It implies that Will and Toby believe that preventing the creation of a happy person is as bad as killing them. I think thatâs pretty unlikely, because most people who value future lives think murdering an existing person is a lot worse than not creating a life.
I donât think my statement that Will and Toby âplace moral weightâ on the non-person-affecting view implies that they accept all of its conclusions. The statement I made is corroborated by Will and Tobyâs own words.
Toby, in collaboration with Hilary Greaves, argues that moral uncertainty âsystematically pushes one towards choosing the option preferred by the Total and Critical Level viewsâ as a populationâs size increases.[1] If Toby accepts his own argument, this means Toby places moral weight on total utilitarianism, which implies the non-person-affecting view.
Will spends most of Chapter 8 What We Owe The Future arguing that âall proposed defences of the intuition of neutrality [i.e. person-affecting view] suffer from devastating objectionsâ.[2] Will states that âthe view that I incline towardsâ is to âaccept the Repugnant Conclusionâ.[3] The most parsimonious view which accepts the Repugnant Conclusion is total utilitarianism, so itâs unsurprising Will endorses Hilary and Tobyâs placing of moral weight on total utilitarianism to âend up with a low but positive critical levelâ.[4]
I donât think Will and Toby believe that preventing the creation of a happy person is as bad as killing them. (Although I do personally think thatâs the logical conclusion of their arguments.) The statement I actually made, that Will and Toby âplace moral weightâ on that view, seems consistent with their writings and worldviews.
It implies that Will and Toby believe that preventing the creation of a happy person is as bad as killing them. I think thatâs pretty unlikely, because most people who value future lives think murdering an existing person is a lot worse than not creating a life.
Thanks for the clarification!
I donât think my statement that Will and Toby âplace moral weightâ on the non-person-affecting view implies that they accept all of its conclusions. The statement I made is corroborated by Will and Tobyâs own words.
Toby, in collaboration with Hilary Greaves, argues that moral uncertainty âsystematically pushes one towards choosing the option preferred by the Total and Critical Level viewsâ as a populationâs size increases.[1] If Toby accepts his own argument, this means Toby places moral weight on total utilitarianism, which implies the non-person-affecting view.
Will spends most of Chapter 8 What We Owe The Future arguing that âall proposed defences of the intuition of neutrality [i.e. person-affecting view] suffer from devastating objectionsâ.[2] Will states that âthe view that I incline towardsâ is to âaccept the Repugnant Conclusionâ.[3] The most parsimonious view which accepts the Repugnant Conclusion is total utilitarianism, so itâs unsurprising Will endorses Hilary and Tobyâs placing of moral weight on total utilitarianism to âend up with a low but positive critical levelâ.[4]
I donât think Will and Toby believe that preventing the creation of a happy person is as bad as killing them. (Although I do personally think thatâs the logical conclusion of their arguments.) The statement I actually made, that Will and Toby âplace moral weightâ on that view, seems consistent with their writings and worldviews.
Greaves, Hilary; Ord, Toby, âMoral uncertainty about population ethicsâ, Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, https://ââphilpapers.org/âârec/ââGREMUA-2
MacAskill, W. (2022). What We Owe the Future (p. 250). Basic Books. p. 234
Ibid. p. 245
Ibid. p. 250