping to look a bit into how much we can trust speculative psychological profiles in general, maybe “best practices” for that shaky endeavour, and maybe how this relates to people like Hitler in particular. (Before getting into EA, I might’ve dismissed such psychological profiles. But I’ve moved towards thinking that, for many questions, it’s hard to do better than weak evidence, and it can be best to just gather diverse kinds of weak evidence, update incrementally, and remain aware of how uncertain we are.)
(Also, by the way, I read The Dictator’s Handbook last year and found it interesting. I agree that the models/ideas in that book seem relevant here.)