I’m not sure that the question about the worst suffering alone is adequate to establish a welfare range or justifies the headline claim (which adds valence symmetry, scale linearity and the assumption that the human and broiler chicken are being rated on the same scale, rather than an entirely separate ‘most possible happiness for a chicken’ scale. I think it’s likely that a major factor behind animal welfare enthusiasts rating the suffering of farmed animals lower than people uninterested in animal welfare is the animal welfare enthusiasts are much more likely to consider the happiness ranges similar or equivalent to human ones...). If you’d asked about the other end of the welfare range—the happiest humans/birds/shrimp/flies in existence—I don’t think you’d have got the same confidence weighted median responses either.
Once you dispense with assumptions participants apparently weren’t asked to make, survey responses are broadly consistent with the view that “torturing animals is bad because they can experience a lot of pain” and “battery chickens’ lives are pretty uncomfortable compared with free range chickens but really not that bad or at all comparable to the lives of humans who eat them” which seems more representative of what the average member of the public thinks than human-chicken equivalence, especially given the revealed preference of most Belgians for eating poultry.
Good criticism, David. Although not entirely clear to me yet, especially the part in brackets. I’d say if we give up the assumptions of valence symmetry and scale linearity, matters are even worse for the chickens, because I expect most people to have a more negative skewed welfare scale (i.e. the negative side of the scale having a wider range than the positive side). If negative experiences can be 10 times as intense as positive experiences, a −3 welfare of a chicken would actually be a −30, i.e. 10 times larger in magnitude than a +3 welfare of a human. Also the answer options of the animal welfare range are skewed in favor of animals having a welfare range lower than 1. Hence, many aspects of the survey indicate that the suffering of broiler chickens is underestimated.
I don’t think the revealed preferences of consumers are good indicators of people’s estimates of the welfare levels of farmed animals, because of many reasons
Cognitive dissonance: see the meat paradox and the mind denial bias of meat eaters. Consumers simply don’t think and don’t want to think about the suffering of the animals they eat. Also, almost 10% of respondents say the survey makes them want to eat less meat. This is in line with personal experience I have with conversations with people on the streets. Just asking them whether they believe a chicken has a positive or negative welfare makes them more inclined to say they want to reduce their meat consumption.
The revealed preference is not only dependent on the estimated welfare level of an animal, but also on the moral weight one gives to animal welfare and other things unrelated to animal welfare. Perhaps a person beliefs that farmed animals suffer a lot, but doesn’t consider animal suffering as important when it comes to food choices. Or the person believes that eating meat is necessary and one is allowed to eat meat at all cost, no matter how high the animal suffering is (comparable to the belief that Israel has an absolute right to self-defense and is allowed to defend itself against Hamas terrorism by attacking Gaza, no matter how high the cost to Palestinians).
Thanks for sharing this.
I’m not sure that the question about the worst suffering alone is adequate to establish a welfare range or justifies the headline claim (which adds valence symmetry, scale linearity and the assumption that the human and broiler chicken are being rated on the same scale, rather than an entirely separate ‘most possible happiness for a chicken’ scale. I think it’s likely that a major factor behind animal welfare enthusiasts rating the suffering of farmed animals lower than people uninterested in animal welfare is the animal welfare enthusiasts are much more likely to consider the happiness ranges similar or equivalent to human ones...). If you’d asked about the other end of the welfare range—the happiest humans/birds/shrimp/flies in existence—I don’t think you’d have got the same confidence weighted median responses either.
Once you dispense with assumptions participants apparently weren’t asked to make, survey responses are broadly consistent with the view that “torturing animals is bad because they can experience a lot of pain” and “battery chickens’ lives are pretty uncomfortable compared with free range chickens but really not that bad or at all comparable to the lives of humans who eat them” which seems more representative of what the average member of the public thinks than human-chicken equivalence, especially given the revealed preference of most Belgians for eating poultry.
Good criticism, David. Although not entirely clear to me yet, especially the part in brackets. I’d say if we give up the assumptions of valence symmetry and scale linearity, matters are even worse for the chickens, because I expect most people to have a more negative skewed welfare scale (i.e. the negative side of the scale having a wider range than the positive side). If negative experiences can be 10 times as intense as positive experiences, a −3 welfare of a chicken would actually be a −30, i.e. 10 times larger in magnitude than a +3 welfare of a human. Also the answer options of the animal welfare range are skewed in favor of animals having a welfare range lower than 1. Hence, many aspects of the survey indicate that the suffering of broiler chickens is underestimated.
I don’t think the revealed preferences of consumers are good indicators of people’s estimates of the welfare levels of farmed animals, because of many reasons
Cognitive dissonance: see the meat paradox and the mind denial bias of meat eaters. Consumers simply don’t think and don’t want to think about the suffering of the animals they eat. Also, almost 10% of respondents say the survey makes them want to eat less meat. This is in line with personal experience I have with conversations with people on the streets. Just asking them whether they believe a chicken has a positive or negative welfare makes them more inclined to say they want to reduce their meat consumption.
The revealed preference is not only dependent on the estimated welfare level of an animal, but also on the moral weight one gives to animal welfare and other things unrelated to animal welfare. Perhaps a person beliefs that farmed animals suffer a lot, but doesn’t consider animal suffering as important when it comes to food choices. Or the person believes that eating meat is necessary and one is allowed to eat meat at all cost, no matter how high the animal suffering is (comparable to the belief that Israel has an absolute right to self-defense and is allowed to defend itself against Hamas terrorism by attacking Gaza, no matter how high the cost to Palestinians).