I appreciate that you bring up an Overton-expanding point, but I have to disagree. I think this argument is a prototypical example of “second-best theory”.[1]
If a system is in a bad Nash equilibrium[2], asynchronously moving closer to a better equilibrium will usually look like it’s just making things worse. The costs are immediate while the benefits only start accruing once sufficient progress has been made.
A critic could then point to the most recently changed variable and say, “stop making it worse!” If they win, you may see marginal gains from the stability of the (tragic) system, giving people the empirical illusion that they were right all along (myopic marginalism).
> “In an economy with some uncorrectable market failure in one sector, actions to correct market failures in another related sector with the intent of increasing economic efficiency may actually decrease overall economic efficiency.”
When no individual benefits from changing their strategy in isolation, the system can remain in an equilibrium which is much worse for every individual, unless they manage to coordinate a simultaneous change to their strategies.
Crucially, nothing says that finding yourself in a bad Nash equilibrium[3] implies that there are no superior Nash equilibria above that level. It’s not about choosing “equilibrium” vs “fairy-tale story”—it’s about “bad equilibrium” vs “better equilibrium”.
And it’s feasible to get to a better equilibrium. Especially if you just need to pass the tipping point once, and you get to retry as many times as it takes. In such a scenario, it would be a tragedy to myopically preserve the Nash you’ve got.
Think about it like this: Both sickle-cell anaemia & malaria are bad when considered separately, but they’re also in a frequency-dependent equilibrium because the allele (HbS) that causes anaemia for a minority also confers resistance against malaria for the majority. Thus, a “second-best theory” would be to say that the HbS allele is good because it improves the situation relative to nobody having resistance against malaria at all. While it’s true, it’s also myopic.
When we cure malaria, there will no longer be any selection-pressure for HbS, so we cure sickle-cell disease as well.
To unpack the metaphor: I think many traditional & strict norms (HbS) around sex & relationships can be net good on the margin, but only because they enforce rigid rules in an area where humans haven’t learned to deal with the complexities (malaria) in a healthy manner. “Sexual liberalism” encompasses imo an attempt to deal with them directly and eventually learn better norms that are more likely to work long-term.
I appreciate that you bring up an Overton-expanding point, but I have to disagree. I think this argument is a prototypical example of “second-best theory”.[1]
If a system is in a bad Nash equilibrium[2], asynchronously moving closer to a better equilibrium will usually look like it’s just making things worse. The costs are immediate while the benefits only start accruing once sufficient progress has been made.
A critic could then point to the most recently changed variable and say, “stop making it worse!” If they win, you may see marginal gains from the stability of the (tragic) system, giving people the empirical illusion that they were right all along (myopic marginalism).
> “In an economy with some uncorrectable market failure in one sector, actions to correct market failures in another related sector with the intent of increasing economic efficiency may actually decrease overall economic efficiency.”
When no individual benefits from changing their strategy in isolation, the system can remain in an equilibrium which is much worse for every individual, unless they manage to coordinate a simultaneous change to their strategies.
Crucially, nothing says that finding yourself in a bad Nash equilibrium[3] implies that there are no superior Nash equilibria above that level. It’s not about choosing “equilibrium” vs “fairy-tale story”—it’s about “bad equilibrium” vs “better equilibrium”.
And it’s feasible to get to a better equilibrium. Especially if you just need to pass the tipping point once, and you get to retry as many times as it takes. In such a scenario, it would be a tragedy to myopically preserve the Nash you’ve got.
A subset of which can be called “inadequate equilibria”.
Think about it like this: Both sickle-cell anaemia & malaria are bad when considered separately, but they’re also in a frequency-dependent equilibrium because the allele (HbS) that causes anaemia for a minority also confers resistance against malaria for the majority. Thus, a “second-best theory” would be to say that the HbS allele is good because it improves the situation relative to nobody having resistance against malaria at all. While it’s true, it’s also myopic.
When we cure malaria, there will no longer be any selection-pressure for HbS, so we cure sickle-cell disease as well.
To unpack the metaphor: I think many traditional & strict norms (HbS) around sex & relationships can be net good on the margin, but only because they enforce rigid rules in an area where humans haven’t learned to deal with the complexities (malaria) in a healthy manner. “Sexual liberalism” encompasses imo an attempt to deal with them directly and eventually learn better norms that are more likely to work long-term.